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Renewed interest in developing computing systems that meet additional non-functional
requirements such as reliability, high availability and ease-of-management/self-management
(serviceability) has fueled research into developing systems that exhibit enhanced reliability,
availability and serviceability (RAS) capabilities. This research focus on enhancing the RAS
capabilities of computing systems impacts not only the legacy/existing systems we have
today, but also has implications for the design and development of next generation (self-
managing/self-*) systems, which are expected to meet these non-functional requirements
with minimal human intervention.
To reason about the RAS capabilities of the systems of today or the self-* systems of
tomorrow, there are three evaluation-related challenges to address. First, developing (or
identifying) practical fault-injection tools that can be used to study the failure behavior of
computing systems and exercise any (remediation) mechanisms the system has available
for mitigating or resolving problems. Second, identifying techniques that can be used to
quantify RAS deficiencies in computing systems and reason about the efficacy of individual
or combined RAS-enhancing mechanisms (at design-time or after system deployment).
Third, developing an evaluation methodology that can be used to objectively compare
systems based on the (expected or actual) benefits of RAS-enhancing mechanisms.
This thesis addresses these three challenges by introducing the 7U Evaluation Methodology,
a complementary approach to traditional performance-centric evaluations that identifies crite-
ria for comparing and analyzing existing (or yet-to-be-added) RAS-enhancing mechanisms,
is able to evaluate and reason about combinations of mechanisms, exposes under-performing
mechanisms and highlights the lack of mechanisms in a rigorous, objective and quantitative
manner.
The development of the 7U Evaluation Methodology is based on the following three hy-
potheses. First, that runtime adaptation provides a platform for implementing efficient and
flexible fault-injection tools capable of in-situ and in-vivo interactions with computing sys-
tems. Second, that mathematical models such as Markov chains, Markov reward networks
and Control theory models can successfully be used to create simple, reusable templates
for describing specific failure scenarios and scoring the system’s responses, i.e., studying
the failure-behavior of systems, and the various facets of its remediation mechanisms and
their impact on system operation. Third, that combining practical fault-injection tools with
mathematical modeling techniques based on Markov Chains, Markov Reward Networks
and Control Theory can be used to develop a benchmarking methodology for evaluating and
comparing the reliability, availability and serviceability (RAS) characteristics of computing
systems.
This thesis demonstrates how the 7U Evaluation Method can be used to evaluate the RAS
capabilities of real-world computing systems and in so doing makes three contributions.
First, a suite of runtime fault-injection tools (Kheiron tools) able to work in a variety
of execution environments is developed. Second, analytical tools that can be used to
construct mathematical models (RAS models) to evaluate and quantify RAS capabilities
using appropriate metrics are discussed. Finally, the results and insights gained from
conducting fault-injection experiments on real-world systems and modeling the system
responses (or lack thereof) using RASmodels are presented. In conducting 7U Evaluations of
real-world systems, this thesis highlights the similarities and differences between traditional
performance-oriented evaluations and RAS-oriented evaluations and outlines a general
framework for conducting RAS evaluations.
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Measuring a system’s performance is the most well-understood approach to evaluating
and comparing computing systems. Researchers routinely use traditional performance
benchmarks produced by organizations including the National Institute of Science and
Technology (NIST) [140], the Standard Performance Evaluation Corporation (SPEC R©)
[177] and the Transaction Processing and Performance Council (TPC) [190], to demonstrate
the feasibility of some experimental system prototype. However, there are a number of other
demands placed on computing systems besides being fast.
Recent renewed interest, [40, 79, 100, 102, 113], in realizing computing systems that meet
additional non-functional requirements such as reliability, high availability and ease-of-
management/self-management (also referred to as serviceability) has fueled research efforts
into enhancing the reliability, availability and serviceability (RAS) capabilities of exist-
ing/legacy systems as well as next-generation self-managing, self-configuring, self-healing,
self-optimizing and self-protecting systems (collectively referred to as self-* systems).
A common desired characteristic of these systems is that they collect, analyze and act on
information about their own operation and changes to their environment while meeting
their functional requirements. Whereas instrumenting systems, collecting, analyzing and
1
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acting on behavioral and environmental data potentially impact the performance of a system
by diverting processing cycles away from meeting functional requirements, these diverted
cycles are used by mechanisms concerned with improving the RAS capabilities of the system
by effecting a feedback/monitoring loop around it.
To reason about tradeoffs between RAS-enhancing mechanisms or to evaluate these mech-
anisms and their impact we need something other than performance metrics. Whereas
performance metrics are suitable for studying the feasibility of having RAS-enhancing
mechanisms activated, i.e., to demonstrate that the system provides “acceptable” perfor-
mance with these mechanisms enabled, the resulting performance numbers convey little
about the efficacy of the mechanisms.
Performance measures do not allow us to analyze the expected or actual impact (beyond
system overheads) of individual or combined mechanisms on the system’s operation. They
are inadequate for comparing the efficacy of individual or combined RAS-enhancing mecha-
nisms, discussing tradeoffs between mechanisms, evaluating different styles of mechanisms
(reactive vs. preventative vs. proactive) or reasoning about the composition of multiple
mechanisms. In essence, performance metrics limit the scope and depth of analysis that
can be performed on systems possessing (or considering the inclusion of) RAS-enhancing
mechanisms.
Reasoning about the RAS capabilities of the systems of today or the self-* systems of
tomorrow also involves addressing three evaluation-related challenges. First, developing (or
identifying) practical fault-injection tools that can be used to study the failure behavior of
computing systems and exercise any (remediation) mechanisms the system has available
for mitigating or resolving problems. Second, identifying techniques that can be used to
quantify RAS deficiencies in computing systems and reason about the efficacy of individual
or combined RAS-enhancing mechanisms (at design-time or after system deployment).
Third, developing an evaluation methodology that can be used to objectively compare
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systems based on the (expected or actual) benefits of RAS-enhancing mechanisms.
This thesis addresses these three challenges by introducing the 7U Evaluation Methodology,
a complementary approach to traditional performance-centric evaluations that identifies crite-
ria for comparing and analyzing existing (or yet-to-be-added) RAS-enhancing mechanisms,
is able to evaluate and reason about combinations of mechanisms, exposes under-performing
mechanisms and highlights the lack of mechanisms in a rigorous, objective and quantitative
manner.
Under the 7U approach, non-functional requirements concerned with reliability, high avail-
ability, and serviceability represent additional high-level goals the system is expected to
meet. In this thesis, we demonstrate how these goals can be codified as augmentations
or additions to the existing policies, service level agreements (SLAs) and service level
objectives (SLOs) that govern the system’s operation. In developing our methodology we
demonstrate techniques that can be used to identify and quantify these goals as well as
measure whether they are being met or exceeded.
1.1 Definitions
This section formalizes some of the terms used throughout this thesis.
• An error is the deviation of system external state from correct service state [107].
Approaches to defining and detecting such deviations include, but are not limited
to: monitoring violations of service level agreements (SLAs), quantifying system
degradation, self-checking software approaches [157], the use of functional redun-
dancy, e.g., Recovery Blocks [152] or computational redundancy, e.g., N-Version
programming [7].
• A fault is the adjudged or hypothesized cause of an error [107].
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• The fault hypothesis/fault model is the set of faults a system is expected to be able
to respond to with a reactive, proactive or preventative action [102]. This fault-model
may include all plausible faults that can affect the system, regardless of whether an
explicit remediation/system-response is available.
• Remediation is the process of trying to correct a fault. In this thesis, remediation
spans the activities of detection, diagnosis and repair since the first step in responding
to a fault is detection [102].
• A failure is an event that occurs when the delivered service violates an environmen-
tal/contextual constraint, e.g., a policy or SLA. This definition allows us to consider
multiple perspectives when discussing failures including, but not limited to, that of
the end-user [16] or system operator/administrator.
• Reliability is a function of the number (or frequency) of end-user interruptions1.
• Availability is a function of the rate of failure/maintenance events and the speed of
recovery [89].
• Serviceability is a function of the frequency and success of servicing and/or adminis-
trative activities addressing failures.
1.2 Problem statement
Performance metrics and performance-oriented benchmarks are not the most effective way
to evaluate systems given the extra-functional demands concerning reliability, availability
and serviceability placed on them. What is required is an evaluation methodology that
allows us to go beyond drawing conclusions about the feasibility of using a system with its
RAS-enhancing mechanisms enabled and instead directly addresses the issue of quantifying
1Reliability may be interpreted as the inverse of the frequency of end-user interruptions.
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the expected or actual benefits of these RAS-enhancing mechanisms.
1.3 Requirements
There are a number of elements needed to effectively solve the problem:
1. Fault-injection techniques that facilitate “in-situ” and “in-vivo” interactions with
computing systems. “In-situ” interactions (in principle2) allow us to study the failure-
behavior of a computing system in its deployed environment while “in-vivo” interac-
tions allow us to inject faults into running systems. Both techniques offer advantages
for studying the failure-behavior of computing systems.
Studying the failure-behavior of computing systems is a non-trivial task. Reproduc-
ing or replicating problems in computing systems may require interacting with the
system in its production/deployed environment rather than in a replicated staging
area/cleanroom since faults may manifest themselves due to unanticipated interactions
between the system of interest and elements (e.g., other software systems) in its envi-
ronment. Further, depending on the scale and/or complexity of the system, replicating
the deployment environment can be a difficult task. Fault-injection tools that can be
used “in-situ” would allow us to study the system directly in its current deployment,
thereby removing the need for replicating the entire production environment.
“In-vivo” interactions with computing systems allow us to perform operations on
them while they execute. The ability to interact with computing systems in execu-
tion gives us a flexible tool that can be used to collect detailed information directly
from the internals of a system and make fine-grained modifications to the system
2Prudence and/or organizational policies may limit or restrict conducting fault-injection experiments on
systems being used by other members of the organization/business. Organizational restrictions on interacting
with “live” production systems do not preclude us from using system mirroring and traffic/request replay
techniques to create an environment suitable for in-situ studies.
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from the inside [64]. A few examples of “in-vivo” interactions include, but are
not limited to: dynamically connecting to/disconnecting from running systems, in-
serting/modifying/removing instrumentation from running systems and performing
fine-grained adaptations in running systems [63], e.g., inducing failures.
An additional benefit of “in-situ” and “in-vivo” interactions is that neither requires
that source code be available. The ability to interact with computing systems without
requiring access to source code has implications for working with legacy and contem-
porary software systems where source code may not be readily accessible. Whereas
we desire tools that can work without requiring access to the source code, access to
the source code, however, may enhance our understanding of how the system operates
and provide insights into how to perform “safe” adaptations of running systems, see
§3.7.8 for an example and §3.10 for more discussion.
Fault-injection techniques that leverage these in-situ and in-vivo interaction capabili-
ties can be used to build tools that can target specific components or subsystems in
computing systems, inject faults into them while the system is running and collect
data on the system’s responses.
2. Fault-injection tools that exercise the RASmechanisms available by inducing/injecting
reasonable (or representative) faults for the system to be evaluated. Whereas there is
no shortage of fault-injection tools – example tools include: [77, 112, 68, 99, 95, 70,
165, 116, 172, 123] – the utility of using a specific fault-injection tool in conducting a
RAS evaluation depends on the fault-model under consideration and the granularity
of the faults that can be injected using the tool. The granularity of the faults in the
fault-model must match the granularity of the faults injected by the tool and the
semantics of the target system’s operation.
Possible mismatches between the granularity of the faults in the fault-model and
the faults that can be injected by the fault-injection tools available prevent us from
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appropriately exercising (and studying) the existing RAS-enhancing mechanisms.
Further, we may not be able to adequately identify all the RAS deficiencies under the
fault-model being considered using these tools since these tools may not trigger/induce
the failures that we wish to study. For example, whereas tools like FIST [68] and
MARS [99] induce bit flips in chips (e.g. processor or memory) by exposing them to
heavy-ion radiation it is not clear whether the bit-flips caused would have a specific
(targeted) effect on a given workload such that perturbations to the workload could be
detected and compensated for by some RAS mechanism.
When conducting a RAS evaluation of a computing system, the evaluation-process
is guided by the fault-model/fault-hypothesis, which codifies the reasonable and/or
representative faults of interest. Each fault in the fault-model is associated with
an existing (or yet-to-be-added) RAS-enhancing mechanism; as a result, each fault
injected by a fault-injection tool should either exercise an existing RAS-enhancing
mechanisms or cause a system-response that highlights a RAS deficiency (under the
current fault-model) that could be addressed by a yet-to-be-added mechanism.
3. Analysis techniques that can be used to quantify (at design-time and post-deployment
time) the impact of the faults under consideration as well as the actual or expected
impact/benefit of RAS-enhancing mechanisms. The analytical techniques we employ
should allow us to identify RAS deficiencies or under-performing RAS mechanisms.
Further, they should facilitate the study of individual or combined mechanisms as
well as accommodate the analysis of different styles of mechanisms (e.g., reactive,
proactive and preventative).
To evaluate and compare the RAS capabilities of computing systems we need to
be able to quantify the impact of faults in terms of reliability, availability and/or
serviceability metrics. Quantifying fault-impacts in terms of RAS metrics involves
identifying and measuring the facets of reliability, availability and serviceability that
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vary when faults occur.
Fortunately, there are many facets of reliability, availability and serviceability that
can be used, and have been used in the past, to quantify fault-impacts including, but
not limited to: frequency of service interruptions or outages, yearly downtime and
its associated “costs” (time and money spent on restoring complete or partial service,
time and money lost due to system unavailability, end-user downtime, etc.), meantime
to system breakdown, the number of servicing visits, the frequency of servicing visits,
the ability to meet SLA targets, the ability to meet production targets, the ability to
avoid or mitigate production slowdowns and system stability.
Further, there are a number of analytical tools/approaches, which have been used in
other engineering disciplines, that we can use to inform our analyses. Probability
Theory, Queuing Theory, Stochastic Petri Nets, Markov Chains and Markov Reward
Networks have been used in Computer Engineering and Computer Science to study the
Reliability and Availability properties of specific hardware and/or software systems
[101, 69]. Techniques from Control Theory – used to study the behavior of dynamic
systems – have found applications in Mechanical Engineering and more recently
Computer Science [90] where the regulation of one or more system objectives is
required.
4. An Evaluation Methodology that allows us to analyze the details of RAS-enhancing
mechanisms (the micro-view) in the context of the high-level goals governing the
system’s operation (the macro-view).
Establishing a link between the details of the mechanisms and their expected or actual
impact on high-level goals allows us to reason about the benefits of existing RAS
mechanisms or the necessity of additional mechanisms. Further, it informs discussions
about the suitability of system objectives concerned with (or affected by) reliability,
availability and serviceability issues.
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1.4 Hypotheses
This thesis investigates three hypotheses for enabling the RAS evaluation of software
systems:
1. Runtime adaptation provides a platform for implementing efficient and flexible fault-
injection tools capable of “in-situ” and “in-vivo” interactions with computing systems.
2. Mathematical models such as Markov chains, Markov reward networks and Control
theory models can successfully be used to create simple, reusable templates for
describing specific failure scenarios and scoring the system’s responses, i.e., studying
the failure-behavior of systems, and the various facets of its remediation mechanisms
and their (actual or expected) impact on system operation.
3. RAS models and experiments using flexible fault-injection tools can be used together
to develop a RAS benchmarking methodology for computing systems. This combina-
tion provides practical advantages over existing purely model-based (e.g. [97, 182]),
purely measurement-based (e.g. [37, 191, 17]) or simulation-based evaluation ap-
proaches (e.g. [50, 187]).
1.5 Thesis outline
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows:
• Chapter 2 describes the origins of this thesis, the motivations behind it and briefly
summarizes its contributions.
• Chapter 3 presents techniques for enabling a range of runtime adaptations in software
applications running in a variety of managed and unmanaged execution environments.
The latter part of this chapter presents and evaluates Kheiron, a suite of runtime
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adaptation tools for .NET, Java and compiled-C applications.
• Chapter 4 identifies analytical tools used to evaluate facets of reliability, availability
and serviceability.
• Chapter 5 outlines the considerations of traditional and non-traditional benchmarks
for software systems, develops the ideas leading to a discussion of the 7U-Evaluation
Methodology and compares the 7U to other evaluation approaches. The latter part of
the chapter describes experiments and presents results from conducting 7U-evaluations
on a number of target systems.
• Chapter 6 summarizes the contributions of the thesis, presents its conclusions and
discusses the possibilities for future work.
Chapter 2
Motivation
The research leading to the development of a Reliability, Availability and Serviceability
(RAS) evaluation methodology had its origins in work on on-the-fly system reconfiguration
and retro-fitting self-management (specifically monitoring, pattern/event analysis, repair and
reconfiguration) capabilities onto existing systems, conducted under the DARPA Dynamic
Assembly for Systems, Adaptability, Dependability and Assurance (DASADA) program
[40].
2.1 DASADA Overview
The DASADA program was concerned with tackling the problem of system complexity
and manageability through the identification of technologies that would allow systems to
gauge their own health and rapidly integrate new heterogeneous, common-off-the shelf
(COTS) components or reconfigure existing components while in operation – Continual
Validation and Co-ordination. The focus of the program was on systems-of-systems and
the technologies developed were expected to deal with heterogeneous systems/components
and internet-scale systems [41]. A reference architecture for the realization of the DASADA
11
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project is shown in Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1: DASADA system architecture [41]
At a high-level, technologies devised to meet the requirements of DASADA revolved around
the concepts of events, probes, gauges, models, controllers and effectors.
Events are the units of information communication and represent system activities of vary-
ing granularities, from low-level resource readings to high-level component or system
interactions. Probes collect primitive data from the target system and send this information
to gauges in the form of events. Gauges aggregate, filter and interpret probe data based on
information contained in models of the system under consideration. Models codify proper-
ties of the target system. These properties may include, but are not limited to, structural,
behavioral and domain considerations. Controllers use gauge-output and system models to
decide which reconfigurations/adaptations need to be performed. Effectors/actuators are
responsible for carrying out adaptations on the target system and its components.
One of the consortiums 1 of researchers collaborating under DASADA produced technologies
used in Kinesthetics eXtreme (KX pronounced “kicks”) our implementation of the DASADA
1This consortium included: Teknowledge, BBN, CMU, WPI, OBJS, UMass and Columbia University.
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reference architecture [93].
Figure 2.2: Kinesthetics eXtreme (KX) system architecture [88]
2.2 Kinesthetics eXtreme (KX)
KX is a platform for retro-fitting self-managing (i.e., monitoring, reconfiguration or re-
pair) capabilities onto systems. It provides a framework for collecting and interpreting
application-specific behavioral and performance data at runtime from a variety of systems
and components. In its deployment, KX monitors, analyzes, reconfigures and/or repairs
applications guided by models of application-level semantics, protocols and performance
requirements [93]. These models express expected correct behaviors of the system and may
be used to anticipate and address error situations. KX also includes a software feedback-
control loop that plans, coordinates and automatically handles contingencies arising from
reconfiguration or repair activities.
KX is an example of a generic, externalized adaptation platform (see Figure 2.2). It
provides a general platform for monitoring and reconfiguring software systems. In order to
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manage/interact with a variety of target systems, KX does not formally mandate specific
probe, gauge, modeling, controller or effector technologies, rather it is able to loosely couple
disparate implementations via semi-structured event formats and a content-based-routing,
publish-subscribe communications substrate, such as Siena [26] 2, Elvin [167] 3 or Gryphon
[12] 4, which facilitates the routing of probe data to interested gauges and controllers 5.
An important goal for KX is to be able to monitor and adapt existing/legacy systems 6. How-
ever, there is a major practical issue that needs to be addressed. Whereas gauges, controllers
and models can be generic, and possibly reusable across different target systems, probes
and effectors may be more tightly coupled to the target system, its components/sub-systems
and/or its environment. As a result, the degree to which KX can remain completely exter-
nalized (separate) from the system being managed (monitored and/or adapted at runtime)
depends heavily on the probe and effector technologies it employs.
2.2.1 Probing Technologies used in KX
In the past, KX has employed a number of different probing solutions developed by others,
each with their relative strengths and weaknesses:
• AIDE, the Active Interface Development Environment [74], developed by Worcester
Polytechnic Institute (WPI), was created to enable the use of Active Interfaces [73]
to adapt Java classes. Components built with active interfaces support two separate
interfaces – one interface representing its functionality and the other representing
adaptation facilities. Application builders can use the adaptation interface to associate
2Siena was developed at the University of Colorado at Boulder.
3Elvin was developed at the University of Queensland, Australia.
4Gryphon was developed at IBM Research.
5Early versions of KX have used both Siena and Elvin for communications.
6The term legacy here considers a) systems where the source code may not be available or easily accessible
and b) systems that were not constructed with all/any of the self-management capabilities that could be
beneficial
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callbacks with the before and/or after invocation phases of a component’s methods7.
The AIDE compiler takes the source code of a Java class and inserts hooks before and
after each phase of a method [58]. As implied from the description, AIDE is limited
to the insertion of probes in Java applications. Further, probe-insertion requires access
to the source-code of the target system.
• ProbeMeister, developed by Object Services and Consulting Inc. (OBJs), used an
early implementation of the Java Debug Interface (JDI) – released as part of Sun
Microsystems’ JDK 1.4 [131] – to deploy probes into (local or) remotely running
Java software [146]. The JDI is part of the Java Platform Debugger Architecture
(JPDA) [130], and it (the JDI) defines a high-level Java Language interface which tool
developers can use to write remote debugger applications. ProbeMeister instruments
Java bytecode and uses the HotSwap Class File Replacement feature available in the
v1.4.x Java Virtual Machine (JVM) [131] to dynamically replace an existing class
with an instrumented one. Whereas ProbeMeister does not need access to the source
code of the application being modified, the JVM where it is hosted needs to run
with debugging services enabled. For example, to invoke methods on remote objects,
ProbeMeister needs to cause a breakpoint in the remote application. However, running
a Java application under a debugger can impose a non-negligible performance penalty.
• Mediating Connectors, developed by Teknowledge, is a technology for mediating
all shared library calls [11] using wrappers and as a result operate in the environment
surrounding a target application – the operating system (specifically the Windows
operating system). Mediators can instrument interfaces, monitor interactions, inte-
grate components together or sandbox potentially harmful or unreliable components.
Whereas Teknowledge’s approach is theoretically applicable to programs running
on other operating systems that package functionality in shared libraries (modulo
7This is similar to the “before-method” and “after-method” advice concepts in Aspect Oriented Program-
ming (AOP) [61].
CHAPTER 2. MOTIVATION 16
idiosyncrasies of executable linking, program startup, library loading and process
creation in Unix-based operating systems and in other members of the Windows
family of operating systems), in practice, an implementation was only provided for
programs running under Windows NT and porting to other operating systems was
considered non-trivial.
2.2.2 Effector Technologies used in KX
KX also experimented with different effector technologies:
• Worklets [193], mobile agent technology, was used as the primary effector technology
in KX. Worklets were originally developed as “...rehostable lightweight mobile agents
for on-the-fly process construction, adaptation and evolution, system reconfiguration,
and knowledge propagation” [92]. They can be transmitted from host to host along a
pre-determined or dynamically determined route based on changes in a host and/or
the host’s environment. In KX, Worklets carry self-contained mobile code (JPython
or Java) that can adapt (reconfigure) local target components based on the state of
the component(s) and the capabilities of the worklet. Worklet interaction with the
target system is mediated by service access modules (SAMs), which translate the
internal configuration capabilities exposed by the host into terminology meaningful
to the worklet. Whereas the movement of Worklets going from one host to another
performing reconfigurations can be used to effect a flexible micro-workflow of co-
ordinated reconfiguration activities, at each hop, the configuration actions that a
Worklet can perform are limited by the configuration “knobs”/capabilities exposed by
the target system or component.
• JMX, Java Management Extensions, provide a standard way of managing and mon-
itoring local and/or remote resources, e.g., applications, devices, services and net-
works [133]. Each resource is instrumented with Java objects called ManagedBeans
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(MBeans). One or more MBean codifies the monitoring and/or management inter-
face exposed by a resource. [193] details a case study involving the combination of
Worklets and JMX to effect the monitoring and reconfiguration of distributed soft-
ware systems. Whereas MBeans can provide a uniform way to monitor and manage
resources, they must either be embedded at the source level (for Java applications
only), or they must interact with Java-based and non-Java-based resources via their
existing/accessible configuration “knobs”.
2.3 Short-term Research Objectives after KX
For a completely externalized approach to the dynamic adaptation of systems, KX relies
on the judicious placement of probes in or around the target system and the exposure of
appropriate configuration “knobs” by the target system for effecting reconfigurations and
adaptations.
Experience with the probe and effector implementations used in the KX case studies [94, 88,
93, 192] during and after DASADA support this assessment of KX and highlight a number of
limitations to retrofitting self-management capabilities (monitoring, reconfiguration and/or
repair) onto existing/legacy systems using an externalized adaptation engine including, but
not limited to:
• The extent to which monitoring, reconfiguration or repair activities could be carried out
on an existing/legacy system was largely determined by the built-in instrumentation,
reconfiguration or repair facilities exposed for external manipulation. For systems
or components lacking these facilities, probes were limited to being placed in the
environs of the target, e.g., monitoring the resource utilization of a process [192] or
monitoring network activity. Similarly, effectors were limited to relatively coarse-
grained reconfiguration or repair activities, e.g., editing a configuration file and/or
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restarting a process [94].
• Limited ability to embed or modify monitoring, configuration or repair mechanisms
in existing/legacy systems without recompiling and/or relinking the target application.
ProbeMeister [146] supports the ability to embed new probes into Java applications
only.
• Limited ability to remove instrumentation from existing/legacy systems without
recompiling and/or relinking the target application.
• Limited ability to effect fine-grained repairs or reconfigurations in target systems, e.g.,
targeted interactions with individual components vs. interactions with the aggregat-
ing/composed application.
To address these limitations we identified four short-term research objectives for improving
the probe and effector technologies used to retrofit self-management capabilities onto
existing/legacy systems:
1. Develop techniques that support the dynamic insertion, modification and/or removal
of monitoring, reconfiguration and/or repair facilities, without requiring recompilation
or relinking of the target system/component - i.e., access to the source code should
not be a requirement.
2. Develop tools and techniques that are able to interact with systems/components written
in multiple programming languages and running on different operating systems.
3. Develop tools and techniques that are transparent to the target systems/components
being adapted.
4. Develop tools and techniques that are able to perform fine-grained dynamic adaptations
in existing/legacy systems.
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2.4 Long-term Research Objectives
Our work towards retro-fitting self-management capabilities onto existing/legacy systems
presented an interesting set of evaluation challenges. Specifically, to evaluate a self-
managing system realized via retro-fitting we must consider:
1. The kinds of self-management capabilities that can be retro-fitted.
2. The approaches and technologies used to retro-fit self-management.
3. The impact of these technologies on specific functional characteristics of the system.
4. The efficacy of the self-management capabilities added to the system, i.e., the impact
of these capabilities on specific non-functional characteristics of the system.
For practical reasons however, these challenges need to be refined. The challenges (as stated
above) are overly broad – with respect to the self-management capabilities to be evaluated
– and overly restrictive with respect to the class of systems considered – self-managing
systems realized via retro-fitting.
2.4.1 Scoping the Self-Management Capabilities to be Evaluated
Under DASADA – DARPA’s initiative to tackle system complexity and manageability
issues – the term self-management was related to the identified principles of Continual
Validation and Co-ordination: system monitoring, modeling, dynamic repair and dynamic
reconfiguration. However, post-DASADA, the notion of self-management took on a broader
context with the advent of Autonomic Computing in 2001 [79].
Autonomic Computing is IBM’s proposal for addressing issues of system automation and
system complexity. [79] identifies eight key elements (properties) of autonomic systems,
which can be used to classify systems into one (or more) of four distinct classes – self-
configuring systems, self-healing systems, self-optimizing systems and self-protecting
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systems 8.
The following definitions for the four classes of self-* systems are adapted from [100]:
• Self-Configuring systems configure themselves automatically in accordance with
high-level policies – representing business-level objectives. When a component is
introduced, it will automatically learn about and take into consideration the composi-
tion and configuration of the system and incorporate itself seamlessly, while the rest
of the system adapts to its presence.
• Self-Healing systems detect, diagnose, and repair localized hardware and software
problems.
• Self-Optimizing systems continually seek ways to improve their operation, identifying
and seizing opportunities to make themselves more efficient in performance or cost.
• Self-Protecting systems will defend the system as a whole against large-scale, corre-
lated problems arising from malicious attacks.
In Autonomic Computing, the goal of self-management “...is to free system administrators
from the details of system operation and maintenance...” [100]. As a result, this contem-
porary definition of self-management encompasses all four aspects of self-configuration,
self-healing, self-optimization and self-protection.
Evaluating self-management capabilities of systems considering all four sub-areas (self-
configuration, self-healing, self-optimization and self-protection) is a non-trivial task. As a
result, the first step in refining the evaluation challenges outlined at the beginning of Section
2.4 is to focus on one of the four sub-areas of self-management.
Our past experience with effecting dynamic reconfigurations and repairs in systems (via
KX) provided a suitable foundation for exploring the area of Self-Healing systems. Further,
our short term research goals (Section 2.3) of developing more flexible, dynamic probe and
8Each system-class maps to a distinct research sub-area in Autonomic Computing.
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effector technologies align nicely with the proposed core sub-areas of self-healing systems
research – problem detection, diagnosis and repair.
2.4.2 Expanding the Classes of Systems to be Evaluated
Whereas focusing on the evaluation of self-managing (later refined to self-healing) systems
realized via retrofit is specific to evaluating systems enhanced by frameworks like KX, this
focus is unnecessarily restrictive for a number of reasons.
First, whether self-healing systems are realized via retrofit or via design, the approaches
and techniques used to evaluate the efficacy of their self-healing capabilities are expected
to be similar (if not identical) while evaluation approaches and tools concerned with the
enabling technologies (runtime retro-fitting tools and technologies vs. design-time tools and
technologies) are expected to differ, resulting in a multi-part evaluation process. Therefore,
the first step in expanding the classes of systems to be evaluated is to consider self-healing
systems regardless of whether they are realized by retrofit or by design.
Second, challenges associated with finding systems, which exhibit all the desired charac-
teristics of self-healing systems, to evaluate or compare against. With a nascent research
area such as autonomic computing, it will take some time for a) fully self-healing systems
to appear, and b) researchers to determine whether any properties of existing systems can
be mapped to the desiderata of self-healing systems [102]. The second step in expanding
the classes of systems to be evaluated is to consider partially self-healing systems and/or
existing systems re-classified as self-healing systems.
Further, an additional implication of a dearth of self-healing systems, is that the classes of
systems to be evaluated may also be expanded to consider non-self-healing systems in order
to facilitate comparisons between a non-self-healing/”vanilla” version of a system, S vanilla,
with its self-healing counterpart, S sel f−healing.
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Whereas expanding the classes of systems to be evaluated to include non-self-healing
systems may at first seem overly permissive, additional motivation for this decision can be
obtained by an examination of the expected benefits of self-healing systems.
Based on desired capabilities of self-healing systems provided in [79] and [100], we can
identify and summarize a number of expected benefits including, but not limited to:
• Improved reliability resulting from the system’s ability to automatically detect, diag-
nose and repair problems.
• High availability from the system’s ability to orchestrate and effect repair activities
online/dynamically – perhaps degrading its operation if necessary.
• Improved manageability/serviceability by shifting responsibility for some of the
management/administration activities (e.g., problem detection, problem determination
and problem resolution) onto the system, thereby reducing the management burden
placed on system administrators.
These expected benefits, however, are not exclusive to self-healing systems alone, rather
they are desirable characteristics for software systems in general. As a result, a Reliability,
Availability and Serviceability evaluation is equally applicable/relevant to self-healing and
non-self-healing systems.
2.5 Revised Research Agenda
The general theme of conducting reliability, availability and serviceability (RAS) evaluations
of systems allows us to align the short term research objectives, concerned with developing
flexible, dynamic probe and effector technologies, and the long-term research objectives
concerned with assessing the impact and efficacy of any self-healing mechanisms a system
may possess or be retro-fitted with.
CHAPTER 2. MOTIVATION 23
Probes and effectors allow us to obtain information on the system’s execution and initiate
changes to the system’s components and/or configuration respectively. Embedding probes
dynamically allows us to provide additional (or modify existing) detection and diagnostic
services, which we expect to impact the system’s reliability and serviceability. Similarly,
the ability to introduce or modify effectors allows us to repair or reconfigure the system as
well as exercise the system’s built-in or retro-fitted self-healing mechanisms via targeted
fault-injection. In the former scenario, we expect dynamic repair or reconfiguration to
impact the system’s reliability, availability and serviceability, whereas in the latter scenario
targeted fault-injection allows us to study the failure behavior of the system and evaluate the
efficacy of any mechanism(s) the system has in place to deal with the faults injected.
To reason about the RAS-properties of systems we need to be able to evaluate target systems
from three broad categories:
1. Category A – Systems without any self-healing/RAS-enhancing mechanisms. Sys-
tems in this category either have no RAS-enhancing mechanisms or have their mech-
anisms turned off. Evaluations of these systems will primarily focus on the failure
behavior of systems and ways to quantify the impact of failures on the system.
2. Category B – Systems with some retro-fitted self-healing/RAS-enhancing mecha-
nisms. Systems in this category include those retro-fitted using externalized adaptation
platforms like KX. Evaluations of these systems must consider the feasibility of the
retro-fitting techniques/technologies as well as the efficacy of the retro-fitted feedback
loop.
3. Category C – Systems with some built-in self-healing/RAS-enhancing mechanisms.
Evaluations of these systems will focus primarily on the efficacy of the built-in
mechanisms; however, discussions of approaches and techniques used to design and
develop these systems may warrant some consideration.
Whereas the development of dynamic probe and effector technologies are necessary to
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realize Category B systems, these technologies can also be used to develop fault-injection
tools for studying the failure behavior of Category A systems and exercising the RAS-
enhancing mechanisms in Category B and C systems. Building fault-injection tools on top
of a dynamic adaptation foundation allows us to use these tools in-vivo (while the system
executes) and in-situ (in the system’s current deployment rather than a staging environment
or “clean-room”) on Category A, B and C systems.
Interest in the RAS-evaluations of Category A, B and C systems guide our revised research
agenda:
• Develop techniques, tools and identify principles for enabling in-vivo and in-situ
retro-fitting/adaptations in systems. This research direction continues the work started
in KX with a focus on supporting fine-grained adaptations of systems/components
written in multiple languages, running on different platforms.
• Develop tools capable of in-vivo and in-situ fault-injection. This research direction
is concerned with designing fault-injection tools and fault-models for target sys-
tems/components, studying the failure behavior of systems and exercising (where
possible) any RAS-enhancing mechanisms available.
• Develop techniques for quantitatively reasoning about the the impact of faults and
the benefits of RAS-enhancements. This research direction is concerned with iden-
tifying design-time and/or post-deployment time analytical techniques and metrics
for quantifying RAS-deficiencies in systems and studying individual or combinations
of existing or proposed RAS-enhancing mechanisms. To increase their applicability,
the analytical techniques should be able to account for and compare mechanisms that
employ different styles of operation (reactive, proactive or preventative) and different
degrees of automation (e.g., to cater for mechanisms that may require some human
intervention).
• Develop an evaluation methodology that allows us to reason about the details of
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RAS-mechanisms or the lack of RAS-mechanisms in the context of the high-level
goals/constraints governing the system’s operation. This research direction is con-
cerned with establishing a framework for comparing systems with and without RAS-
enhancements (i.e., systems in categories A, B and C). The key focus is to identify
ways to relate the details of the RAS-mechanisms a system may have or consider
(accounting for composition, style, automation, etc.) to the high-level constraints gov-
erning the system’s operation including, but not limited to: service level agreements
(SLAs), administrator time/servicing activities, mean time to repair (MTTR) and
cost considerations. In essence, we seek to investigate how RAS-mechanisms could
affect/influence the choice of systems; whether quantitative data on RAS-capabilities
and environmental constraints can be used to determine that one system is “better”
than another; and finally to investigate the relationship between the process of evalu-
ating and comparing RAS-capabilities to the more well understood and established
process of evaluating and comparing performance.
2.6 Summary of Contributions
This thesis presents four contributions:
1. Kheiron, a suite of tools developed to perform runtime adaptations, transparently
and with low overheads, on programs written in different languages running on
different platforms. Three versions of Kheiron exist, each one targeting a specific
platform. Kheiron/CLR manipulates .NET programs running in Microsoft’s Common
Language Runtime (CLR). Kheiron/JVM manipulates Java programs running in Sun
Microsystems’ Java Virtual Machine (JVM). Kheiron/C manipulates compiled-C
programs (ELF binaries) running on Linux. Despite targeting three very different
execution environments all three implementations of Kheiron are built around four
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shared principles that allow us to use the unmodified execution environment as a
common vehicle for manipulating programs in execution. (Chapter 3)
2. Runtime fault-injection tools for applications and operating systems. We build on
Kheiron’s dynamic adaptation capabilities and techniques to develop tools for injecting
targeted faults into components of the popular N-tier web application stack (including
application servers, the web-applications they host and the operating systems they run
on). We use these fault-injection capabilities to develop a fault-model for N-tier web-
application stacks and study the failure-behavior of the targeted systems/components.
(Chapter 3)
3. RAS-models. These are analytical models that can be used at design-time and/or
post-deployment to quantitatively reason about facets of reliability, availability and
serviceability (potentially or actually) affected by failures and/or mitigated by the
existence of reactive, proactive or preventative mechanisms for detection, diagnosis
or repair. RAS-models depend on well known mathematical formalisms for study-
ing system-behavior and system-failures including continuous time Markov chains
(CTMCs), Markov Reward Networks and Control Theory as part of the process of
quantitatively comparing the expected or actual RAS-properties of systems. (Chapter
4)
4. The 7U-EvaluationMethodology. A complementary approach to traditional performance-
centric evaluations of systems that focuses on comparing the RAS-capabilities of
systems. The 7U evaluates the details of RAS-enhancing mechanisms (micro-view)
in the context of the high-level goals governing the system’s operation (macro-view),
e.g., SLAs, administrator time/servicing activities, Mean time to repair (MTTR),
etc. via the combination of fault-injection tools, RAS-models and fault-injection
experiments and model-driven-simulations. The 7U emphasizes the link between the
mechanism-details and their impact on the policies governing the system as a way to
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reason about the overall benefits derived from RAS-mechanisms. Using this link, we
develop a RAS-benchmarking framework that allows us to discuss a number of issues
quantitatively including: whether there are deficiencies that need to be addressed, the
efficacy of current or proposed mechanisms, and the effects on high-level goals when
mechanisms are added, replaced, removed or modified.
Part I
Runtime Adaptation and Fault-Injection
This part describes Kheiron, a suite of tools for effecting adaptations and injecting faults in
programs running in contemporary managed and unmanaged execution environments based
on a shared model of operation.
28
Chapter 3
Runtime Modification of Systems
Runtime adaptation allows us to effect controlled changes in software systems without
having to take them oﬄine. It is a form of system evolution – “...modification of a func-
tion already provided by the system or extension by the introduction of new functions”
[103]. Examples of changes include, but are not limited to: introducing new functional-
ity, modifying existing functionality [166], conducting system upgrades/updates [49] and
performing reconfigurations [144, 104], repairs or fine-grained manipulations of program
elements (data structures, modules, routines, type definitions, classes, objects,components
etc.) [197, 49]. In this thesis we also include runtime fault-injection in this list as a form
of runtime adaptation concerned with adding or evaluating (self-)diagnostic capabilities to
systems.
Runtime adaptation provides two major benefits: support for in-vivo interactions with
systems and support for in-situ interactions with systems. In-vivo interactions allow us
to perform operations on systems while they execute, whereas in-situ interactions allow
us to perform operations on systems where they execute, i.e., in their current deployment
environment, obviating the need for a separate staging area or clean-room environment.
Avoiding the re-creation of the deployment environment has three advantages; 1) system
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engineers and operators can interact with systems that are deployed in environments that
may be infeasible to duplicate due to cost, complexity, etc., 2) engineers and operators
interested in studying the failure behavior of systems may find it more difficult to reproduce
failures in a system re-deployed in a clean room, e.g., if factors in the deployed environment
contribute to the failure events of interest and 3) allows the deployment organization, rather
than the vendors, to manage the assessment process.
We identify four shared requirements for runtime adaptation and runtime fault-injection
tools and techniques:
1. Support for in-vivo and in-situ interactions with systems. The tools and techniques
developed must be able to interact with systems while they execute. Further, they
should be amenable to interacting with systems in their current deployment.
2. The tools and techniques developed should be transparent to the target system. The
target system should not require recompilation or relinking.
3. Support for fine-grained interactions with program elements (e.g., data types, type
definitions, modules, methods).
4. Support for interacting with applications written in multiple languages, running on
different operating system platforms.
In this chapter we develop a generic model for effecting runtime adaptations in systems and
present a suite of runtime adaptation tools (Kheiron) that satisfy the above requirements.
Our model for effecting runtime adaptations identifies the execution environment as the main
enabler of transparent adaptations in existing/legacy software systems and is based on four
key facilities exposed by (or transparently added to) contemporary execution environments:
• Profiling/tracing facilities to understand the operation of the target system
• Program steering facilities to modify or augment the control flow of the target system
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• Meta-data querying facilities to discover structural properties of the system
• Metadata editing facilities to define/modify structural properties of the system in order
to modify the functionality of the target system
We use these four facilities to build and evaluate a suite of runtime adaptation tools for
.NET, Java and compiled C applications: Kheiron/CLR, Kheiron/JVM and Kheiron/C
respectively. We demonstrate Kheiron’s ability to effect a variety of sophisticated fine-
grained adaptations in running applications via three case studies concerned with dynamic
reconfiguration (Kheiron/CLR) §3.7.8, runtime fault-injection (Kheiron/JVM) §3.8.6, and
selective emulation of applications (Kheiron/C) §3.9.4.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: §3.1 introduces common terms
used throughout this chapter. §3.2 provides an overview of runtime adaptation. §3.3
presents the motivations behind runtime adaptation. §3.4 provides some background on
execution environments including their role and general operation. §3.5 describes some of
the challenges involved in facilitating runtime adaptation via the execution environment. §3.6
outlines the hypotheses investigated in this chapter. §3.7 - §3.9 present the implementations
of Kheiron and their evaluation. §3.11 covers related work and §3.12 summarizes the
contributions made in this chapter.
3.1 Definitions
This section formalizes some of the terms used throughout this chapter.
• An existing/legacy system is any system for which the source code may not be avail-
able or for which it is undesirable to engage in substantial re-design and development.
• An execution environment is responsible for the preparation for distinguished entities
– executables – such that they can be run. Preparation in this context involves the
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loading and laying out in memory of an executable. The level of sophistication, in
terms of services provided by the execution environment beyond loading, depends
largely on the type of executable.
• A managed execution environment, e.g., Sun Microsystems’ Java Virtual Machine
(JVM) or Microsoft’s Common Language Runtime (CLR), is responsible not only
for loading and running managed executables, but for providing additional applica-
tion services, including but not limited to: garbage collection, application isolation,
security sandboxing and structured exception handling. These application services
are typically geared towards enhancing the robustness of applications. Managed
execution environments are typically implementations of an abstract machine with its
own “specialized” instruction set and rules about the content/packaging of managed
executables [111, 124].
• A managed executable/application is represented in an abstract intermediate form
expected by the managed execution environment. This abstract intermediate form
consists of metadata and managed code. Metadata describes the structural aspects
of the application, including classes, their members and attributes, and their rela-
tionships with other classes [110]. Managed code represents the functionality of the
application’s methods encoded in an abstract binary form, bytecode, conforming to
the specialized instruction set expected by the managed execution environment.
• An unmanaged execution environment consists of the underlying processor (e.g.,
IA-32/x86) and the operating system (e.g., Linux).
• An unmanaged/native executable also contains metadata, albeit not as rich as its
managed counterparts. Compiled C/C++ programs may contain symbol information;
however, there is neither a guarantee nor requirement that it be present. Further,
unmanaged/native executables contain instructions that can be directly executed on
the underlying processor (hence the use of the term native) whereas the bytecode
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found in managed executables must be interpreted or Just-In-Time (JIT) compiled
into processor instructions by a component of the managed execution environment.
3.2 Overview
The need for software to evolve as its usage and operational goals change has added
the non-functional requirement of adaptation to the list of facilities expected in systems
[104, 144, 143, 75, 166]. Example system-adaptations include, but are not limited to, the
ability to support reconfigurations, repairs, self-diagnostics or user-directed evaluations
driven by fault-injection.
However, not all systems have the built-in facilities to support many of the desired system-
adaptations. System designers have two alternatives when it comes to realizing software
systems capable of adaptation. Adaptation mechanisms can be static, i.e., built into the
system, as is done in the K42 operating system [19], or such functionality can be dynamically
added, i.e., retro-fitted onto them using externalized architectures like KX [94] or Rainbow
[169].
While arguments can be made for either approach, the retrofit approach provides more
flexibility. Static system-adaptations force the system to be taken oﬄine, rebuilt and
restarted/redeployed to add, modify or remove mechanisms whereas dynamic adaptations
allow mechanisms to be added, modified or removed while the system executes. The ability
to keep the system running while adaptations occur make dynamic adaptations preferable to
their static counterparts [170, 102, 162]. Further, “baked-in” adaptation mechanisms restrict
the analysis and reuse of said mechanisms.
With any system there is a spectrum of adaptations that can be performed. Frameworks
like KX perform coarse-grained adaptations, e.g., re-writing configuration files and restart-
ing/terminating operating system processes. However, in this thesis, we focus on fine-grained
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adaptations, those interacting with individual components, sub-systems or methods, e.g.,
augmenting these elements at runtime to support reconfigurations, repairs, self-diagnostics
or user-directed evaluations driven by fault-injection.
In this chapter we describe the technologies underlying Kheiron, a framework for facilitating
adaptations in running programs in a variety of execution environments with low-overhead,
upon which we build the dynamic fault-injection tools used in §3.8.6 and Chapter 5. The
fault-injection tools we build are examples of software-implemented fault-injection tools
[77].
Kheiron supports a variety of application types and execution environments. It manipulates
compiled C-programs running in an unmanaged execution environment as well as programs
running in Microsoft’s Common Language Runtime and Sun Microsystems’ Java Virtual
Machine. We present case-studies and experiments that demonstrate the feasibility of using
Kheiron to support fine-grained runtime system-adaptations. We also describe the concepts
and techniques used to retro-fit adaptations onto existing systems in the various execution
environments.
Managing the performance impact of the mechanisms used to effect fine-grained adaptations
in the running system presents an additional challenge. Since we are interacting with
individual methods or components we must be cognizant of the performance impact of
effecting the adaptations e.g. inserting instrumentation into individual methods may slow
down the system; but being able to selectively add/remove instrumentation allows the
performance impact to be tuned throughout the system’s execution.
This chapter is primarily concerned with addressing the challenges of efficiently retro-
fitting fine-grained adaptation mechanisms onto existing software systems and managing
the performance impacts associated with retro-fitting these adaptation mechanisms. We
leverage the unmodified execution environment to transparently facilitate the adaptations
of existing/legacy systems. We describe three systems we have developed for this purpose.
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Kheiron/CLRmanipulates running .NET applications. Kheiron/JVMmanipulates running
Java applications. Finally, Kheiron/C manipulates running compiled C programs on the
Linux platform.
Our contribution is the ability to transparently retro-fit new functionality onto existing soft-
ware systems. The techniques used to facilitate the retro-fit exhibit negligible performance
overheads on the running systems. Finally, our techniques address effecting adaptations in a
variety of contemporary execution environments. New functionality, packaged in separate
modules, collectively referred to as an adaptation engine, is loaded by Kheiron. At runtime,
Kheiron can seamlessly transfer control over to the adaptation engine, which effects the
desired adaptations in the running application.
3.3 Motivation
The ability to adapt is critical for systems [100]. However, not every system is designed or
constructed with all the adaptation mechanisms it will ever need. As a result, there needs to
some way to enable existing applications to introduce and employ new mechanisms.
There are a number of specific fine-grained adaptations that can be retro-fitted onto existing
systems including: adding fault-injection, problem detection, diagnosis and in some cases
remediation mechanisms.
In this chapter we describe how our Kheiron implementations can be used to facilitate a
number of fine-grained adaptations in running systems via leveraging facilities and properties
of the execution environments hosting these systems. These adaptations include: Inserting
or removing system instrumentation [138] to discover performance bottlenecks in the
application or detect (and where possible repair) data-structure corruption. The ability to
remove instrumentation can decrease the performance impact on the system associated with
collecting information. Periodic refreshing of data-structures, components and subsystems
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done using micro-reboots, which could be performed at a fine granularity, e.g., restarting
individual components or sub-systems, or at a coarse granularity, e.g., restarting entire
processes periodically. Replacing failed, unavailable or suspect components and subsystems
(where possible) [64]. Input filtering/audit to detect misused APIs. Inserting faults or
initiating ghost transactions[157] against select components or subsystems and collecting
the results to obtain more details about a problem or investigate a system response. Selective
emulation of functions – effectively running portions of computation in an emulator, rather
than on the raw hardware to detect errors and prevent them from crashing the application.
3.4 Background on Execution Environments
At a bare minimum, an execution environment is responsible for the preparation of dis-
tinguished entities – executables – such that they can be run. Preparation, in this context,
involves the loading and laying out in memory of an executable. The level of sophistication,
in terms of services provided by the execution environment beyond loading, depends largely
on the type of executable.
We distinguish between two types of executables, managed and unmanaged executables,
each of which require or make use of different services provided by the execution environ-
ment. A managed executable, e.g., a .NET program or Java bytecode program, runs in a
managed execution environment such as Microsoft’s Common Language Runtime (CLR)
or Sun Microsystems’ Java Virtual Machine (JVM), respectively, whereas an unmanaged
executable, e.g., a compiled C program, runs in an unmanaged execution environment, which
consists of the operating system and the underlying processor. Both types of executables
consist of metadata and code. However the main differences are the amount and specificity
of the metadata present and the representation of the instructions to be executed.
Managed executables/applications are represented in an abstract intermediate form expected
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by the managed execution environment. This abstract intermediate form consists of two
main elements, metadata and managed code. Metadata describes the structural aspects of
the application including classes, their members and attributes, and their relationships with
other classes [110]. Managed code represents the functionality of the application’s methods
encoded in an abstract binary format known as bytecode.
The metadata in unmanaged executables is not as rich as the metadata found in managed
executables. Compiled C/C++ programs may contain symbol information; however, there
is neither a guarantee nor requirement that it be present. Finally, unmanaged executables
contain instructions that can be directly executed on the underlying processor unlike the
bytecode found in managed executables, which must be interpreted or Just-In-Time (JIT)
compiled into native processor instructions.
Managed execution environments differ substantially from unmanaged execution environ-
ments1. The major differentiation points are the metadata available in each execution context
and the facilities exposed by the execution environment for tracking program execution,
receiving notifications about important execution events including; thread creation, type
definition loading and garbage collection. In managed execution environments, built-in
facilities also exist for augmenting program entities such as type definitions, method bodies
and inter-module references, whereas in unmanaged execution environments such facilities
are not as well-defined.
3.5 Challenges of Runtime Adaptation via the Execution
Environment
There are a number of properties of execution environments that make them attractive for
effecting adaptations on running systems. They represent the lowest level (short of the
1The JVM and CLR also differ considerably even though they are both managed execution environments.
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hardware)2 at which changes could be made to a running program. Some may expose
(reasonably standardized) facilities (e.g., profiling APIs [126, 134]) that allow the state of
the program to be queried and manipulated. Further, other facilities (e.g., metadata APIs
[125]) may support the discovery, inspection and manipulation of program elements, e.g.,
type definitions and structures. Finally, there may be mechanisms that can be employed to
alter to the execution of the running system.
However, the low-level nature of execution environments also makes effecting adaptations a
risky (and potentially arduous) exercise. Injecting and effecting adaptations must not corrupt
the execution environment nor the system being adapted. The execution environment’s rules
for what constitutes a “valid” program must be respected while guaranteeing consistency-
preserving adaptations in the target software system. Causing a crash in the execution
environment typically has the undesirable side-effect of crashing the target application and
any other applications being hosted.
At the level of the execution environment the programming-model used to specify adap-
tations may be quite different from the one used to implement the original system. For
example, to effect changes via an execution environment, those changes may have to be
specified using assembly instructions (moves and jump statements), or bytecode instructions
where applicable, rather than higher level language constructs. This disconnect may limit
the kinds of adaptations that can be performed and/or impact the mechanisms used to inject
adaptations.
3.6 Hypotheses
The main hypothesis in this chapter is that: Runtime adaptation provides a platform for
implementing efficient and flexible fault-injection tools capable of “in-situ” and “in-
2The un-managed execution environment includes the operating system.
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vivo” interactions with computing systems. In validating this hypothesis we investigate
the following supporting propositions:
1. The execution environment is a feasible target for efficiently and transparently
effecting adaptations in the applications they host. All software systems run in an
execution environment, as a result we can target the execution environment as the
lowest common denominator for adapting live systems.
2. Existing facilities in execution environments can be leveraged to effect runtime
adaptations in software systems. Built-in facilities for profiling, execution control
and any available APIs for metadata querying or manipulation allow for a trans-
parent and sufficiently low-overhead approach to adapting running programs. Two
adaptations of interest for the purposes of this thesis are: the insertion of monitor-
ing/instrumentation, and the insertion of faults/disturbances to measure their effects
on systems with/without appropriate remediation mechanisms.
3. Any guarantees on application integrity/consistency are a function of the exe-
cution environment, the execution environment’s operation and the amount of
knowledge we have about the application’s operation. The ability to perform
adaptations on running systems allows for a great degree of flexibility. On-the-fly
adaptations allow the system to remain available (even if it operates in a degraded
mode) during these changes. However, the greatest challenge is preserving the in-
tegrity/consistency during and after adaptations. We demonstrate how properties of
the execution environment and working knowledge of the target system’s operation
can be combined to guarantee that the application’s integrity is preserved during and
after adaptations.
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3.7 Kheiron/CLR: Runtime Adaptation in the Common
Language Runtime
The Common Language Runtime (CLR) is the runtime environment in which .NET ap-
plications execute. It provides an operating layer between the .NET application and the
underlying operating system [110]. The CLR manages the execution of .NET applications,
taking on the responsibility of providing services such as application isolation, security
sandboxing and garbage collection. Managed .NET applications are called assemblies and
managed executables are called modules. Within the CLR, assemblies execute in application
domains, which are logical constructs used by the runtime to provide isolation from other
managed applications.
.NET applications, as generated by the various compilers that target the CLR, are represented
in an abstract intermediate form. This abstract intermediate representation is comprised of
two main elements, metadata and managed code. Metadata is “...a system of descriptors
of all structural items of the application – classes, their members and attributes, global
items...and their relationships”[110]. Tokens are handles to metadata entries; they can refer
to types, methods, members, etc. Tokens are used instead of pointers so that the abstract
intermediate representation is memory-model independent. Managed code “...represents the
functionality of the application’s methods...encoded in an abstract binary format known as
Microsoft Intermediate Language (MSIL)” [110]. MSIL, also referred to as bytecode, is a
set of abstract instructions targeted at the CLR.
.NET applications written in different languages can interoperate closely, calling each others’
functions and leveraging cross-language inheritance, since they share the same abstract
intermediate representation.
It should be noted that the ability to interoperate relies on programs’ adherence to certain
rules on naming conventions, data types, function types and certain other elements, forming
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a common denominator for different languages [110]. These detailed rules can be found in
the Common Language Specification (CLS) [124].
3.7.1 Common Language Runtime Execution Model
During execution, two major components of the CLR that interact with metadata and
bytecode are the loader and the just-in-time (JIT) compiler. The loader reads the assembly
metadata and creates an in-memory representation and layout of the various classes, members
and methods on demand as each class is referenced. The JIT compiler uses the results of
the loader and compiles the bytecode for each method into native assembly instructions
for the target platform. JIT compilation only occurs the first time the method is called
in the managed application. Compiled methods remain cached in memory; subsequent
method calls jump directly into the native (compiled) version of the method skipping the
JIT compilation step, as shown in Figure 3.1.
Figure 3.1: Overview of the CLR execution cycle
3.7.2 The CLR Profiler and Unmanaged Metadata APIs
The CLR Profiler APIs allow an interested party (a Kheiron/CLR) to collect information
on the execution and memory usage of a running application. There are two interfaces of
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interest, ICorProfilerCallback, which Kheiron/CLR must implement, and ICorProfilerInfo,
which is implemented by the CLR. Implementors of ICorProfilerCallback (also referred
to as the notifications API [126]) can receive notifications about assembly loads and un-
loads, module loads and unloads, class loads and unloads, function entry and exit, and
just-in-time compilations of method bodies. The complete list of notifications can be found
in [126]. The ICorProfilerInfo interface is used by Kheiron/CLR to obtain details about
particular events, e.g., when a module has finished loading, the CLR will call the ICorProfil-
erCallback::ModuleLoadFinished implementation of Kheiron/CLR passing the moduleID.
Kheiron/CLR can then use ICorProfilerInfo::GetModuleInfo to get the module’s name, path
and base load address.
The unmanaged metadata APIs allow users (e.g. Kheiron/CLR) to emit/import data for/from
the CLR. These interfaces are considered low-level interfaces that provide fast access to
metadata [125]. There are two interfaces of interest, IMetaDataEmit and IMetaDataImport.
As the names suggest, the former is used to write metadata and the latter is used to read
metadata. As mentioned earlier in Section 3.7, tokens are abstractions used as handles to the
metadata of module, type, method, members etc. IMetaDataEmit generates new metadata
tokens as metadata is written while IMetaDataImport resolves the details of a supplied
metadata token.
3.7.3 Kheiron/CLR Architecture
Our Kheiron/CLR prototype is implemented as a single dynamic linked library (DLL) that
includes an implementation of ICorProfilerCallback. Figure 3.2 shows the four (4) main
components in our prototype.
• The Execution Monitor receives module load, unload and module attached to as-
sembly events, JIT compilation, events and function entry and exit events from the
CLR.
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• The Metadata Helper wraps the IMetaDataImport interface and is used by the
Execution Monitor to resolve metadata tokens, such as method tokens, to less cryptic
method names and attributes.
• Internal book-keeping structures store the results of metadata resolutions as well
as execution statistics such as method invocation and JIT compilation times.
• The Byte-code and Metadata Transformer wraps the IMetaDataEmit interface
to write new metadata, e.g., adding new methods to a type and adding references
to external assemblies, types and methods. It also generates, inserts and replaces
bytecode in existing methods as directed by the Execution Monitor. Bytecode changes
are committed by forcing the CLR to JIT compile the modified methods again (re-
JIT).
Figure 3.2: Kheiron/CLR prototype architecture diagram
3.7.4 Model of Operation
Kheiron/CLR performs operations on types and methods at various stages in the method
invocation cycle shown in Figure 3.3 to make them capable of interacting with modules
concerned with performing instrumentation, fault-injection, etc..
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Figure 3.3: First method invocation in a managed application
To allow an adaptation engine to interact with a class instance we augment the type definition
such that the necessary “hooks” can be added. Augmenting the type definition is a two-phase
operation. The first phase occurs at module load time, Stage 1 in Figure 3.3.
When the loader loads a module, the bytecode for the method bodies of the module’s
types is laid out in memory. The starting address of the first bytecode instruction in a
method body is referred to as the Relative Virtual Address (RVA) of the method. At the
end of the module load Kheiron/CLR automatically adds (prepares) shadow methods, using
IMetaDataEmit::DefineMethod, for each of the original public and/or private methods of
the type. A shadow method shares all the properties (attributes, signature, implementation
flags and RVA) of the original method except the name. By sharing (borrowing) the RVA of
the original method, the shadow method points at the method body of the original method.
Figure 3.4 shows an example of adding a shadow method, SampleMethod, for an original
method, SampleMethod. Extending the metadata of a type by adding methods must be done
before the type definition is installed in the CLR. Once the type definition is installed its
list of methods and members becomes read only; further requests to define new methods
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or members are silently ignored even though the return value from the API call indicates
success.
Figure 3.4: Preparing a shadow method
The second phase of type augmentation occurs the first time an original method is JIT
compiled, Stage 4 in Figure 3.3. This phase converts the original method into a thin wrapper
that simply calls the shadow method as shown in Figure 3.5. The heart of phase 2 allocates
space for a new method body, uses the Byte-code & Metadata Transformer to generate the
sequence of bytecode instructions to call the shadow, and sets the new RVA for the original
method to point at the new method body.
There are a number of special considerations when creating shadows, especially in the
case of non-void methods. The main issues revolve around ensuring the MaxStack and
LocalVarSigTok properties in the method header of the wrapper are kept consistent with the
newly defined method body with respect to the number of local variables and the maximum
stack space needed to execute the instructions in the method body. Additionally, the new
method body must contain any applicable instructions to push the arguments expected by the
shadow method. Failure to get these details right results in a failed program verification and
a subsequent crash of the CLR. The interested reader is directed to [110] for more details.
Using shadows and wrappers has a number of advantages. Given the structure of the wrapper
method, see Figure 3.6, we can inject repair instructions as prologues and/or epilogues to
shadow method calls.
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Figure 3.5: Creating a shadow method
Figure 3.6: Kheiron/CLR conceptual diagram of a wrapper
Adding a prologue to the wrapper requires that new bytecode instructions prefix the existing
bytecode instructions. The level of difficulty is the same whether we augment the wrapper or
the original method. Adding epilogues, however, presents a few more challenges. Intuitively,
to add an epilogue, we wish to insert new instructions before control leaves a method. In the
simple case, a method has a single return statement and the epilogue can be inserted right
before that point. For methods with multiple return statements and/or exception handling
routines, finding every possible return point can be an arduous task [137]. Further, the
layout and packing of the bytecode for methods that contain exception handling routines is
considered a special case which may be challenging to augment correctly [137].
Using wrappers presents a cleaner approach since we can ignore all of the complexity in the
shadow method. Further, the regular structure and single return statement of the wrapper
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method lends itself easily to adding an epilogue. Exceptions thrown, but not caught inside
the shadow method, will cause the stack to be unwound to the wrapper where the exception
can be caught – if an exception handler was included in the wrapper generation process – or
passed up to the caller as would be the case in the original unmodified application.
3.7.5 Performing an Adaptation
To perform a repair, for example, we augment the wrapper to insert a jump into an adaptation
engine at the control point(s) before and/or after a shadow method call. Effecting the jump
into an adaptation engine is a four-step process.
• Step one extends the metadata of the assembly currently executing in the CLR such
that a reference to the assembly containing the adaptation engine is added using
IMetaDataEmit::DefineAssemblyRef.
• Step two uses IMetaDataEmit::DefineTypeRef to add references to the adaptation
engine type (class).
• Step three adds references to the subset of the adaptation engine’s methods that we
wish to insert calls to, using IMetaDataEmit::DefineMemberRef.
• Step four augments the bytecode and metadata of the wrapper function to insert
bytecode instructions to make calls into the adaptation engine before and/or after the
existing bytecode that calls the shadow method.
Of the above four steps, steps 1 – 3 are relatively easy compared to step 4. The main concern
when performing steps 1 through 3 is to ensure the assembly properties (name, version,
path, culture info, etc.), type properties (type name and assembly reference) and member
properties (method name, type reference, and method signature) are valid. The unmanaged
APIs were designed to be fast and as a result sacrifice extensive semantic error checking
[125]. Further, these APIs are intended to be used by tool developers and compiler writers
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and as a consequence, it is the responsibility of the API user to get the details right as it
relates to generating or editing metadata. Errors in these details can result in failed metadata
verifications, failed assembly resolutions and halting of the CLR.
In step 4, adding a jump into the adaptation engine as a prologue is done by inserting as few
as two (2) MSIL instructions3, see Figure 3.7, before the existing MSIL instructions that
comprise the current method body.
1: ldarg.0 //pass this pointer to the adaptation
engine method
2: call <Metadata token of adaptation engine
method>
Figure 3.7: Jump into adaptation engine
Adding a jump as an epilogue is slightly more complicated, despite the regular structure of
the wrapper method. Class methods that have a return type other than void look like Figure
3.8 after we create a shadow for them.
1: ldarg.0 //push *this* before calling member
method
2: call <Metadata token of shadow method>
3: stdloc.0 //store return value in first local slot
4: ldloc.0 //push the return value on the stack
5: ret //return
Figure 3.8: Before epilogue insertion
To add the epilogue, we need to keep track of where we inserted the last call instruction and
whether it returns a value or not. If it returns a value we insert the instructions shown in
Figure 3.7 between instructions 3 and 4 in Figure 3.8 and re-emit instructions 4 to 6. The
final result is shown in Figure 3.9.
3This assumes that the method being called on the adaptation engine is a static method that takes an object
as its sole argument, e.g., public static void RepairEngine::Repair(Object o). In the case of invoking non-static
methods additional bytecode instructions to load the this pointer of an instance of the class containing the
method to be invoked also need to be inserted
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1: ldarg.0 //push *this* before calling member
method
2: call <Metadata token of shadow method>
3: stdloc.0 //store return value in first local slot
4: ldarg.0 //pass this pointer to the adaptation
engine method
5: call <Metadata token of adaptation engine
method>
6: ldloc.0 //push the return value on the stack
7: ret //return
Figure 3.9: After epilogue insertion
To persist the bytecode changes made to the method bodies of the wrappers, the Execution
Monitor requests the CLR JIT compile the wrapper method again (referred to as a re-JIT).
The actual re-JIT takes place the next time the wrapper method is called. In our Kheiron/CLR
prototype re-JIT requests are submitted in the Function Exit event, Stage 6 in Figure 3.3.
Kheiron/CLR uses the ICorProfilerInfo::SetFunctionReJIT function to persist bytecode
changes but it can also use it to undo the changes we make. We can temporarily disable
shadows, reverting back to shadow prepare phase, Figure 3.4, and we can remove prologues
and/or epilogues by setting the wrapper method RVA to the RVA of a method body without
those prologues and/or epilogues and requesting a re-JIT. This facility allows us to manage
the performance hit we take from making shadowed method calls and we can flexibly attach
or detach the adaptation engine as desired by rewriting the bytecode in the wrapper method,
removing the instrumentation or jumps into the repair engine and requesting a re-JIT of the
modified wrapper.
The ability to perform multiple JIT compilations on demand is a powerful facility, allowing
us to undo or redo any changes we make; however, some additional tweaking (see §3.7.6) is
required to get function re-JITs to work as expected in our prototype.
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3.7.6 Forcing Multiple JIT Compilations (re-JITs)
The CLR includes some infrastructure support for function re-JITs. To enable re-JITs the
CLR the predefined constant COR PRF ENABLE REJIT, found in corprof.h, must be used
when informing the CLR of the kinds of notifications Kheiron/CLR wishes to receive. As
shown in Figure 3.1, the CLR needs a way to determine whether a method body has already
been JIT-compiled. To do this the CLR relies on a tripwire in the form of an indirect method
call to a helper function known as the prestub helper. When a type is loaded, a structure
known as a MethodTable is created for it. The method table will eventually contain pointers
to the native assembly versions of the method bodies. However, initially each slot in the
method table is loaded with a pointer to the prestub helper [181].
Function ID 0x00975338
Calculating the address of the
prestub by hand:
Before JIT Compilation
0x0097532A 00 00 f8 be de 02 04
0x00975331 00 fe e8 18 dc f7 ff
0x00975338 05 00 00 00 98 20 00
0x0097533F c0 05 00 fc e8 08 dc
0x00975346 f7 ff 06 00 00 00 b0
Function ID + Word(Function ID-4)
0x00975338 + 0xfff7dc18 = 008F2F50




by hand to force a re-JIT.
Figure 3.10: Locating the prestub and forcing a re-JIT by hand
The prestub helper does the work of compilation. After compilation the relevant slot in the
MethodTable is updated with a pointer to the compiled version of the method body. Figure
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3.11 illustrates what happens before and after a JIT compilation. Before the JIT compilation,
execution jumps into the prestub helper, instruction e8 near address on X86. After JIT
compilation this is replaced with an absolute jump, instruction e9 address on X86, where
the jump target is the memory location of the compiled method body. The process used to
force reJITs in our framework, is based on refinements and extensions to the process used in
[56]. We calculate the address of the prestub helper in memory, as shown in Figure 3.10.
The prestub address is used to calculate the offset for the near address jump for any function
ID. Restoring the appropriate memory location causes the CLR to jump into the prestub
helper the next time the function is called.
In the CLR v1.0 and v1.1 the changes we make by hand to force a re-JIT can be achieved
using the ICorProfilerInfo::SetFunctionReJIT; however, this API function was inadvertently
included in the CLR v1.x releases and has been subsequently removed from CLR v2.0
[127]. As a result Kheiron/CLR’s ability to make changes and then undo them (via causing a
re-JIT) is currently limited to CLR v1.x. Our by hand approach for causing a re-JIT (Figure
3.10) has not been tested in the CLR v2.0.
3.7.7 Evaluation Part 1: Kheiron/CLR Performance Impact
The first part of the evaluation of our Kheiron/CLR prototype focuses on quantifying the
overheads on program execution using two separate benchmarks.
The experiments were run on a single Pentium III Mobile Processor, 1.2 GHz with 1
GB RAM. The platform was Windows XP SP2 running the .NET Framework v1.14322.
Enabling Kheiron/CLR is done by setting four environment variables before starting the
application (Figure 3.12) 4. In our evaluation we used the C# benchmarks SciMark 5 and
4Information about the CLR Profiler must also be entered into the Windows registry via regsvr32 /s <fully
qualified path to Kheiron/CLR dll>
5http://rotor.cs.cornell.edu/SciMark/
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Function ID 0x00975338
Before JIT Compilation
0x0097532A 00 00 f8 be de 02 04
0x00975331 00 fe e8 18 dc f7 ff
0x00975338 05 00 00 00 98 20 00
0x0097533F c0 05 00 fc e8 08 dc
0x00975346 f7 ff 06 00 00 00 b0
0x0097534D 20 00 c0 00 00 08 00
0x00975354 0c 00 00 00 08 34 e2
0x0097535B 02 00 00 00 00 00 00
After JIT Compilation
0x0097532A 00 00 f8 be de 02 04
0x00975331 00 fe e9 a0 70 47 02
0x00975338 05 00 00 00 d8 c3 de
0x0097533F 02 05 00 fc e9 e0 88
0x00975346 47 02 06 00 00 00 28
0x0097534D dc de 02 00 00 08 00
0x00975354 0c 00 00 00 08 34 e2








Figure 3.11: JIT compilation overview
Linpack 6.
SciMark is a benchmark for scientific and numerical computing. It includes five (5)
computation kernels: Fast Fourier Transform (FFT), Jacobi Successive Over-relaxation
(SOR), Monte Carlo integration (Monte Carlo), Sparse matrix multiply (Sparse MatMult)
and dense LU matrix factorization (LU).
Linpack is a benchmark that uses routines for solving common problems in numerical
linear algebra including linear systems of equations, eigenvalues and eigenvectors, linear
6http://www.shudo.net/jit/perf/Linpack.cs
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set DBG PRF LOG=0x1
set Cor Enable Profiling=0x1
set COR PROFILER DLL=<path to Kheiron/CLR dll>
set COR PROFILER=<Identifier string Kheiron/CLR>
Figure 3.12: Enabling Kheiron/CLR
least squares and singular value decomposition. In our tests we used a problem size of 1000.
Overheads. Kheiron/CLR consists of a profiler that uses the Profiler API [126] to intercept
module load, unload and module attached to assembly events, JIT compilation events and
function entry and exit events. As expected, running an application in the profiler imposes
some overhead on the application. Figure 3.13 shows the runtime overhead for running the
benchmarks with and without profiling enabled. We performed five (5) test runs for SciMark
and Linpack each with and without profiling enabled. All executables under test and our
profiler implementation were optimized release builds. For each benchmark, the bar on the
left shows the performance of the benchmark running without profiling enabled. The bar on
the right shows the normalized performance with our profiler (Kheiron/CLR) enabled.
Our measurements show that Kheiron/CLR contributes ∼5% runtime overhead when no
repairs are active, which we consider negligible.
SCIMark Composite Score Average Stdev
Without Kheiron/CLR 187.71 189.15 189.28 189.08 189.56 188.956 0.720
With Kheiron/CLR 181.52 181.95 182.19 182.43 182.64 182.146 0.435
% Slowdown 3.30% 3.81% 3.75% 3.52% 3.65% 3.60% 0.20%
Table 3.1: Kheiron/CLR overheads on SCIMark when no repair active
Linpack Composite Score Average Stdev
Without Kheiron/CLR 60.1 60.045 61.54 61.089 61.37 60.829 0.709
With Kheiron/CLR 57.91 57.511 58.112 58.366 57.91 57.962 0.314
% Slowdown 3.64% 4.22% 5.57% 4.46% 5.64% 4.71% 0.87%
Table 3.2: Kheiron/CLR overheads on Linpack when no repair active
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Figure 3.13: Kheiron/CLR overheads when no repair active
Our prototype imposes additional overheads on the running application at different points in
its execution. We prepare shadows at module load time, specifically when the module binds
to an assembly, which occurs before the application begins running. We create shadows
the first time the method is JIT compiled, provided a shadow has been prepared for it and
we force re-JITs when we add or remove the prologues and epilogues that jump into the
adaptation engine.
To quantify these overheads, we use the SciMark2.SOR class, which executes the Jacobi
Successive Over-relaxation benchmark. Table 3.3 shows the impact on module bind time due
to preparing shadows on the two public methods of SciMark2.SOR, SciMark2.SOR::execute
and SciMark2.SOR::num flops.
Preparing shadows at module load time causes the application to take slightly longer to
load but does not affect its steady state execution since the module bind must occur before
the application begins to execute. Moreover, the impact on module bind time in this
case is relatively small, sub-millisecond, and is dominated by time spent making calls to
IMetaDataEmit::DefineMethod, which adds new method definitions to a type.
Creating shadows imposes a one time overhead incurred the first time the method is JIT
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Module Name SciMark.exe
Module Load time (ms) 0.0230229
Module bind time (ms) 0.374817
# shadows prepared 2
Total shadow prepare time (ms) 0.196664
Average shadow prepare time (ms) 0.0983317
Bind time - shadow prepare time (ms) 0.178153
Table 3.3: Kheiron/CLR overheads of preparing shadows
compiled. As shown in Table 3.4 the time for the first JIT compilation is dominated by the
time spent creating the shadow7.
Method name SOR::execute
First JIT time (ms) 13.7202
# shadows created 1
Total shadow create time (ms) 13.3576
Average shadow create time (ms) 13.3576
First JIT time - shadow create time (ms) 0.3626
Table 3.4: Kheiron/CLR overheads of creating shadows
Forcing multiple JIT-compilations adds additional overhead to the steady-state execution
times of the application. In our experiments we compute the method time as:
Ttotalmethodtime = Tshadowcreatetime + TJIT time + Tinvoketime
Table 3.5 compares the total method time for the SciMark2.SOR::execute wrapper method,
with the total method time for its shadow method. In this case the disparity in method times
is1% and the overall impact on the performance of the benchmark is negligible.
For methods that are not as computationally intensive as SOR::execute, where Tshadowcreatetime+
TJIT time is a significant fraction of Tinvoketime, the overheads of creating shadows and multiple
re-JITs will be much worse.
7Shadow creation time is dominated by the calls to the IMethodMalloc::Alloc function, which allocates the
buffer for the new method body at the appropriate address in memory
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Wrapper Method Shadow Method
SOR::execute SOR:: execute
Function ID 0x935ae8 0x935b18
Enter/Leave count 15 15
JIT Count 15 1
# shadows created 1 0
Create shadow (ms) 11.1834 n/a
Total Invoke time (ms) 6273.27 6272.31
Total JIT time (ms) 2.9621 0.90244
Total method time (ms) 6287.4156 6273.21244
Table 3.5: Execution overheads on SciMark2.SOR::execute
Figure 3.14: CLR re-JIT measurements for SciMark2.SOR::execute wrapper
Based on our experiments we are able to identify and measure three sources of overhead
Kheiron/CLR imposes on a target system’s operation – load-time overhead, JIT-compilation
time overhead and runtime overhead. In the case of the load-time and JIT-compilation
overheads, the impact is small (sub-second and in some cases sub-millisecond) and for
runtime overhead, Kheiron/CLR’s impact on the target system is negligible ∼5% when no
repairs or reconfigurations are active. We are also able to demonstrate how Kheiron/CLR
can interact with the Common Language Runtime and the applications it hosts in a manner
that is transparent to both the runtime and the target application.
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Total JIT time (ms) 2.962142
Average JIT time (ms) 0.197476
Stdev (ms) 0.101077
Table 3.6: CLR re-JIT measurements for SciMark2.SOR::execute wrapper
3.7.8 Evaluation Part 2: Kheiron/CLRDynamic Reconfiguration Case
Study
The second part of the evaluation of Kheiron/CLR looks at its ability to effect repairs and
reconfigurations in a non-trivial system while preserving the integrity of the target system
and the CLR.
To evaluate our Kheiron/CLR prototype beyond small/toy examples, we searched on Source-
Forge.NET [174] for potential target systems already implemented on the CLR that might
benefit from runtime adaptation. We report on our experience using Kheiron/CLR to fa-
cilitate runtime reconfigurations in a system that was developed (and is in use) by others:
the Alchemi Enterprise Grid Computing System developed at the University of Melbourne,
Australia [188].
We selected the Alchemi Enterprise Grid Computing System [6], from the University of
Melbourne, Australia. Alchemi has several appealing characteristics relevant for our case
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study purposes: It was developed and is currently maintained by others, whom we do not
know and have not contacted, hence we regard it as a legacy system upon which runtime
adaptations can be carried out only via an externalized engine. It is publicly available on
SourceForge [175], which makes it possible for other autonomic computing researchers to
“repeat” our experiment employing their own technology for comparison purposes. Alchemi
is also well-documented, which makes it feasible to construct plausible scenarios, where
performing runtime reconfigurations and/or repairs on the system could result in real benefits
for its real-world users.
Alchemi is apparently being used in a number of scientific and commercial grid applications,
including an application for distributed, parallel environmental simulations at Common-
wealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) Land and Water, Australia,
and a micro-array data processing application for early detection of breast cancer devel-
oped by Satyam Computers Applied Research Laboratory in India.8 Finally, Alchemi is
implemented as a .NET application on top of the CLR, which is a prerequisite for Khe-
iron/CLR. Alchemi is written in C#, and leverages a number of technologies provided by
the .NET Framework, including .NET Remoting [86], multi-threading and asynchronous
programming.
Alchemi Architecture. The Alchemi Grid follows a master-worker parallel programming
paradigm, where a central component (the Manager) dispatches independent units of parallel
execution (grid threads) to be executed on grid nodes (Executors), see Figure 3.15. The
Manager is responsible for providing the services associated with the execution of grid
applications and their constituent grid threads. It monitors the status of the Executors
registered with it, and schedules grid threads to run on them. Executors accept grid threads
from the Manager, execute them, and return the completed threads to the Manager. An
Executor can be configured as either dedicated, i.e., managed centrally where the Manager
8A list of projects using Alchemi can be found at http://www.alchemi.net/projects.html.
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Figure 3.15: Alchemi architecture – source: User Guide for Alchemi 1.0 [5]
“pushes” a computation to an idle, dedicated Executor whenever its scheduling requires,
or non-dedicated, where the Executor instead polls the Manager and hence “pulls” some
computational work only during idle periods, e.g., when a screen saver is active.
Motivation behind Reconfiguring Alchemi. The Alchemi Manager is clearly a key
subsystem and, within the Manager, the scheduler – which makes all the grid work allocation
decisions – is a key component. As in any resource allocation scenario, the scheduling
strategy is critical to the overall efficacy of the system. Further, the efficacy of any particular
scheduling algorithm may depend on factors that can vary quite dynamically within the
grid, such as the arrival times and rate of jobs submitted for execution, the computational
weight of individual work units, the set of currently available Executors, and the overall
workload placed on Executors at any point in time. The version of Alchemi used in our
evaluation (v1.0 beta) provides a default scheduler, embodied in its DefaultScheduler class,
that schedules grid threads on a Priority and First Come First Served (FCFS) basis, in that
order. This scheduling algorithm is fixed at compile-time and used throughout the execution
lifetime. However, Alchemi conveniently provides a scheduling API that allows custom
schedulers to be written.
We do not address whether a one-size-fits-all scheduling algorithm could be implemented
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to take into account all operating conditions and all kinds of submitted application mixes,
but instead intend to enable the Alchemi Manager to switch dynamically among different
scheduling algorithms, each potentially tuned for specific conditions and workloads, as the
state of the system changes. The same scheduler-swapping provisions could also be used
to avert or alleviate situations in which (a subset of) Executors misbehave – for reasons
varying from misconfiguration, to the occasional bug in the code of grid threads for some
applications, to malicious interference by rogue Executor nodes – in ways that cannot
be immediately detected by the monitoring capabilities of the Manager. By default, the
Manager only tracks whether an executor node is “alive” using periodic heatbeats.
In the next section we describe a proof-of-concept experimental case study that demonstrates
how Kheiron/CLR can be used to facilitate runtime reconfiguration, specifically replacement
of the Alchemi scheduler, without any modifications to the source code of the target system
or the underlying CLR managed execution environment. We show how our adaptation
engine attached via Kheiron/CLR is able to transparently swap scheduler implementations
on the fly, which would enable existing Alchemi installations to take advantage of multiple
alternative scheduling algorithms without having to re-compile and re-install any system
components. We also discuss how the reconfigurations are carried out in a way that preserves
the consistency of the running grid application, as well as the overall distributed grid system.
We should stress that our case study focuses on the feasibility of effecting such consistency-
preserving reconfigurations of a legacy software system like Alchemi running in a managed
execution environment. We do not at all address the optimization issues implied by the
concept of dynamic scheduler replacement. We claim only that Kheiron/CLR facilitates the
development of specific remedies such as optimization: for instance, our approach could
enable an adaptive scheduler-swapping scheme that could ensure the grid’s performance
across a vast range of applications and conditions, which remains an open and interesting
research issue.
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Reconfiguring Alchemi. To swap the grid scheduler in a running instance of the Alchemi
grid, we need to implement the reconfiguration engine that interacts with Alchemi’s Manager
component. Using Kheiron/CLR, our CLR profiler described in Section 3.7.3, we can
dynamically attach/detach such an adaptation engine implemented as a separate assembly
to/from a running managed application in a fairly mechanical way. However, a first important
step is to carefully plan the interactions between the running application, the reconfiguration
engine and the CLR, in such a way that they do not compromise the integrity of either the
managed application or the CLR.
Consequently, we – as the developers of the adaptation engine to be attached by Kheiron/CLR
– must gather some knowledge about the system. Specifically, we need details about how
the Alchemi Manager component works, particularly the execution flow in the Manager
from startup to shutdown. That enables us to identify potential “safe” control points where
reconfiguration actions can take place. We also need to identify those classes the adaptation
engine must interact with to effect the scheduler swap. The final step is to implement the
special-purpose reconfiguration engine based on what we learn about the system.
In particular, we learned that when the Alchemi Manager is started (by running the Al-
chemi.Manager.exe assembly) an instance of the ManagerContainer class, from the Al-
chemi.Core.dll assembly), is created. The instance of the ManagerContainer class repre-
sents the Manager proper. On startup, theManagerContainer::Start() routine performs a
set of initialization tasks:
1. An object is registered with the .NET Remoting services, allowing Executors to
interact with the Manager instance.
2. A singleton instance of the InternalShared class is created, holding a reference to the
scheduler implementation being used (among other things). The concrete scheduler im-
plementation is referenced as an implementation of theAlchemi.Core.Manager.IScheduler
interface, which standardizes the scheduler API [6].
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3. Two threads, the scheduler thread and the watchdog thread, are started. The sched-
uler thread runs theManagerContainer::ScheduleDedicated()method, which loops
“forever” on a flag member variable, stopScheduler. It periodically retrieves the
scheduler implementation from the InternalShared singleton instance and queries
it for a DedicatedSchedule. A DedicatedSchedule is a <Grid Thread ID, Executor
ID> tuple specifying where the selected grid thread should be scheduled to run. The
watchdog thread runs the ManagerContainer::Watchdog() method, which loops
“forever” on the stopWatchdog flag member variable, periodically checking the
status of dedicated Executors.
Based on this Manager startup sequence, we outline below the tasks involved in performing
a scheduler swap:
1. Use Kheiron/CLR to insert a prologue into theManagerContainer::Start() method
such that it jumps into the reconfiguration engine assembly where the instance of the
ManagerContainer can be cached so we can interact with it later to effect the scheduler
swap.
2. Use Kheiron/CLR to insert a prologue into the constructor for the InternalShared class
such that it jumps into the reconfiguration engine assembly where the instance can be
cached.
3. Once instances of the ManagerContainer and InternalShared classes have been cached,
the reconfiguration engine can cause the scheduler thread to exit normally by setting
the stopScheduler flag to true, allowing the thread to exit when it next tests the while
loop condition.
4. The Alchemi.Core.Manager.IScheduler reference stored in the InternalShared sin-
gleton can then be replaced by another IScheduler implementation.
5. The stopScheduler flag is set to false and the scheduler thread is restarted.
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The Reconfiguration Engine and Replacement Scheduler. Our adaptation engine im-
plementation, found in the PSL.Alchemi.ReconfigEngine.dll assembly, consists of two C#
classes, PSLScheduler and ReconfigEngine. The implementation was done without contact-
ing the Alchemi developers and took about half a day to complete. The total implementation
is 465 LOC – 95 LOC for PSLScheduler.cs and 370 LOC for ReconfigEngine.cs.
PSLScheduler implements the Alchemi.Core.Manager.IScheduler interface, and is func-
tionally equivalent to the DefaultScheduler implementation that ships with Alchemi, except
for some extra debugging and logging facilities. As noted previously, the goal of PSLSched-
uler is solely to demonstrate a successful reconfiguration – the scheduler swap – and to
exemplify how Kheiron facilitates the development of such a reconfiguration, not to actually
improve scheduling.
ReconfigEngine is responsible for caching instances of the Manager classes of interest, Man-
agerContainer and InternalShared, as well as effecting the scheduler swap. It is implemented
according to the singleton design pattern. To effect changes on the ManagerContainer and
InternalShared instances, the ReconfigEngine relies on the Reflection API, since many of
the key variables are private and in some cases read-only. The ReconfigEngine sets up a
communication channel after it has attached to the Manager, which allows a Reconfiguration
Console to send commands to the ReconfigEngine to trigger reconfigurations (our case study
did NOT include sensor monitoring for those conditions under which a different scheduler
would be warranted). Table 3.7 shows the method signatures of the ReconfigEngine API.
Method
public static ReconfigEngine GetInstance()
public static void CacheManagerContainer(object o)
public static void CacheInternalShared(object o)
public void SwapScheduler()
Table 3.7: Reconfiguration engine API
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Experimental Setup. Our experimental testbed was an Alchemi cluster consisting of two
Executors (Pentium-4 3GHz desktop machines each with 1GB RAM running Windows XP
SP2 and the .NET Framework v1.1.4322), and a Manager (Pentium-III 1.2GHz laptop with
1GB RAM running Windows XP SP2 and the same .NET Framework version).
We ran the PiCalculator sample grid application, which ships with Alchemi, multiple times
while requesting that the scheduler implementation be changed during the application’s
execution. The PiCalculator application computes the value of Pi to n decimal digits. In our
tests we used the default n=100.
We swapped between the DefaultScheduler and the PSLScheduler. The two schedulers are
algorithmically equivalent, except that the PSLScheduler outputs extra logging information
to the Alchemi Manager GUI so that we could confirm that a scheduler swap actually
occurred.
Results. One thing we measured was the time taken to swap the scheduler. We requested
scheduler swaps between runs of the the PiCalculator application. The time taken to replace
the scheduler instance was about 500 ms, on average; however, that time was dominated by
the time spent waiting for the scheduler thread to exit. In the worst case, a scheduler-swap
request arrived while the scheduler thread was sleeping (as it is programmed to do for up
to 1000 ms on every loop iteration), causing the request to wait until the thread resumes
and exits before it is honored. As a result we consider the time taken to actually effect
the scheduler swap (modulo the time spent waiting for the scheduler thread to exit) to be
negligible.
Table 3.8 compares the job completion times when no scheduler swap requests are submitted
during execution of the PiCalculator grid application, with job completion times when one or
more scheduler swap requests are submitted. As expected, the difference in job completion
times is negligible, ∼1%, since the scheduler implementations are functionally equivalent.
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Further, swapping the scheduler had no impact on on-going execution of the Executors, as
an Executor is not assigned an additional work unit (grid thread) until it is finished executing
its current work unit.
run# Job Completion time (ms) w/o swap Job Completion time (ms) w/swap #Swaps
1 18.3063232 17.2748400 2
2 18.3163376 18.4665536 1
3 18.3363664 17.3148976 4
4 18.3463808 17.3148976 2
5 18.3063232 17.4150416 2
6 17.4250560 18.2662656 2
7 18.3463808 18.3163376 4
8 17.5352144 18.5266400 1
9 17.5252000 18.4965968 2
10 18.3363664 18.3463808 2
Avg 18.07799488 17.97384512 2.2
Table 3.8: PiCalculator.exe job completion times
Thus we were able to demonstrate that Kheiron/CLR can be used to facilitate a consistency-
preserving reconfiguration of the Alchemi Grid Manager without compromising the integrity
of the CLR or the Alchemi Grid Manager, and by extension the Alchemi Grid and jobs
actively executing in the grid. The combination of ensuring that the augmentations made
by Kheiron/CLR to insert hooks for the adaptation engine respect the CLR’s verification
rules for type and method definitions and the inclusion of human analysis to determine what
transformations Kheiron/CLR should perform on the target system, and when they should
be performed, can help guarantee that the operation of the target system is not compromised.
Human analysis of the target system’s operation leverages the consistency-guarantees of
Kheiron/CLR with respect to the CLR, allowing the designers of adaptations to focus on
preserving the consistency of the target system (at the application level) based on knowledge
of its operation.
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3.8 Kheiron/JVM: Runtime Adaptation in the Java Vir-
tual Machine
The Java Virtual Machine (JVM) is the technology component responsible for the hardware
and operating system independence of Java applications [111]. It is an abstract computing
machine, with its own instruction set and binary format for executables (the class file format).
These two elements – the abstract computing machine and the class file binary format for
executables – allow Java applications to be written and compiled once (into class files) and
run on multiple operating system and hardware platforms provided that an implementation
of the Java Virtual Machine exists for that operating system/hardware platform 9.
Java applications are compiled into executables (classfiles), which contain JVM instructions
(bytecodes), a symbol table (constant pool) and other ancillary information.
Despite the JVM’s primary association with the Java programming language, it is not tightly
tied to the Java. In fact the JVM “...knows nothing of the Java programming language, only
of a particular binary format, the class file format” [111]. As a result any language with
functionality that can be expressed in a valid class file can be hosted in the JVM.
The JVM, like the CLR, is an example of a managed execution environment In addition to
providing host and operating system independence, it also provides a number of services
to the applications it hosts including: application isolation, garbage collection of memory,
security sandboxing of applications and structured exception handling.
Despite the conceptual similarities between the CLR and JVM with respect to the abstrac-
tions and services they provide to the applications they host, there are many differences
between them. In this thesis we only highlight the differences related to effecting adaptations
in running Java applications.
9This is/was one theoretical goal for Java and the JVM; however, multiple JVM implementations running
on top of different operating systems e.g. Windows, Linux, Solaris, etc. led to subtle differences in how a
program executes across platforms [194].
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3.8.1 Java Virtual Machine Execution Model (Java HotspotVM)
The unit of execution (sometimes referred to as a module) in the JVM is the classfile. Class-
files contain both the metadata and bytecode of a Java application. Two major components of
the JVM interact with the metadata and bytecode contained in the classfile during execution,
the classloader and the global native-code optimizer.
The classloader reads the classfile metadata and creates an in-memory representation and
layout of the various classes, members and methods on demand as each class is referenced.
The global native-code optimizer uses the results of the classloader and compiles the
bytecode for a method into native assembly for the target platform.
The JVM first runs the program using an interpreter, while analyzing the code to detect the
critical hot spots in the program. Based on the statistics it gathers, it then focuses the attention
of the global native-code optimizer on the hotspots to perform optimizations including JIT-
compilation and method inlining [131]. This model of execution of the JVM was introduced
in v1.4, and is the reason why these and later VM versions/implementations are referred
to as Hotspot VMs. Compiled methods remain cached in memory, and subsequent method
calls jump directly into the native (compiled) version of the method.
3.8.2 JVM Profiler and Metadata APIs
The v1.5 implementation of the Java HotspotVM introduces a new API for inspecting and
controlling the execution of Java applications – the Java Virtual Machine Tool Interface
(JVMTI) [134]. JVMTI replaces both the Java Virtual Machine Profiler Interface (JVMPI)
and the Java Virtual Machine Debug Interface (JVMDI) available in older releases. The
JVMTI is a two-way interface: clients of the JVMTI, often called agents, can receive
notifications of execution events in addition to being able to query and control the application
via functions either in response to events or independent of events. JVMTI notification
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events include (but are not limited to): classfile loading, class loading, method entry/exit.
The Java HotspotVM does not have a built in API for manipulating type definitions. As a
result, to perform operations such as reading class and method attributes, parsing method
descriptors, defining new methods for types, emitting/rewriting the bytecode for method
implementations and creating new type references the first version of Kheiron/JVM relied on
APIs we developed based on information provided in the Java Virtual Machine Specification
(Chapter 4) [111]. Later versions of Kheiron/JVM use the Byte Code Engineering Library
(BCEL) [149], which provides a set of abstractions for manipulating metadata in classfiles
and facilities for verifying the validity of the modified classfile(s).
3.8.3 Kheiron/JVM Architecture
The implementation of Kheiron/JVM consists of a JVMTI agent (1890 lines of C++ code)
and a set of supporting Java classes that modify classfiles, collect execution statistics and
communicate with the JVMTI agent (779 lines of Java code) using the Java Native Interface
(JNI). To deploy Kheiron/JVM, the C++ code is packaged in an application extension library,
(.dll on Windows and .so on Linux), while the Java code is packaged in a jar file. Figure
3.16 shows the five main components of Kheiron/JVM.
• The Kheiron JVMTI Agent receives execution-related events from the JVM. Specif-
ically, our agent subscribes to class hook events (e.g., classfile load events for every
class), garbage collection events (e.g., GC start and end events), compiled method
load events (method compiled, loaded and unloaded events) and exception events
(exception thrown and caught events). Our JVMTI agent does not subscribe to method
entry/exit events from the JVM since these can severely degrade application perfor-
mance [134]. Instead, we rely on the Bytecode Transformer to add method entry and
exit profiling hooks to the methods of the classes we are interested in.
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Figure 3.16: Kheiron/JVM architecture diagram
• The Bytecode Transformer parses and modifies classfiles. It is able to add new
methods or variables to types and add references to other classes or methods. It is also
responsible for generating, inserting or replacing the bytecode in existing methods.
Bytecode changes can be committed at loadtime (via returning a modified classfile
in response to the ClassfileLoadHook event generated by the JVM when a classfile
is read from storage) or at runtime via the RedefineClasses function exposed by the
JVMTI. In the case of runtime modifications of methods, active method invocations
continue to use the old implementation of a method while new invocations use the
latest version [134]10. In our Kheiron/JVM implementation the Bytecode Transformer
is primarily responsible for injecting instrumentation hooks into classes such that
method invocations and object creations can be tracked. The hooks inserted interact
with methods exposed by the Stats Collector and/or the Fault Manager depending on
the desired adaptation.
• The Stats Collector captures object creation and method entry and exit events via the
hooks inserted by the Bytecode Transformer. The Stats Collector uses a number of
different book-keeping data structures to manage and collate the events received while
10[134] also outlines the restrictions on the modifications permitted using the RedefineClasses API.
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an application is executing.
• The Object Manager manages an object pool of book-keeping data structures. It is
responsible for creating, distributing and recycling these book-keeping data-structure
instances in an effort to limit the amount of memory consumed by Kheiron related
objects.
• The Fault Manager is responsible for injecting faults or inducing failures in a Java
application. It relies on hooks inserted by the Bytecode Transformer to capture and/or
interact with elements (object instances, data structures, methods implementations,
etc.) in the target application.
Communication between the Kheiron JVMTI agent written in C++ and the Kheiron/JVM
Java classes is achieved using the Java Native Interface (JNI). JNI is a two-way interface that
allows Java code running in a JVM to call and by called by code written in other languages,
e.g., C and C++ [132]. Whereas there are other approaches to facilitating communication
between Java and non-Java applications, e.g., TCP/IP sockets, interprocess communication
mechanisms (IPC), etc., JNI allows communication between Java and non-Java elements that
share the same process space as is the case with our JVMTI C++ agent and Kheiron/JVM
Java classes, which are hosted in a single JVM process.
The ability of the profiler/JVMTI agent to call or interact with managed (Java) code in a
structured way via the JNI APIs is unique to the JVM. This allows JVMTI agents to leverage
functionality available in the Java system libraries and/or other Java based libraries. In the
CLR, profilers are intended to be purely unmanaged code, i.e., written in C/C++. Profiler
developers are warned that “...attempts to combine managed and unmanaged code from a
CLR profiler can cause crashes, hangs and deadlocks” [126].
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3.8.4 Model of Operation
Kheiron/JVM performs operations on type definitions, object instances and methods at
various stages in the execution cycle (see Figure 3.17) to make them capable of interacting
with an adaptation engine. In particular, to enable an adaptation engine to interact with a
class instance, Kheiron/JVM augments the type definition to add the necessary “hooks”.
Augmenting the type definition is a two-step operation.
Figure 3.17: First method invocation in the Java HotspotVM
Step 1 occurs at classfile load time (Stage 1 in Figure 3.17), signaled by the ClassFileLoad-
Hook JVMTI callback that precedes it. At this point the VM has obtained the classfile
data from storage but has not yet constructed the in-memory representation of the class.
Kheiron/JVM adds what we call shadow methods for each of the original public and/or
private methods. A shadow method shares most of the properties – including a subset of
attributes, e.g., exception specifications and the method descriptor – of the corresponding
original method. However, a shadow method gets a unique name. Figure 3.18, transition
A to B, shows an example of adding a shadow method SampleMethod for the original
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method SampleMethod.
Extending the metadata of a type by adding new methods must be done before the type
definition is installed in the JVM. Once a type definition is installed, the JVM will reject the
addition or removal of methods. Attempts to call RedefineClasses will fail if new methods
or fields are added. Similarly, changing method signatures, method modifiers or inheritance
relationships is also not allowed.
Figure 3.18: Preparing and creating a shadow method
Step 2 of type augmentation occurs immediately after the shadow method has been added,
while still in the ClassFileLoadHook JVMTI callback. Kheiron/JVM uses bytecode-
rewriting techniques to convert the implementation of the original method into a thin
wrapper that calls the shadow method, as shown in Figure 3.18, transition B to C.
Kheiron/JVM’s wrappers and shadow methods facilitate the adaptation of class instances.
In particular, the regular structure and single return statement of the wrapper method, see
Figure 3.19, enables Kheiron/JVM to easily inject adaptation instructions into the wrapper
as prologues and/or epilogues to shadow method calls.
To add a prologue to a method new bytecode instructions must prefix the existing bytecode
instructions. The level of difficulty is the same whether we perform this insertion in the
wrapper or in the original method. Adding epilogues, however, is more challenging (as
highlighted in 3.7.4). To address these challenges, we employ the same wrapper-based
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Figure 3.19: Kheiron/JVM conceptual diagram of a wrapper
approach, which allows us to create a regular method structure with a single entry point, and
a single known exit point. The simplified structure of the wrapper makes it easy to add/edit
prologues and epilogues as necessary.
To initiate an adaptation, Kheiron/JVM augments the wrapper to insert a jump into an
adaptation engine at the control point(s) before and/or after a shadow method call. This
allows an adaptation engine to be able to take control before and/or after a method executes.
Effecting the jump into the adaptation engine is a two-step process.
• Step 1: Extend the metadata of the classfile currently executing in the JVM such that
a reference to the classfile containing the adaptation engine is added to the constant
pool11 as well as references to the subset of the adaptation engine’s methods that we
wish to insert calls to.
• Step 2: Augment the bytecode and metadata of the wrapper function to insert bytecode
instructions to transfer control to the adaptation engine before and/or after the existing
bytecode that calls the shadow method. The adaptation engine can then perform
any number of operations, such as inserting and removing instrumentation, caching
class instances, performing consistency checks over class instances and components,
injecting faults, or performing reconfigurations and diagnostics of components.
11The constant pool stores symbolic information about fields, methods, interfaces, constants, data types, etc.
that is referenced by bytecode instructions.
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3.8.5 Evaluation Part 1: Kheiron/JVM Performance Impact
We are able to show, that like our other framework for facilitating adaptations in a managed
execution environment, Kheiron/CLR, Kheiron/JVM imposes only a modest performance
impact on a target system when no adaptations, repairs or reconfigurations are active. We
have evaluated the performance of our prototype by quantifying the overheads on program
execution using two separate benchmarks.
The experiments were run on a single Pentium III Mobile Processor, 1.2 GHz with 1 GB
RAM. The platform was Windows XP SP2 running the Java HotspotVM v1.5 update 4.
Enabling Kheiron/JVM is done by adding a switch to the commandline that starts the JVM
(Figure 3.20). In our evaluation we used the Java benchmarks SciMark v2.012 and Linpack13.
java -cp .;kheiron.jar -agentpath:<path to
Kheiron/JVM dll/.so> <main class>
Figure 3.20: Enabling Kheiron/JVM
SciMark is a benchmark for scientific and numerical computing. It includes five compu-
tation kernels: Fast Fourier Transform (FFT), Jacobi Successive Over-relaxation (SOR),
Monte Carlo integration (Monte Carlo), Sparse matrix multiply (Sparse MatMult) and dense
LU matrix factorization (LU). Linpack is a benchmark that uses routines for solving com-
mon problems in numerical linear algebra including linear systems of equations, eigenvalues
and eigenvectors, linear least squares and singular value decomposition. In our tests we used
a problem size of 1000.
SCIMark Composite Score Average Stdev
Without Kheiron/JVM 115.15 115.83 116.10 116.01 116.57 115.934 0.515
With Kheiron/JVM 113.61 111.50 114.89 116.00 115.54 114.308 1.807
% Slowdown 1.34% 3.74% 1.04% 0.02% 0.89% 1.40% 1.39%
Table 3.9: Kheiron/JVM overheads on SCIMark when no repair active
12http://math.nist.gov/scimark2/
13http://www.shudo.net/jit/perf/Linpack.java
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Linpack Composite Score Average Stdev
Without Kheiron/JVM 55.00 58.06 57.81 58.42 58.36 57.531 1.434
With Kheiron/JVM 54.33 57.47 56.30 57.66 57.96 56.744 1.488
% Slowdown 1.22% 1.02% 2.62% 1.30% 0.69% 1.369% 0.738%
Table 3.10: Kheiron/JVM overheads on Linpack when no repair active
Figure 3.21: Kheiron/JVM overheads when no repair active
Running an application under the JVMTI profiler imposes some overhead on the application.
Also, the use of shadow methods and wrappers converts one method call into two. Figure
3.21 shows the runtime overhead for running the benchmarks with and without profiling
enabled. We performed five test runs for SciMark and Linpack each with and without
profiling enabled. Our Kheiron/JVM DLL profiler implementation was compiled as an
optimized release build. For each benchmark, the bar on the left shows the performance
normalized to one, of the benchmark running without profiling enabled. The bar on the right
shows the normalized performance with our profiler enabled.
Our measurements show that our profiler contributes ∼2% runtime overhead when no
adaptations are active, which we consider negligible. Further, Kheiron-related objects occupy
∼155K of memory on the JVM heap, 120K of which is pre-allocated for the ObjectManager’s
pool of book-keeping data structures. Finally, we demonstrate howKheiron/JVM can interact
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with the Java Virtual Machine and effect adaptations in the applications it hosts in a manner
that is transparent to both the JVM and the target application requiring only a change to the
commandline used to start the application.
By implementing Kheiron/JVM we are able to show that our conceptual approach of lever-
aging facilities exposed by the execution environment, specifically profiling and execution
control services, and combining these facilities with metadata edit and emit APIs that respect
the verification rules for types, their metadata and their method implementations (bytecode)
is a sufficiently low-overhead approach for adapting running programs in contemporary
managed execution environments.
3.8.6 Evaluation Part 2: Kheiron/JVMWeb-Application Fault-Injection
The second part of the evaluation of Kheiron/JVM looks at its ability to dynamically
instrument, inject faults and induce failures in a Java-based application server and its hosted
web-application classes.
For this case study we use an n-tier web application stack consisting of the TPC-W web-
application [119]14, the (Java-based) Resin web and application server [186] and a MySQL
database server as our system under test (SUT). We target the Java-based components of the
stack, i.e. the web/application server and the TPC-W servlet classes for fault-injection.
We add to Kheiron/JVM the ability to inject 18 different faults into the web-application stack
components. Wrapper methods generated by Kheiron/JVM include a call into the Fault
Manager, which looks up the name of the method being invoked and performs a specific
fault-injection action, e.g., allocating a block of memory or throwing a specific exception as
necessary. Methodname-fault mappings are stored in a fault-model specification file that is
read by Kheiron/JVM upon initialization.
14TPC-W is a transactional web e-Commerce benchmark, modeled after an online bookstore.
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These 18 faults make up our fault-model and are are grouped into four failure categories
– resource depletion failures, processing failures, configuration failures and JVM failures
– (see Table 3.11. Our fault-model for N-tier web-applications is motivated primarily by
the discussion in [21] and [142], which identify resource leaks/state corruption, intermit-
tent/transient processing faults, hangs, configuration errors and crashes as major causes of


















No Class Definition Found Exception
Unsatisfied Link Error (JNI)




Table 3.11: Kheiron/JVM web-application stack fault-model
In our evaluation experiments we use an implementation of the TPC-W benchmark (web-
application and client-load generator) developed by the Predictive High-Performance Ar-
chitecture Research Mavens (PHARM) group at the University of Wisconsin-Madison.
Resin 3.0.22 was chosen as the web/application server and MySQL 5.0.27 was used for the
database servers. Resin and MySQL were installed on a single Windows XP Media Center
Edition Version 2002 SP2 machine (2 GB RAM, 228 GB HD and an Intel R©CoreTM2 Duo
CPU E6750 @ 2.66 GHz Processor) running a v1.5.0 update 7 Java Virtual Machine. These
evaluations were conducted using an optimized release build of the Kheiron/JVM Windows
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DLL.
We use the injection of resource depletion faults, processing faults and configuration faults to
demonstrate Kheiron/JVM’s ability to induce failures in the TPC-W web-application classes.
Fault-injection using Kheiron/JVM is guided by a fault-specification configuration file which
contains the name of the fault to inject, the fully-qualified name of the method to target for
fault-injection and the frequency of injection (e.g. once every N method invocations or once
every N minutes).
Servlet Instrumentation. The TPC-W distribution consists of 14 servlet classes, which
together expose 15 servlet methods for remote clients to interact with. To identify potential
targets for fault-injection we first collect profiles of servlet execution over five 25-minute
intervals using the TPC-W load generator configured to generate traffic for 20 clients.
Enabling application-server instrumentation was done using the commandline shown in
Figure 3.22. The configuration file watch.config contains the names of the servlets to
instrument as well as a pointer to a fault-specification file, which uses a NullFault (not to be
confused with the NullPointer Fault mentioned in Table 3.11) to collect invocation statistics
on the 15 servlet methods.
httpd.exe -verbose -classpath .;kheiron.jar
-J-agentpath:kheiron jvm.1.5.dll=watch.config
Figure 3.22: Enabling application-server instrumentation with Kheiron/JVM
The execution profile for the TPC-W servlets is shown in Figure 3.23. From this graph
we can identify five potential fault-injection targets: TPCW search request servlet.doGet,
TPCW home interaction.doGet, TPCW execute search.doGet, TPCW product detail servlet
and TPCW shopping cart interaction.doGet.
Resource Depletion Failures. For our resource depletion tests we target the
TPCW execute search servlet with an aggressive memory leak, 500K every 5 invocations,
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Figure 3.23: TPC-W servlet method invocation profile
in a JVM configured to use a maximum heap size of 64 MB. The TPCW execute search
servlet is invoked approximately 651 times during a 25 minute TPC-W run with a 20 client
load. Figures 3.24 and 3.25 show the effects of the memory leak injected into the TPC-W
servlet on 1) the length of time the underlying JVM operates with a given heap-size and
2) the rate at which the JVM requests additional memory from the Operating System to
accommodate the expanding heap. In addition to the increased memory-request rate, we
also observe a surge in Garbage Collection activity as the JVM’s Garbage Collector works
to recover memory in order to compensate for the heap’s growth (see Figure 3.26).
Processing Failures. To demonstrate a processing failure, we slow down the entire TPC-
W web-application by injecting a 100 msec delay in every servlet method invoked by a
remote client – the name of each servlet method is associated with a delay in the fault-model
specification file used by Kheiron/JVM. Figure 3.27 shows the average execution time of
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Figure 3.24: JVM memory request profile
w/o Kheiron/JVM-injected memory leak
Figure 3.25: JVM memory request profile
w/Kheiron/JVM-injected memory leak
Figure 3.26: JVM garbage collection events with and without Kheiron/JVM-injected
memory leak
the servlets with and without the Kheiron/JVM injected delays.
Configuration Failures. To demonstrate a targeted configuration failure, we cause the
TPCW execute search servlet to fail 30% of the time by injecting a MissingResourceFault
(by causing a Missing Resource Exception to be thrown). The invocation results are shown
in Figure 3.28. Further stacktraces dumped to the application server logs (see Figure 3.29)
confirm Kheiron/JVM as the cause of the failure.
In this section we demonstrated the ability of Kheiron/JVM to transparently instrument
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Figure 3.27: Average servlet method execution times with and without
Kheiron/JVM-injected delays
Figure 3.28: TPCW execute search invocation failures
and inject targeted faults into web-application classes hosted in an application server. We
presented a simple fault-model for web-applications consisting of four failure categories,
injected faults from three of the four categories and measured the effects on the web-
application classes, remote clients accessing these classes and the the underlying Java
Virtual Machine.






at TPCW execute search.doGet





Figure 3.29: Injecting configuration faults with Kheiron/JVM
3.9 Kheiron/C: Runtime Adaptation of Compiled-C Pro-
grams
Effecting adaptations in unmanaged applications is markedly different from effecting adapta-
tions in their managed counterparts, since they lack many of the characteristics and facilities
that make runtime adaptation qualitatively easier, in comparison, in managed execution
environments. Unmanaged execution environments store/have access to limited metadata
about program elements, limited or no built-in facilities for execution tracing, and less
structured rules on well-formed programs.
In this section we focus on using Kheiron/C to facilitate adaptations in running compiled C
programs, built using standard compiler toolkits like gcc and g++, packaged as Executable
and Linking Format (ELF) [189] object files, on the Linux platform.
3.9.1 Native Execution Model
One unit of execution in the Linux operating system is the ELF executable. ELF is the
specification of an object file format. Object files are binary representations of programs
intended to execute directly on a processor as opposed to being run in an implementation of
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an abstract machine such as the JVM or CLR. The ELF format provides parallel views of
a file’s contents that reflects the differing needs of program linking, loading and program
execution.
Program loading is the procedure by which the operating system creates or augments
a process image. A process image has segments that hold its text (instructions for the
processor), data and stack. On the Linux platform the loader/linker maps ELF sections into
memory as segments, resolves symbolic references, runs some initialization code (found in
the .init section) and then transfers control to the main routine in the .text segment.
One approach to execution monitoring in an unmanaged execution environment is to build
binaries in such a way that they emit profiler data. Special flags, e.g., -pg, are passed to the
gcc compiler used to generate the binary. The executable, when run, will also write out a
file containing the times spent in each function executed. Since a compile-time/link-time
flag is used to create an executable that has logic built in to write out profiling information,
it is not possible to augment the data collected without rebuilding the application. Further,
selectively profiling portions of the binary is not supported.
To gain control of a running unmanaged application on the Linux operating system, tools
use built-in facilities such as ptrace and the /proc file system. ptrace is a system call that
allows one process to attach to a running program to monitor or control its execution and
examine and modify its address space. Several monitored events can be associated with a
traced program including: the end of execution of a single assembly language instruction,
entering/exiting a system call, and receiving a signal. ptrace is primarily used to implement
breakpoint debuggers. Traced processes behave normally until a signal is caught – at which
point the traced process is suspended and the tracing process notified [39]. The /proc
filesystem is a virtual filesystem created by the kernel in memory that contains information
about the system and the current processes in their various stages of execution.
With respect to metadata, ELF binaries support various processors with 8-bit bytes and
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32-bit architectures. Complex structures, etc. are represented as compositions of 32-bit,
16-bit and 8-bit “types”. The binary format also uses special sections to hold descriptive
information about the program. Two important sections are the .debug and .symtab sections,
where information used for symbolic debugging and the symbol table, respectively, are kept.
The symbol table contains the information needed to locate and relocate symbolic references
and definitions. The fields of interest in a symbol table entry (Figure 3.30) are st name,
which holds an index into the object file’s symbol string table where the symbol name is
stored, st size, which contains the data object’s size in bytes and st info, which specifies the
symbol’s type and binding attributes.
Figure 3.30: ELF symbol table entry [189]
Type information for symbols can be one of: STT NOTYPE, when the symbol’s type is
not defined, STT OBJECT, when the symbol’s type is associated with a data object such as
variable or array, STT FUNC, for a function or other executable code, and STT SECTION,
for symbols associated with a section. As we can see, the metadata available in ELF object
files is not as detailed or as expressive as the metadata found in managed executables. For
example, we lack richer information on abstract data types and their relationships, functions
and their signatures – number of expected parameters, parameter types and function return
types – i.e., limited support for sophisticated reflection and metadata APIs. Further, since
unmanaged applications run on the underlying processor, there is no intermediary exposing
an execution tracing and control API; instead we have to rely on platform-specific operating
system support, e.g., ptrace and strace on Unix.
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3.9.2 Kheiron/C Model of Operation
Our current implementation of Kheiron/C relies on the Dyninst API [18] (v4.2.1) to interact
with target applications while they execute. Dyninst presents an API for inserting new code
into a running program. The program being modified is able to continue execution and does
not need to be recompiled or relinked. Uses for Dyninst include, but are not limited to,
runtime code-patching and performance steering in large/long-running applications.
Dyninst employs a number of abstractions to shield clients from the details of the runtime
assembly language insertion that takes place behind the scenes. The main abstractions
are points and snippets. A point is a location in a program where instrumentation can
be inserted, whereas a snippet is a representation of the executable code to be inserted.
Examples of snippets include BPatch funcCallExpr, which represents a function call, and
BPatch variableExpr, which represents a variable or area of memory in a thread’s address
space. Behind the abstractions, Dyninst relies on trampolines – a small piece of code
constructed on-the-fly on the stack – to alter the original flow of execution to include the
inserted instrumentation (see Figure 3.31).
To use the Dyninst terminology, Kheiron/C is implemented as amutator (Figure 3.32), which
uses the Dyninst API to attach to and modify running programs. On the Linux platform,
where we conducted our experiments, Dyninst relies on ptrace and the /proc filesystem
facilities of the operating system to interact with running programs.
Kheiron/C uses the Dyninst API to search for global or local variables/data structures (in
the scope of the insertion point) in the target program’s address space, read and write
values to existing variables, create new variables, load new shared libraries into the address
space of the target program, and inject function calls to routines in loaded shared libraries
as prologues/epilogues (at the points shown in Figure 3.32) for existing function calls in
the target application. As an example, Kheiron/C could search for globally visible data
structures, e.g., the head of a linked list of abstract data types, and insert periodic checks of
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Figure 3.31: Dyninst model of operation
the list’s consistency by injecting new function calls passing the linked-list head variable as
a parameter.
To initiate an adaptation, Kheiron/C attaches to a running application (or spawns a new
application given the command line to use). The process of attaching causes the thread of the
target application to be suspended. It then uses the Dyninst API to find the existing functions
to instrument (each function abstraction has an associated call-before instrumentation point
and a call-after instrumentation point). The target application needs to be built with symbol
information for locating functions and variables to work – with stripped binaries Dyninst
reports ∼95% accuracy locating functions and an ∼87% success rate instrumenting functions.
The disparity between the percentage of functions located and the percentage of functions
instrumented is attributed to difficulties in instrumenting code rather than failures in the
analysis of stripped binaries [71]. Kheiron/C uses the Dyninst API to locate global structures
or local variables in the scope of the intended instrumentation points. It then loads any
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Figure 3.32: Kheiron/C
external library/libraries that contain the desired adaptation logic and uses the Dyninst API
to find the functions in the adaptation libraries, for which calls will be injected into the target
application. Next, Kheiron/C constructs function call expressions, which are converted into
assembly instruction sequences by Dyninst, and inserts them at the instrumentation points.
Finally, Kheiron/C allows the target application to continue its execution.
3.9.3 Evaluation Part 1: Kheiron/C Performance Impact
We carry out a simple experiment to measure the performance impact of Kheiron/C on a
target system. Using the C version of the SciMark v2.0 benchmark we compare the time
taken to execute the un-instrumented program, to the time taken to execute the instrumented
program – we instrumented the SOR execute and SOR num flops functions such that a call
to a function (AdaptMe) in a custom shared library is inserted. The AdaptMe function is
passed an integer indicating the instrumented function that was called. Our experiment was
run on a single Pentium 4 Processor, 2.4 GHz with 1 GB RAM. The platform was SUSE
Linux 9.2 running a 2.6.8-24.18 kernel and using Dyninst v4.2.1. All source files used in
the experiment (including the Dyninst v4.2.1 source tree) were compiled using gcc v3.3.4
and glibc v2.3.3.
As shown in Figure 3.33, the overhead of the inserted function call is negligible, ∼1%. This
is expected since the x86 assembly generated behind the scenes effects a simple jump into
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Figure 3.33: Kheiron/C overheads of simple instrumentation
the adaptation library followed XSby a return before executing the bodies of SOR execute
and SOR num flops. We expect that the overhead on overall program execution would
depend largely on the operations performed by the inserted “snippets”. Further, the time
the SciMark process spends suspended while Kheiron/C performs the instrumentation is
sub-second, ∼684 msecs ± 7.0686.
3.9.4 Evaluation Part 2: Kheiron/C Injecting Selective Emulation
In this section, we explore the flexibility of Kheiron/C by using it enable a sophisticated
runtime adaptation of a compiled-C application.
To enable applications to detect low-level faults and recover at the function level or, to
enable portions of an application to be run in a computational sandbox, we describe an
approach that allows portions of an executable to be run under the STEM x86 emulator (see
Figure 3.36). We use Kheiron/C to dynamically load the emulator into the target process’
address space and emulate individual functions. STEM (Selective Transactional EMulation)
is an instruction-level emulator – developed by Locasto et al. [171] – that can be selectively
invoked for arbitrary segments of code. The emulator can be used to monitor applications
for specific types of failure prior to executing an instruction, to undo any memory changes
made by the function inside which the fault occurred (by having the emulator track memory
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modifications) and, simulate an error return from the function (error virtualization)[171].
Figure 3.34: Selective emulation in action
The original implementation of STEM works at the source-code level, i.e., a programmer
must insert the necessary STEM “statements” around the portions of the application’s source
code expected to run under the emulator (Figure 3.35). In addition, the STEM library is
statically linked to the executable. To inject STEM into a running, compiled C application,
we need to be able to: load STEM dynamically into a process’ address-space, manage the
CPU-to-STEM transition as well as the STEM-to-CPU transition.
To dynamically load STEM we change the way STEM is built. The original version of
STEM is deployed as a GNU AR archive of the necessary object files; however, the final
binary does not contain an ELF header – this header is required for executables and shared
object (dynamically loadable) files. A cosmetic change to STEM’s makefile suffices – using
gcc with the -shared switch at the final link step. Once the STEM emulator is built as a true
shared object, it can then be dynamically loaded into the address space of a target program
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Figure 3.35: Inserting STEM via source code
using the Dyninst API.
Next, we focus on initializing STEM once it has been loaded into the target process’ address
space. The original version of STEM requires two things for correct initialization. First, the
state of the machine before emulation begins must be saved – at the end of emulation STEM
either commits its current state to the real CPU registers and applies the memory changes or
STEM performs a rollback of the state of the CPU, restoring the saved register state, and
undoes the memory changes made during emulation. Second, STEM’s instruction pipeline
needs to be correctly setup, including the calculation of the address of the first instruction to
be emulated.
To correctly initialize our dynamically-loadable version of STEM we need to be able to
effect the same register saving and instruction pipeline initialization as in the source-scenario.
In the original version of STEM register saving is effected via the emulate init macro, shown
in Figure 3.35. This macro expands into inline assembly, which moves the CPU (x86)
registers (eax, ebx, ecx, edx, esi, edi, ebp, esp, eflags) and segment registers (cs, ds, es, fs,
gs, ss) into STEM data structures.
Whereas Kheiron/C can use Dyninst to dynamically load the shared-object version of STEM
into a target process’ address-space and inject a call to the emulate begin function, the same
cannot be done for the emulate init macro, which must precede a call to emulate begin.
Macros cannot be injected by Dyninst since they are intended to be expanded inline by the
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C/C++ preprocessor before compilation begins. This issue is resolved by modifying the
trampoline – a small piece of code constructed on-the-fly on the stack – Dyninst sets up for
inserting prologues, code (usually function calls) executed before a function is invoked.
Dyninst instrumentation via prologues works as follows: the first five bytes after the base
address15 of the function to be instrumented are replaced with a jump (0xE9 [32-bit
address] ) to the beginning of the trampoline. The assembly instructions in the trampoline
save the CPU registers on the stack, execute the prologue instrumentation code, restore the
CPU registers and branches to the instructions displaced by the jump instruction into the
trampoline. Then another jump is made to the remainder of the function body before control
is finally transferred to the instruction after the instrumented function call [18].
We modify this trampoline such that the contents of the CPU general purpose registers and
segment registers are saved at a memory address (register storage area) accessible by the
process being instrumented. This modification ensures that the saved register data can be
passed into STEM and used in lieu of the emulate init macro. In addition, we modify Dyninst
such that the instructions affected by the insertion of the five-byte jump into the trampoline
are saved at another memory address (code storage area) accessible by the process being
instrumented. Since the x86 processor uses variable-length instructions, there is no direct
correlation between number of instructions displaced and the number of bytes required to
store them. However, Dyninst has an internal function getRelocatedInstructionSz, which
it uses to perform such calculations. We use this internal function to determine the size of
the code storage area where the affected instructions are copied.
The entire CPU-to-STEM transition using our dynamically-loadable version of STEM
is as follows: Kheiron/C loads the STEM emulator shared library and a custom library
(dynamically linked to the STEM shared library) that has functions (RegisterSave and
EmulatorPrime). Next, Kheiron/C uses the Dyninst API to find the functions to be run
15The location in memory of the first assembly instruction of the function.
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under the emulator. Kheiron/C uses Dyninst functions that support its BPatch thread::malloc
API to allocate the areas of memory in the target process’ address-space where register
data and relocated instructions are saved. The addresses of these storage areas are set as
fields added to the BPatch point class – the concrete implementation of Dyninst’s point
abstraction. RegisterSave is passed the address of the storage area and copies data over from
the storage area into STEM registers – so that a subsequent call to emulate begin will work.
EmulatorPrime is passed the address of the code storage area, its size and the number of
instructions it contains. Kheiron/C injects calls to the RegisterSave, EmulatorPrime and
emulate begin functions (in this order) as prologues for the functions to be emulated and
allows the target program to continue. A modification to STEM’s emulate begin function
causes STEM to begin its instruction fetch from the address of the code storage area.
At the end of this process, the instrumented function, when invoked, loads the STEM
emulator and initializes it with the CPU and segment register values as well as enough
information to cause our dynamically-loadable version of STEM to alter its instruction
pointer after executing the relocated instructions and continue the emulation of the remaining
instructions of the function. After the initialization, the injected call to emulate begin will
cause STEM to begin its instruction fetch-decode-execute loop thus running the function
under the emulator.
The final modification to STEM addresses the STEM-to-CPU transition, which occurs when
the emulator needs to unload and allow the real CPU to continue from the address after the
function call run under the emulator. Rather than inject calls to emulate end, we modify
STEM’s emulate begin function such that it keeps track of its own stack-depth. Initially,
this value is set to 0; if the function being emulated contains a call (0xE8) instruction, the
stack-depth is incremented, when it returns the stack-depth is decremented. STEMmarks the
end of emulation by the detection of a leave (0xC9) or return/ret (0xC2/0xC3) at stack-depth
0. At this point, the emulator either commits or restores the CPU registers and, using the
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Figure 3.36: Selective emulation via Kheiron/C + Dyninst
address stored in the saved stack pointer register (esp), causes the real CPU to continue its
execution from the instruction immediately after the emulated function call.
3.10 Integrity/Consistency-preserving Adaptations
To provide any guarantees that the runtime adaptations we effect preserve the integrity and
consistency of the application and execution environment we need to have an understanding
of how the execution environment works and how the application works.
In the preceding three sections (§3.7, §3.8 and §3.9) we discuss and demonstrate techniques
for effecting a variety of runtime adaptations in applications running in managed and
unmanaged execution environments; however, in the presentation of our runtime adaptation
techniques we have primarily focused on the execution environment’s role in ensuring
that adaptations preserve the integrity/consistency of the application and the execution
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environment.
For example, managed execution environments like the CLR and JVM have rules on what
constitutes a valid program, these rules act as guidelines for our metadata and bytecode
insertions and modifications. Similarly, the instruction set of the underlying processor,
function call setup/cleanup conventions and linkage specifications provide guidelines for
runtime adaptations in unmanaged execution environments.
However, understanding how the execution environment works is only one aspect of effecting
integrity/consistency-preserving adaptations. Knowledge of how the target application
operates is also important. Our case study of reconfiguring the Alchemi Enterprise Grid
Computing system using Kheiron/CLR briefly touches on this (see §3.7.8).
Whereas Kheiron/CLR can effect adaptations in Alchemi without requiring access to source
code for re-compilation, our ability to safely effect a scheduler swap in the Alchemi Manager
was enhanced by having access to its source code. This access allowed us identify the main
activities and actors (object instances, threads, variables, etc.) involved in its startup and
shutdown processes and develop an adaptation strategy that effected an orderly shutdown of
the Alchemi Manager and correctly re-initialized it with a with a new scheduler instance.
This example of adapting Alchemi safely underscores the need to understand the operation
of the target system being adapted. Without access to knowledge of how the system works –
either through source code, developer/engineer knowledge etc. – the only guarantees that
can be given are ones concerning the execution environment’s rules for valid programs.
Whereas analysis of executable units can identify structural dependencies, e.g., compile-time
program-element dependencies, symbols and function/method implementations (bytecode
or assembly instructions), while program tracing can provide insights into the sequences
of operations that occur, they are not guaranteed to reveal the semantics of the system’s
operation – symbol names may be misleading or obfuscated/mangled – making it difficult
to understand how the system works and harder to provide guarantees that the adaptations
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being effected will not compromise its integrity/consistency.
3.11 Related Work
3.11.1 Runtime Adaptation
Our Kheiron prototypes are concerned with facilitating very fine-grained adaptations in
existing/legacy systems, whereas systems such as KX [94] and Rainbow [169] are concerned
with coarser-grained adaptations. However, the Kheiron prototypes could be used as low-
level mechanisms orchestrated/directed by these larger frameworks.
JOIE [34] is a toolkit for performing load-time transformations on Java classfiles. Un-
like Kheiron/JVM, JOIE uses a modified classloader to apply transformations to each
class brought into the local environment [33]. Further, since the goal of JOIE is to fa-
cilitate load-time modifications, any applied transformations remain fixed throughout the
execution-lifetime of the class whereas Kheiron/JVM can undo/modify some of its load-time
transformations at runtime e.g. removing instrumentation and modifying instrumentation
and method implementations via bytecode rewriting. Finally, Kheiron/JVM can also perform
certain runtime modifications to metadata, e.g. adding new references to external classes
such that their methods can be used in injected instrumentation.
FIST [105] is a framework for the instrumentation of Java programs. The main difference
between FIST and Kheiron/JVM is that FIST works with a modified version of the Jikes
Research Virtual Machine (RVM) [9] whereas Kheiron/JVM works with unmodified Sun
JVMs. FIST modifies the Jikes RVM Just-in-Time compiler to insert a breakpoint into the
prologue of a method to generate an event when the method is entered to allow a response
on the method entry event. Control transfer to instrumentation code can then occur when the
compiled version of the method is executed. The Jikes RVM can be configured to always
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JIT-compile methods; however, the unmodified Sun JVMs, v1.4x and v1.5x, do not support
this configuration. As a result, Kheiron/JVM relies on bytecode rewriting to transfer control
to instrumentation code as a response to method entry and/or method exit – transfer of
control will occur with both the interpreted and compiled versions of methods 16.
A popular approach to performing fine-grained adaptations in managed applications is
to use Aspect Oriented Programming (AOP). AOP is an approach to designing software
that allows developers to modularize cross-cutting concerns [61] that manifest themselves
as non-functional system requirements. In the context of self-managing systems AOP is
an approach to designing the system such that the non-functional requirement of having
adaptation mechanisms available is cleanly separated from the logic that meets the system’s
functional requirements. An AOP engine is still necessary to realize the final system. Unlike
Kheiron, which can facilitate adaptations in existing systems at the execution environment-
level, the AOP approach is a design-time approach, mainly relevant for new systems.
AOP engines weave together the code that meets the functional requirements of the system
with the aspects that encapsulate the non-functional system requirements. There are three
kinds of AOP engines: those that perform weaving at compile time (static weaving), e.g.,
AspectJ [57], Aspect C# [76]; those that perform weaving after compile time but before load
time, e.g., Weave .NET [46], which pre-processes managed executables, operating directly
on bytecode and metadata; and those that perform weaving at runtime (dynamic weaving)
using facilities of the execution environment, e.g. A dynamic AOP-Engine for .NET [56]
and CLAW [106]. Kheiron/JVM is similar to the dynamic weaving AOP engines only in its
use of the facilities of execution environment to effect adaptations in managed applications
while they run.
Adaptation concepts such as Micro-Reboots [21] and adaptive systems such as the K42
operating system [19] require upfront design-time effort to build in adaptation mechanisms.
16Kheiron/JVM uses the JVMTI, which was introduced in the v1.5 JVM and as a result only works with
v1.5x or later JVM implementations.
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Our Kheiron implementations do not require special designed-in hooks, but they can take
advantage of them if they exist. In the absence of designed-in hooks, our Kheiron imple-
mentations could refresh components/data structures or restart components and sub-systems,
provided that the structure/architecture of the system is amenable to it, i.e., reasonably
well-defined APIs exist.
Georgia Tech’s ‘service morphing’ [148] involves compiler-based techniques and operating
system kernel modifications for generating and deploying special code modules, both to
perform adaptation and to be selected amongst during dynamic reconfigurations. A service
that supports service morphing is actually comprised of multiple code modules, potentially
spread across multiple machines. The assumption here is that the information flows and the
services applied to them are well specified and known at runtime. Changes/adaptations take
advantage of meta-information about typed information flows, information items, services
and code modules. In contrast, Kheiron operates entirely at runtime rather than compile
time. Further, Kheiron does not require a modified execution environment: it uses existing
facilities and characteristics of the execution environment whereas service morphing makes
changes to a component of the unmanaged execution environment – the operating system.
Trap/J [159] and Trap.NET [158] produce adapt-ready programs (statically) via a two-step
process. An existing program (compiled bytecode) is augmented with generic interceptors
called “hooks” in its execution path, wrapper classes and meta-level classes. These are then
used by a weaver to produce an adapt-ready set of bytecode modules. Kheiron/JVM operates
entirely at runtime and could use function call replacement (or delegation) to forward
invocations to specially produced adapt-ready implementations via runtime bytecode re-
writing.
For performing fine-grained adaptations on unmanaged applications, a number of toolkits
are available; however many of them, including EEL [108] and ATOM [178], operate
post-link time but before the application begins to run. As a result, they cannot interact with
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systems in execution and the changes they make cannot be modified without rebuilding/re-
processing the object file on disk. Using Dyninst as the foundation under Kheiron/C we are
able to interact with running programs – provided they have been built to include symbol
information.
Our Kheiron implementations specifically focus on facilitating fine-grained adaptations
in applications rather than in the operating system itself. KernInst [184] enables a user
to dynamically instrument an already-running unmodified Solaris kernel in a fine-grained
manner. KernInst can be seen as implementing some autonomic functionality, i.e., kernel
performance measurement and consequent runtime optimization, while applications continue
to run. DTrace [24] dynamically inserts instrumentation code into a running Solaris kernel
by implementing a simple virtual machine in kernel space that interprets bytecode generated
by a compiler for the ‘D’ language, a variant of C specifically for writing instrumentation
code. TOSKANA [48] takes an aspect-oriented approach to deploying before, after and
around advice for in-kernel functions into the NetBSD kernel. They describe some examples
of self-configuration (removal of physical devices while in use), self-healing (adding new
swap files when virtual memory is exhausted), self-optimization (switching free block
count to occur when the free block bitmap is updated rather than read), and self-protection
(dynamically adding access control semantics associated with new authentication devices).
3.11.2 Software Implemented Fault-Injection Tools
For software-implemented fault-injection tools there are a number of benefits realized by
building them on top of a dynamic-adaptation framework like Kheiron.
1. Unlike FAUMachine [172], Ferrari [95] and Ftape [191], which are limited to injecting
bit flips in CPU registers, memory addresses and emulating disk I/O errors, using
Kheiron’s capabilities we build fault-injection tools that can inject more specific
faults targeting individual components, subsystems, methods and data structures e.g.
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removing components, inserting delays or hangs, modifying specific fields of data
structures/objects or inducing resource leaks.
2. Unlike Doctor [70], which uses compile-time program modifications to insert the fault-
injection mechanisms, Kheiron’s ability to dynamically add and remove mechanisms
allows us the flexibility to manage the performance overhead of persistent fault-
injection mechanisms by dynamically removing them. Further, new fault-injection
mechanisms can be added on-the-fly.
3. Unlike Xception [112], which depends on the low-level facilities of the PowerPC
processor, Kheiron’s ability to support the insertion of fault-injection mechanisms
does not rely on specific debugging or performance monitoring facilities of the x86
processor.
4. Unlike FIST (Fault Injection System for Study of Transient Fault Effect) [68] and
MARS (Maintainable Real-Time System) [99], fault-injection tools built using Khe-
iron do not require special hardware to induce faults. FIST and MARS use hardware
that generates ion radiation and electromagnetic fields to induce faults in target sys-
tems.
5. Holodeck [165] interposes between the application and the operating system. As a
result, it induces faults in the application indirectly. For example, it can corrupt files,
corrupt network packets, intercept/redirect system calls, etc. However, fault-injection
tools built on top of Kheiron can inject faults directly into the application itself.
6. Jaca [116] is a fault-injection tool intended to validate Java applications. Jaca injects
high-level faults affecting attributes and methods of an object’s public interface via
load-time bytecode rewriting. The faults injected by Jaca include corrupting method
attributes, parameters and return values. In addition to performing load-time bytecode
changes like Jaca, fault-injection tools built using Kheiron are also able to perform
runtime changes that add, augment or remove fault-injection mechanisms. Further,
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Kheiron supports the adaptations of applications written in a broader set of languages
including C, Java and languages targeting Microsoft’s CLR, e.g., C#, VB .NET, etc.
through the use of a common model for interacting with programs dynamically that is
built on top of existing execution environment facilities.
3.12 Summary
This chapter introduced Kheiron, a suite of tools for effecting fine-grained in-vivo and
in-situ adaptations in software systems written in different languages (.NET, Java and C),
running in different execution environments. We identified two major classes of execution
environments, managed and unmanaged, and presented a generic model, which is used by





ELF Binaries JVM 1.5.x CLR 1.1




































Table 3.12: Execution environment facilities
Our generic model of adaptation is based on four key facilities existing, or easily added
to, contemporary execution environments: program tracing, program steering, metadata
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querying and metadata editing. Table 3.12 summarizes techniques used to effect adaptations
in the three execution environments studied – Microsoft’s Common Language Runtime, Sun
Microsystems’ Java Virtual Machine and the unmanaged execution environment consisting
of the Linux operating system and the raw x86 processor.
In elaborating on the implementation details of Kheiron, we comprehensively cover and
compare the techniques that are used to effect runtime adaptations in the contemporary
managed and unmanaged execution environments studied.
Finally, we demonstrate Kheiron’s ability to effect fine-grained adaptations in multiple
systems using three case studies: runtime reconfiguration of .NET applications using Khe-
iron/CLR (§3.7.8), runtime fault-injection in Java-based applications using Kheiron/JVM
((§3.8.6)) and selective emulation of C programs using Kheiron/C (§3.9.4). The next
chapter develops an evaluation methodology and benchmark for assessing the Reliability,
Availability and Serviceability (RAS) properties of software systems, which uses the run-
time adaptation capabilities of Kheiron (specifically its in-vivo and in-situ fault-injection
capabilities) to construct failure scenarios that are used in RAS-evaluations.
Part II
RAS Evaluations via Runtime
Adaptation and RAS Modeling
This part describes the runtime fault-injection tools and analytical techniques that we
combine to construct failure scenarios, which allow us to evaluate and compare the RAS




Evaluating and comparing the Reliability, Availability and Serviceability (RAS) capabilities
of systems requires reasoning about aspects of the system’s operation that may be difficult
to capture or quantify using performance metrics alone.
Whereas performance metrics provide insights into the feasibility of using a system with its
RAS-enhancing remediation mechanisms enabled, there are more in-depth analyses that we
wish to perform. For example, we want to be able to evaluate the efficacy of any RAS mech-
anisms the system may have, reason about the expected benefits of yet-to-be-added RAS-
enhancing mechanisms, reason about RAS deficiencies, evaluate different combinations of
mechanisms, evaluate and compare mechanisms that may employ different remediation-
strategies (reactive, preventative, proactive), reason about tradeoffs between mechanisms and
identify under-performing or sub-optimal mechanisms. Measures concerned with overall
system performance do not adequately capture the details that distinguish one remediation
mechanism from another, e.g., remediation accuracy/success rates, fault/failure coverage,
the impact of remediation failures, the consequences of remediation strategy/style and
accounting for partially automated remediations. These deficiencies of performance metrics
and benchmarks limit our ability to use them as a primary means of comparing or ranking
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systems based on their RAS capabilities.
An additional consideration for evaluating the RAS capabilities of systems is that the no-
tions of “good” and “better” are dependent on the environmental constraints governing
the system’s operation. For example, service level agreements (SLAs), policies, and inter-
nally/externally visible service level objectives including but not limited to: uptime guaran-
tees, meeting production targets, reducing production delays, improving problem-resolution
and service-restoration activities, etc. Whereas there are aspects of the environmental con-
straints that can be evaluated using performance metrics, such as response time guarantees
in SLAs, these metrics are insufficient for evaluating other constraints.
As a result, evaluating and comparing RAS capabilities requires something beyond per-
formance metrics and benchmarks. Specifically, tools and techniques that support more
in-depth analyses of the details of RAS mechanisms (the micro-view), while considering the
role and effects of the environmental constraints (the macro-view).
The importance of the environmental constraints in evaluating the RAS capabilities of
systems cannot be understated since these constraints serve four major purposes. First, they
help identify the failures and faults that impact these environmental constraints. Second, they
enable reasoning about these impacts from the different perspectives of those affected (end-
users, system operators/engineers/administrators and management). Third, they provide a
source of possible metrics that can be used to quantify the impacts of RAS deficiencies,
remediation failures and partially automated remediations. And finally, they establish the
(scoring-)boundaries within which a system and its collection/composition of mechanisms
can be considered to be better than another.
In this thesis we develop a model-based and measurement-based approach to evaluating the
RAS capabilities of systems. Our evaluation approach is based on failure scenarios, which
can be combined and extended to develop a RAS benchmark for a specific system or class
of systems.
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A failure scenario consists of three elements:
1. A set of faults that induce the failure of interest
2. A set of fault-injection tools capable of a) injecting one or more of the faults or b)
otherwise inducing the failure of interest
3. A set of reusable analytical model templates used for scoring i.e. to quantify the
impact(s) of a failure and/or the efficacy of any remediation mechanism(s) available
and to capture the different perspectives of interest (end-user, operator/engineer and
management)
4.1 Hypotheses
In Chapter 3 we demonstrated techniques and a suite of tools for effecting fine-grained adap-
tations that could be used to inject faults and induce failures in a variety of systems written
in multiple languages running on different platforms. In the context of RAS evaluations
and the construction of failure-scenarios, similarly flexible adaptation tools allow failure
scenario support to be grafted onto existing/legacy systems allowing for the study of the
failure behavior of systems and an evaluation of their RAS capabilities directly in their
deployment environments. Such dynamic tools play a major role in our measurement-based
evaluations of RAS capabilities.
The main hypothesis in this chapter is that mathematical tools such as Markov chains,
Markov reward networks and Control Theory models can be successfully used to de-
scribe failure scenarios designed to quantitatively evaluate/score the RAS capabilities
of systems. In validating this hypothesis we demonstrate how these tools can be used to
create simple, reusable model templates for scoring and studying RAS properties. Further,
we show that these model templates produced for scoring can be simpler than a detailed
model of the implementation of the mechanisms, sub-system or system being studied while
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still providing insights into the failure behavior of systems and the efficacy of its remediation
mechanisms.
4.2 Analytical Tools
4.2.1 Continuous Time Markov Chains (CTMCs)
The first analytical tool we discuss is the Continuous Time Markov Chain (CTMC). We
use CTMCs to model the failure behavior of systems, model the activities associated with
remediations and quantitatively assess the impacts of these failures and/or remediations on
facets of system reliability, availability and serviceability.
We choose CTMCs as one of our evaluation tools because of their flexibility, their ability to
be combined and/or arranged hierarchically, their wide use and the existence of numerous
solution techniques for their analysis [69, 101]. CTMCs have been well studied and have
been used to analyze different classes of failures, e.g., independent [2], near-coincident [42]
and cascading failures [91] in degradable, repairable and fault-tolerant systems.
CTMCs can also be used to reason about different remediation strategies – reactive, preven-
tative, proactive [101]. Further, they provide the foundations for other modeling formalisms
used to study the behavior of computer systems including, but not limited to: Stochastic
Petri Nets (SPNs) and Stochastic Activity Networks (SANs) [161].
Finally, CTMCs can lead to the development of fluid models of system behavior allowing
for powerful control theoretic analysis of system operation [139].
We now provide some background on CTMCs, highlighting the properties that make them
suitable for modeling and evaluating RAS capabilities.
A Markov chain is defined as a Markov process with a finite (or countably infinite) state
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space. A Markov process is a stochastic process whose dynamic behavior is such that the
probability distributions for its future development depend only on the present state and not
on how the process arrived in that state [101] – the memoryless property. The memoryless
property of Markov processes greatly simplifies their analysis [69] and provides for tractable
solution techniques.
Graphically, Markov chains can be represented by a directed graph. The vertices in the
graph represent the states of system operation and the edges represent state transitions (see
Figure 4.1).
A Markov chain is irreducible if all states in the chain can be reached pairwise from each
other. A state in the chain is said to be absorbing if and only if no other state in the chain
can be reached from it [69]. These two distinctions allow us to use Markov chains to
model a software system (or aspects of its operation) as an infinitely running process or as a
terminating/on-demand process [59], depending on the kind of system being studied and/or
the kinds of analysis to be conducted e.g. studying the steady-state behavior of a system
using irreducible Markov chains vs. reasoning about the expected time to completion for an
operation using Markov chains with absorbing states.
Figure 4.1: Markov chain
States in a Markov chain may be labeled/grouped to identify some interesting behavioral
property of the system or process being modeled. For example a state may be marked as
’UP’ to indicate that the system being modeled is doing useful work (this includes operating
in a degraded mode); otherwise it may be labeled as ’DOWN’ to indicate that the system is
oﬄine or not doing useful work.
A Markov chain may be (time)-homogeneous or non-homogeneous. In a homogeneous
Markov chain, the transition probabilities are independent of the time epoch, i.e., the
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probability of a transition from state si to s j during an interval [v, t] – usually written pi j(v, t)
– depends only on the time difference (t − v) rather than on the specific time/epoch (global
clock value) when the transition occurs. However, in a non-homogeneous Markov chain the
transition probabilities pi j(v, t) can change as a result of the current epoch (global clock).
Using homogeneous Markov chains, allows us to model the failure behavior of a system as
time-independent, whereas using non-homogeneous Markov chains allows us to analyze
time-dependent failures, e.g., aging-related failures as presented in [13].
There are two classes of Markov chains, Continuous Time Markov Chains (CTMCs) and
Discrete Time Markov Chains (DTMCs). Whereas DTMCs and CTMCs have a number
of similarities, the major distinction between them comes with respect to when transitions
between states can occur. This distinction is integral to our use of CTMCs to model failures
and remediation activities rather than DTMCs.
In a DTMC, state transitions occur at fixed discrete time points. From its start state s0, a
DTMC evolves step by step according to one-step transition probabilities. For any time
point the probabilities of a transition from si to s j can be computed using the transition
probabilities of the initial state, s0. CTMCs, on the other hand, are more flexible. In a
CTMC, state transitions occur at arbitrary points in time leading to a fluid-like interpretation
of its behavior using rates of transition between states to describe/characterize the behavior
of a CTMC over time.
State transition rates (i.e., state transitions and state sojourn times) of a homogeneous CTMC
can be described by an exponential distribution [69] 1. In the context of studying system
failures the memoryless property of the exponential distribution implies that failures appear
at random points during an interval. This can be restated as: the time we must wait for
the next failure event is statistically independent of how long we have spent waiting for
it to happen [72]. Modeling failures as randomly-appearing using CTMCs provides more
1The exponential distribution is the only continuous-time distribution that provides the memoryless
property.
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flexibility than DTMCs and may be more natural, for example, in situations where predicting
failure events down to a specific time step, as can be done with a DTMC using its one-step
transition probabilities, is difficult in the general case or unnecessary for the analysis at hand.
However, if such specificity is required, transient analysis of the CTMC, using a technique
called Uniformization can derive the one-step transition probability matrix for an equivalent
DTMC [69].
The exponentially distributed rates of transition between the states of a CTMC and its
structure – the arrangement of subsets of states in series, parallel or combinations thereof
– can be used to model processes that may be characterized by a variety of probability
distributions. In the context of RAS evaluations, the probability distributions are used to
estimate the hazard rates (rates of failure), describe the failure behaviors and/or remediation
activities and to construct the CTMCs used in their analysis.
There are a number of probability distributions that have been used to model failures
and remediations including, but are not limited to: the Erlang-k distribution, the Hypo-
exponential distribution, the Hyper-exponential distribution, the Weibull distribution and the
Log-Logistic distribution. Details on estimating the rate of failure (hazard rate) for each of
these probability distributions using exponentially distributed transition rates can be found
in [101].
• The Erlang-k distribution is used to model processes with k sequential stages each
having identical exponential rates of transition. The Exponential distribution is a
special case of the Erlang distribution with k = 1. In the context of characterizing
failure behaviors, the Erlang-k distribution can be used to model constant failure
rate (CFR) distributions in systems without redundancy (k = 1) or in systems with
redundancy (k > 1). Similarly, in the context of characterizing remediation activities
the Erlang-k distribution can be used to characterize systems with constant repair
times and a single shared repair station or multiple repair stations.
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• TheHypo-exponential distribution is used to model processes with multiple sequen-
tial stages as well; however, it provides for a variation on the Erlang-k distribution,
and allows each stage to have different exponential rates of transition. In the context
of characterizing failure behaviors, the Hypo-exponential distribution is used to model
systems with increasing failure rate (IFR) distributions. IFR distributions are one way
to model cascading failures, where the rate of failure monotonically increases at each
stage. In the context of characterizing remediation activities, IFR distributions are a
prerequisite for preventative maintenance. If a system’s failure behavior cannot be
described by an IFR distribution then preventative maintenance will not result in any
improvements [101]. The goal of preventative maintenance is to avoid the system
entering a stage where its failure rate increases by performing actions that revert the
system to an earlier point in its lifetime. If failure rates normally decrease over the
lifetime of a system, preventative maintenance actions that revert the system to an
early point in its lifetime would be counter-productive. The Hypo-exponential distri-
bution can also be used to model remediations with multiple sequential steps where
the remediation times are strictly increasing, e.g., resorting to one or more manual
remediations after one or more automated remediations have been unsuccessful.
• The Hyper-exponential distribution is used to model processes with k alternate
or parallel stages where the process can only occupy one stage at any time. In
the context of characterizing failure behaviors, the Hyper-exponential distribution
is used to model decreasing failure rate (DFR) distributions [101]. In the context
of characterizing remediation activities, the Hyper-exponential distribution can be
used for analyzing systems with multiple alternative remediations for a single failure.
This includes considerations for imperfect remediations where c% of failures are
successfully handled by remediation R1 and (1 − c)% of failures are handled by
remediation R2.
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• TheWeibull distribution is a parametric distribution, which can be used to model
DFR, CFR or IFR distributions. Whereas its modeling capabilities are equivalent to
the Erlang-k, Hypo-exponential and Hyper-exponential distributions, it provides for
more flexibility via the choice of its parameters.
• The Log-Logistic distribution is a less rigid probability distribution able to model
more complex failure rate distributions than DFR (strictly decreasing), CFR (constant)
and IFR (strictly increasing). The Log-Logistic distribution can be used to model
processes where the rate of failure initially increases then decreases – UBT (upside-
down bathtub) distributions [101]. The Log-Logistic distribution has been used in
reliability growth models, which track reliability improvements over the lifetime of a
system as enhancements are made to its design, subsystems and/or components.
For modeling more complex processes, CTMCs may be constructed to represent combina-
tions of one or more of the probability distributions listed above. The Generalized Erlang
distribution is one example of a distribution realized by combining the Hyper-exponential
and Erlang-k distributions [69]. In addition to combining CTMCs to model different prob-
ability distributions, multiple CTMCs can be composed and/or arranged hierarchically to
analyze a system at different levels of detail. Such compositions allow us to manage the size
(state space) of the Markov chain being analyzed and is a standard largeness-avoidance tech-
nique for enabling the tractable analysis of complex Markov Chains [98]. In a hierarchical
arrangement, sub-models can be evaluated independently and their results later combined
using another sub-model.
In addition to being tractable to analyze, composable, and powerful enough to model com-
plex failure behaviors and/or remediation activities that can be characterized by different
probability distributions, techniques also exist for creating Markov chains to model processes
that may have non-exponential probability distributions. In the “simple” case, approxima-
tions based on combinations of exponential distributions may be used. For more complex
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cases techniques such as the inclusion of supplementary and indicator variables [121, 69]
and embedding techniques [69] may be used to turn an initially non-Markov process into a
Markov process, which can then be analyzed using existing solution techniques.
4.2.2 Markov Reward Networks
Markov Reward Networks are a simple extension of Markov Chains that allow us to assign
cost or reward structures (values) to states and/or transitions of a Markov process. As a result,
Markov Reward Networks provide a unifying framework for an integrated specification of
model structure and system requirements [69].
Markov Reward Networks have been used extensively in optimization problems in Markov
decision theory [69] and performability analysis [120] (an integrated approach to evaluating
performance and dependability characteristics of computing systems).
In our construction of RAS models we use Markov Reward Networks based on Continuous
Time Markov Chains (CTMCs) discussed earlier (4.2.1) to quantify the impacts of failure
and/or remediations. Using Markov Reward Networks does not preclude considering the
performance implications of failure and/or remediations, e.g., degradation since performance
related measures such as throughput per unit time can be assigned to one or more states in
the CTMC and used to quantify the performance impacts. Assigning rewards or costs to
CTMC states combined with the appropriate labeling/grouping of states allow us to capture
the impacts of failures and/or remediations from the three different perspectives of interest –
end user/client, administrator/operator/engineer and business/management (examples of this
are provided in 4.3).
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4.2.3 Feedback Control Models
In this thesis we use principles of the branch of Control Theory concerned with Feedback
control systems to reason quantitatively about a system’s ability to meet the operational
goals and environmental constraints (policies), which govern its operation.
We use feedback control models as one of our evaluation tools because of the framework it
provides for realizing predictable systems – systems where the expected response of the
system to changes (in the system and/or in its environment) can be characterized and/or
evaluated quantitatively. Further, feedback control can also be used to realize robust adaptive
systems – systems that automatically adjust to reject disturbances and accommodate noise
while continuing to meet their operational goals.
We posit that predictable systems are easier to manage than unpredictable systems, and
as a result predictability affects the Serviceability characteristics of a system concerned
with meeting objectives in the presence of failures and/or remediations. In this section we
identify the properties of feedback control systems that can be used to quantify facets of
system Serviceability in the development of our RAS models.
Control Theory and feedback control has been widely studied and employed in other
engineering disciplines including, but not limited to: mechanical engineering and electrical
engineering. Further, despite the stochastic nature of computing systems, feedback control
has been applied to their analysis and design with encouraging results [90, 145, 45, 196] 2.
We now provide some background on Feedback control, highlighting the properties that
make it suitable for use in constructing RAS models.
Control Theory is concerned with the study of dynamical systems and is commonly used to
achieve one or more of the following objectives: regulatory control, disturbance rejection
and optimization.
2One approach for dealing with system stochastics involves building on results from Queuing Theory[90]
when developing feedback control models of system behavior.
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Regulatory control ensures that some measurable characteristic (measured output) of the
(target) system is equal to or near a desired/specified reference value (reference input).
Disturbance rejection ensures that disturbances acting on the system do not significantly
affect its measured output. And finally, optimization is concerned with obtaining the best
value of the measured output of the system. In our development of RAS models we are
interested primarily in regulatory control.
There are two main classes of control systems, open-loop (feedforward) control systems
(Figure 4.2) and closed-loop (feedback) control systems (Figure 4.3). Before discussing
the differences between feedforward and feedback control systems we first describe the
elements typically found in control systems:
Figure 4.2: Block diagram of feedforward control [90]
Figure 4.3: Block diagram of a feedback control system [90]
• The Target System – the system to be controlled.
• Measured output – one or more measurable characteristics of the target system.
• Reference input – desired value(s) of the measured output.
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• Control input – one or more (dynamically adjustable) parameters that affect the
behavior of the target system.
• The Controller – manipulates/determines the setting of the control input to achieve
the reference input.
• The Transducer – transforms the measured output such that it can be compared with
the reference input and/or used by the Controller. Examples include moving-average
filters and unit conversions.
• Control error – difference between the measured output and the reference input.
• Disturbance input – changes that affect the way the control input influences the
measured output.
• Noise input – any effect that changes the measured output of the target system.
The main difference between feedforward control and feedback control is the role of the
measured output in each of these control systems and its implications for controller design.
Feedforward controllers use the reference input (and sometimes the disturbance input) to
determine the setting of the control input needed to achieve the desired measured output.
Unlike feedback controllers, they do not use the measured output to adjust the control
input. As a result, feedforward control is more suitable for systems where the control
input is a deterministic function of the reference and/or disturbance input and an accurate
model of the system that is robust to changes in the system and its operating environment is
available or can be constructed [90]. These properties of feedforward control systems, while
making them less complex to design than feedback control systems, also make them less
flexible/adaptive.
In addition to being more flexible than feedforward control systems, feedback control
systems and the design principles used to realize them can be used to develop systems that
exhibit four desirable properties – referred to as SASO properties – and analyze whether
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systems exhibit any or all of these properties:
1. Stability – a stable system produces bounded output for any bounded input (these con-
trol systems are sometimes referred to as being Bounded Input Bounded Output/BIBO
stable).
2. Accuracy – the measured output of an accurate control system converges or becomes
sufficiently close to the reference input (small steady-state control error).
3. Short settling times – a control system with short settling times quickly converges to
its steady state value.
4. Avoids overshoot – a control system that avoids overshoot allows changes to the
control input to made while maintaining its measured output.
The flexible/adaptive nature of feedback control systems and the ability to analyze the
SASO properties of such systems provides a framework for codifying operational policies
(internally and externally visible service level objectives, environmental constraints, SLAs
etc.) for a computing system and reasoning about the ability of the system to meet these
goals in the presence of failures and/or remediation activities.
4.3 Analysis Techniques
In §4.2 we described the three analytical tools/ frameworks: Continuous Time Markov
Chains (CTMCs) §4.2.1, Markov Reward Networks §4.2.2, and Feedback Control §4.2.3 –
and their associated properties that motivated their use in the creation of (RAS) models used
to analyze the failure behavior and/or remediation activities of systems. In this section we
discuss the specific facets (metrics) of reliability, availability and serviceability quantified
using our RAS models and describe the analysis techniques used to calculate them.
To aid this discussion we demonstrate the construction and use of RAS models via an exam-
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ple analytical evaluation of a recursively restartable (microrebootable) J2EE3 application
server prototype developed by the Berkeley/Stanford Recovery Oriented Computing (ROC)
group on top of a modified version of the open-source JBoss application server. Our analysis
complements the measurement-based evaluation done in [20]4 and uses the results reported
therein to derive estimates for RAS model parameters.
Whereas the evaluation done in [20] focuses primarily on comparing fine-grained microre-
boots to coarser-grained full-system reboots, the goal of our analysis is to create an RAS
model that can be used to describe failure scenarios for a system using recursive microreboots
and to score/evaluate the system’s responses.
4.3.1 Microreboot RAS Model
Recursive microreboots are a technique for improving overall system availability by reac-
tively restarting failed components and rejuvenating functioning components to prevent
degradation [21]. It is specifically targeted at recovering from failures such as crashes,
deadlocks, infinite loops, livelocks and state corruption (memory leaks, dangling pointers,
damaged heaps, etc.).
A microreboot (µRB) can be applied at different levels of a system: component-level,
subsystem-level or whole-system level5. As a remediation technique, recursive microreboots
target the minimal set of a system’s components for a restart and progressively restart larger
subsets of components up to and including restarting the entire system. Microreboots, like
whole-system reboots, have a number of properties in common that make them attractive
as a remediation mechanism. They return the target of recovery (component, subsystem,
3Java 2 Platform, Enterprise Edition (J2EE) defines the standard for developing multi-tier enterprise
applications [128].
4Additional measurement-based evaluations can be found in [23] and [22].
5The ability to precisely target and restart system elements at these various levels depend on a number of
structural properties and design considerations of the system under consideration. See [21] for more details on
design considerations for recursively restartable systems.
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system) to a well-understood state – its start state. Further, they provide a high confidence
way of reclaiming stale or leaked resources [21].
We chose recursive microreboot for our analysis example because it is an instance of a
sophisticated remediation mechanism that exhibits a number of characteristics that make it
interesting to study:
1. Layered recovery strategy – one layer for each level at which recovery can occur in
the system.
2. Imperfect recovery between layers – failures can escalate to higher layers e.g. if
component-level reboots are unsuccessful then the failure “bubbles” up to the next
higher layer to be handled – subsystem-level reboots – and so on.
3. Problem mitigation rather than elimination – microreboots do not eliminate the
underlying root cause of the problem, rather they attempt mitigate its effects. Over
time, the same failures can resurface.
In [20], the authors evaluate the efficacy of microrebooting, comparing fine-grained microre-
boots to coarse-grained system reboots using their microrebootable J2EE application server,
custom fault-injection tools and eBid, a version of the Rice University Bidding System
(RUBiS) N-tier web-application, modified to be amenable to microreboots. RUBiS is a
J2EE/Web-based auction system modeled after eBay.com.
The test system deployment in [20] consists of the following elements, which also correspond
to the units of recovery. These recovery units are listed in order of fine-grained restarts to
coarse-grained restarts:
• Enterprise Java Beans (EJBs) – these encapsulate the business logic of the eBid
web-application. They may interact with other EJBs and/or backend databases in the
processing of a client request.
• Web Archive (WAR) – this is the unit of deployment for the web application. It
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contains the presentation tier of the web application: Java Server Pages (JSPs) and
servlets. These invoke EJB methods and format the returned results for presentation
to the client.
• eBid web-application – the collection of EJBs, JSPs and servlets.
• JVM/JBoss – the execution/hosting environment for the eBid web-application.
A Recovery Manager component added to the JBoss application server performs failure
diagnosis and recovery guided by the simple recursive policy of “cheapest recovery first”. In
response to the faults injected into eBid, the recovery manager progressively reboots larger
sets of components: first EJBs, then eBid’s WAR, then the eBid web application, followed
by the JVM/JBoss, and if necessary finally reboots the operating system. To fully resolve
some failures microreboots may be followed up by additional automated or manual actions,
e.g., recovering persistent data may be done automatically (via transaction rollback) or may
require manual reconstruction of the data in the database.
Based on the description of the microrebootable application server in [20], we use the
SHARPE [160] RAS modeling and analysis tool to generate a model (shown in Figure 4.4)
that can be used to evaluate the efficacy of the application server and its recovery manager.
The RAS model is an irreducible CTMC that consists of 6 states and 17 parameters, see
Table 4.1.
Our RAS model captures a number of key elements of the operation of the application
server’s recovery manager including: a) multiple layers of recovery and b) the possible
escalation of failures to higher levels of recovery. Further, the use of an irreducible CTMC
allows us to model the operation of the Recovery Manager as an infinitely running process
where failures can re-occur.
This RAS model, plus fault-injection tools like Kheiron (Chapter 3) or the ones used in the
experiments in [20], can be used to design, initiate and score fault-injection experiments
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Figure 4.4: RAS model for a microrebootable application server
that represent different failure scenarios for evaluating the efficacy of microreboots.
Fault-injection tools can be used to control the rate of failure (λ f ailure) and/or the proportions
of failures that initially target a specific level of recovery (pe jb rb, pwar rb, and p jvm jboss rb).
Varying these parameters allows us to study the behavior of the system under different
fault-loads/failure mixes.
Parameters concerned with the success or failure of recovery at a specific level (pe jb rb success,
pe jb f allthru, pwar rb success, pwar f allthru, pebid rb success, pebid f allthru, p jvm jboss rb success, and
p jvm jboss f allthru) can be observed experimentally or varied in the model to reason about their
expected impacts on system operation.
Parameters concerned with recovery times at a specific level (µe jb rb, µwar rb, µebid rb,
µ jvm jboss rb, and µoperator f ix) can be observed experimentally or varied in the model based on
simple rules of thumb, e.g., an order of magnitude increase in recovery time as the recovery
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S 0 The initial state of the system
S 1 State where one or more EJBs is being restarted
S 2 State where the eBid WAR file is being restarted
S 3 State where the entire eBid application is being restarted
S 4 State where the JVM/JBoss application server is being restarted
S 5 State where an operator performs some action(s) to resolve an issue
λ f ailure Rate at which faults are injected/failures induced
pe jb rb Proportion of failures that are initially handled by an EJB restart
pwar rb Proportion of failures that are initially handled by a WAR restart
p jvm jboss rb Proportion of failures that are initially handled by a JVM/JBoss restart
pe jb rb success Proportion of failures successfully resolved by an EJBs restart
pe jb f allthru Proportion of failures that fall through to WAR restart level
pwar rb success Proportion of failures successfully resolved by a WAR restart
pwar f allthru Proportion of failures that fall through to eBid restart level
pebid rb success Proportion of failures successfully resolved by restarting eBid
pebid f allthru Proportion of failures that fall through to JVM/JBoss restart level
p jvm jboss rb success Proportion of failures successfully resolved by a JVM/JBoss restart
p jvm jboss f allthru Proportion of failures that fall through to operator fix level
µe jb rb EJB restart time
µwar rb WAR restart time
µebid rb eBid web-application restart
µ jvm jboss rb JVM/JBoss restart
µoperator f ix Time for an operator resolution
Table 4.1: RAS model parameters for a microrebootable application server
level increases.
Finally, labeling states associated with normal request processing or degraded request
processing as UP states and states where no requests are processed as DOWN states allow
us to capture different perspectives on what it means for the microrebootable application
server to be considered “working”. By adjusting state-labels and varying the parameters of
the RAS model, we can quantify various facets of reliability, availability and serviceability
for the microrebootable application server.
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4.3.2 Model Analysis – RAS Measures and Metrics
In our example analysis we use the numerical parameter values shown in Table 4.2 to
describe a specific failure scenario used to evaluate the efficacy of microreboots:
λ f ailure 3 failures every 10 minutes (3/600,000 msecs) [20]
pe jb rb 100%
pwar rb 0%
p jvm jboss rb 0%
pe jb rb success 95%
pe jb f allthru 5%
pwar rb success 95%
pwar f allthru 5%
pebid rb success 95%
pebid f allthru 5%
p jvm jboss rb success 95%
p jvm jboss f allthru 5%
µe jb rb EJB restart time – 1/501.27 msecs6
µwar rb WAR restart time – 1/1,028 msecs (Table 3 [20])
µebid rb eBid web-application restart – 1/7,699 msecs (Table 3 [20])
µ jvm jboss rb JVM/JBoss restart – 1/19,083 msecs (Table 3 [20])
µoperator f ix Time for an operator resolution – 1/5 minutes (1/300,000 msecs)
Table 4.2: Microrebootable application server RAS model failure scenario parameters
In this failure scenario, recovery is always initiated at the EJB restart level (pe jb rb = 100%),
recovery at each level is assumed to be 95% successful and human operators are only
involved if recovery of a failure escalates beyond the JVM/JBoss level.
Note that whereas some of the numerical parameter values used in our analysis are based
on experimental results reported in [20], e.g., λ f ailure, µe jb rb, µwar rb, µebid rb, and µ jvm jboss rb,
the remaining parameter values are hypothetical and are used solely to discuss the different
RAS measures and metrics that can be calculated.
The first step in our analysis is to use SHARPE to compute the steady-state probability vector,
pi, for the CTMC in Figure 4.4 using the numerical parameters in Table 4.2 – see Table 4.3
for the results. The steady-state probabilities are the time-independent probabilities of being
6Average restart time of the 22 EJBs in eBid, calculated using Table 3 in [20].
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in a particular state of the CTMC as time, t → ∞. In the sections below we demonstrate how








Table 4.3: Microreboot RAS model steady-state probabilities
4.3.3 Reliability Measures
Reliability measures emphasize the occurrence of undesirable events in the system [72].
There are a number of forms and metrics that can be used to express the reliability of a
system including:
1. Reliability Functions – the probability that an incident of sufficient severity has not
yet occurred since the beginning of a time interval of interest.
2. Mean Time to Failure (MTTF) – the average length of time that elapses until an
incident occurs.
3. Frequency of Incidents – the average number of incidents that occur per unit time.
In our analytical evaluation of the microrebootable application-server we discuss its reliabil-
ity in terms of the Frequency of Incidents, where the frequency of an incident is a function
of the probability of being in a particular state, pii.
For the microrebootable application server we can identify four kinds of incidents that may
affect its reliability:
1. Frequency of failure escalations to higher levels of recovery (Fa→b), i.e., frequency of
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S 1 to S 2 transitions, S 2 to S 3 transitions, S 3 to S 4 transitions or S 4 to S 5 transitions.
Frequent failure escalations delays system recovery, may signal instabilities in the
system or its environment, or may result in other disruptions.
2. Frequency of recovery activities (F2), i.e., time spent in S 1, S 2, S 3, S 4, and S 5.
3. Frequency of outages resulting from more expensive recovery actions (F3) e.g. eBid
or JVM/JBoss restart vs. EJB or WAR restarts.
4. Frequency of recovery actions exceeding a given duration tolerance (F4).
Frequency of failure escalations (Fa→b). The frequency of failure escalations to higher
levels of recovery (Fa→b) during an interval T is given by:
Fa→b = T ∗ (γa→b ∗ pia) (4.1)
Where γa→b is the rate of transition out of recovery state S a to higher level recovery state S b.
During an interval of 1 day (T = 1,440 minutes = 86,400,000 msecs) we expect to inject
a total of 1440 ∗ 3 f ailures10 minutes = 432 failures of which, 21.537952 (Equation 4.2) are escalated
from EJB recovery level to WAR recovery level, 1.076898 (Equation 4.3) are escalated
from WAR recovery level to eBid recovery level, 0.053845 (Equation 4.4) are escalated
from eBid to JVM/JBoss recovery level and 0.002692 (Equation 4.5) are escalated from
JVM/JBoss recovery level to Operator recovery level, resulting in a total of of 22.671386






Table 4.4: Failure escalation incidents per day
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Fe jb→war = 86, 400, 000 ∗ γe jb→war ∗ pi1
→ Fe jb→war = 86, 400, 000 ∗ γe jb→war ∗ 0.002499 = 21.537952






Fwar→eBid = 86, 400, 000 ∗ γwar→eBid ∗ pi2
→ Fwar→eBid = 86, 400, 000 ∗ γwar→eBid ∗ 0.000256 = 1.076898






FeBid→JVM/JBoss = 86, 400, 000 ∗ γeBid→JVM/JBoss ∗ pi3
→ FeBid→JVM/JBoss = 86, 400, 000 ∗ γeBid→JVM/JBoss ∗ 0.000096 = 0.053845






FJVM/JBoss→Operator = 86, 400, 000 ∗ γJVM/JBoss→Operator ∗ pi3
→ FJVM/JBoss→Operator = 86, 400, 000 ∗ γJVM/JBoss→Operator ∗ 0.000012 = 0.002692
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Frequency of recovery activities (F2). The frequency of recovery activities (F2) during
an interval T is given by:
F2 = T ∗ (pi2 + pi3 + pi4 + pi5) (4.6)
During an interval of 1 day (T = 86,400,000 msecs) we expect the recovery manager of
the microrebootable application server to spend 4.14 minutes per day performing failure
recovery activities (Equation 4.7).
F2 = 86, 400, 000 ∗ (pi2 + pi3 + pi4 + pi5) = 248, 193.82 msecs (4.14 mins) (4.7)
Frequency of outages (F3). The frequency of outages during 1 day resulting from more
expensive recovery actions (F3) is given by:
F3 = FeBid→JVM/JBoss + FJVM/JBoss→Operator (4.8)
We therefore expect the microrebootable application server to experience 0.056537 outages
per day (20.64 per year) due to expensive recovery actions (Equation 4.9).
F3 = 0.053845 + 0.002692 = 0.056537 (4.9)
Frequency of recovery actions exceeding a given duration tolerance (F4). The fre-
quency of recovery actions exceeding a given duration tolerance (F4) in an interval T is
given by:
F4(τ) = T ∗
 ∑
i∈S Recovery
γi→0 ∗ pii ∗ e(−γi→0∗τ)
 (4.10)
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Where:
• τ is the duration tolerance in time units.
• S Recovery = { S 1, S 2, S 3, S 4, S 5 }.
• γi→0 is the rate of transition from a recovery state S i ∈ S Recovery to the failure free state,
S 0.
• e(−γi→0∗τ) is the probability that a recovery action takes longer than τ time units.
Of the 432 failure recovery actions initiated per day (T = 86,400,000 msecs) , the number
of recovery actions expected to exceed 1000 msecs is 70.578179 (Equation 4.11).
F4(1000 msecs) = T ∗ (0.95 ∗ 1501.27 ∗ pi1 ∗ e
−0.95∗ 1501.27 ∗1000 (4.11)
+ 0.95 ∗ 1
1028
∗ pi2 ∗ e−0.95∗ 11028 ∗1000
+ 0.95 ∗ 1
7699
∗ pi3 ∗ e−0.95∗ 17699 ∗1000
+ 0.95 ∗ 1
19083




∗ pi5 ∗ e− 1300000 ∗1000)
= 70.578179
4.3.4 Availability Measures
Availability measures capture the proportion of total time in which a system is in an
operational condition [72]. To discuss system availability using the RAS model shown in
Figure 4.4, we need to identify which states of the model represent an operational state (UP
state) or an outage state (DOWN state). Availability measures can then be expressed as a
function of the UP states.
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There are three forms and metrics that can be used to express the availability of a system
[72]:
1. Instantaneous (or point) basic availability – the probability that a system is up at time
t.
2. Steady state basic availability – the probability that the system is up assuming that the
system has reached a steady state (i.e., time t → ∞).
3. Interval basic availability – the proportion within a given interval of time that the
system is up, which is calculated by carrying out a time average value of instantaneous
availability over the time interval of interest.
In our analytical evaluation of the microrebootable application server we discuss its avail-
ability in terms of its steady-state basic availability (S S avail), where the steady-state basic
availability is a function of the probability of being in a particular state, pii.
For the microrebootable application server we can identify three perspectives on its steady-
state availability that may be of interest:
1. Basic steady-state availability where all recovery activities are considered outages
(zero tolerance for recovery actions). This perspective captures the proportion of time
the system is in normal operating mode, S 0, and may be of special interest to system
administrators – S S avail(admin).
2. Tolerance availability, here a subset of the recovery actions result in outages that are
above a specific tolerance threshold, e.g, for the microrebootable application server,
recovery actions associated with eBid restarts, JVM/JBoss restarts and Operator
restarts may be considered above the tolerance threshold, while restarts to the EJB or
WAR levels may be considered tolerable. This perspective captures the proportion of
time that end-users can receive service, { S 0, S 1, S 2 }, and may be of special interest
to end-users/clients of the system – S S avail(client).
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3. Capacity-oriented availability, captures how much service the system is delivering.
Whereas in [20] microreboots are presented as a means of improving the availablility of
web application servers, they are not perfect. During a microreboot (or more expensive
system reboot) some client requests are lost – 78 requests per fine-grained restart
and 3917 requests per coarse-grained restart7. Using these numbers we can estimate
the percentage of requests lost during an interval as compared to the total number of
requests that could be serviced during that same interval – S S avail(capacity).
Basic Steady-state Availability (S S avail(admin)). The basic steady-state availability of
the system from the administrator’s perspective (i.e., zero tolerance for restarts) during an
interval T is given by:
UPadmin = {S 0},DOWNadmin = {S 1, S 2, S 3, S 4, S 5} (4.12)
S S avail(admin) = T ∗ pi0
S S downtime(admin) = T ∗ (pi1 + pi2 + pi3 + pi4 + pi5) (4.13)
During an interval of 1 day (1440 minutes), we expect the microrebootable application
server to be UP for 1435.86 minutes and DOWN for 4.14 minutes from the administrator’s
perspective (Equation 4.14).
S S avail(admin) = T ∗ pi0 (4.14)
→ S S avail(admin) = 1440 ∗ 0.997127 = 1435.86 minutes
S S downtime(admin) = 1440 ∗ (1 − 0.997127) = 4.14 minutes (4.15)
7See [20] Figure 1.
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Tolerance Availability (S S avail(client)). The tolerance availability of the system (basic
steady state availability from the client perspective) during an interval T is given by:
UPclient = {S 0, S 1, S 2},DOWNclient = {S 3, S 4, S 5} (4.16)
S S avail(client) = T ∗ (pi0 + pi1 + pi2)
S S downtime(client) = T ∗ (pi3 + pi4 + pi5) (4.17)
During an interval of 1 day (1440 minutes), we expect the microrebootable application server
to be UP for 1439.83 minutes and DOWN for 0.17 minutes from the client’s perspective
(Equation 4.18).
S S avail(client) = T ∗ (pi0 + pi1 + pi2) (4.18)
→ S S avail(client) = 1440 ∗ 0.999883 = 1439.83 minutes
S S downtime(client) = 1440 ∗ (1 − 0.999883) = 0.17 minutes (4.19)
Capacity-oriented Availability. The capacity-oriented availability of the microrebootable
application server, S S avail(capacity) during an interval T is calculated using:
• The number of failures during the interval, FT .
• The number of requests serviced during the interval, rT ; this is a function of the
throughput of the application server.
• The percentage of failures handled via fine-grained recovery actions, p f gr.
• The number of requests lost as a result of fine-grained recovery actions, r f gr.
• The percentage of failures handled via coarse-grained recovery actions, pcgr = (1 −
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p f gr).
• The number of requests lost as a result of coarse-grained recovery actions, rcgr.
And is given by:
S S avail(capacity) = 1 −
FT ∗
(




Letting S 1 and S 2, EJB restarts and WAR restarts respectively, represent fine-grained
recovery actions and S 3, S 4 and S 5, eBid restarts, JVM/JBoss restarts and Operator fixes,
respectively, represent coarse-grained recovery actions, during the interval of 1 day (T =
86, 400, 000 msecs):
• FT = 3600000 ∗ 86, 400, 000 = 432 failures per day
• rT = 70 requests per sec[20] ∗ 86, 400 secs = 6048000 requests per day
• p f gr = 99.74% (see failure/fault coverage equation, Equation 4.22)
• r f gr = 78 requests
• rcgr = 3917 requests
Therefore:





6048000 = 0.993716 (4.21)
4.3.5 Serviceability Measures
Serviceability measures capture the impacts of system failures and/or remediation activi-
ties. Whereas reliability and availability have more rigorous mathematical definitions [72],
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serviceability is less well defined. For our evaluation purposes, when we discuss the service-
ability of a system we are specifically interested in quantifying the impacts of failures (which
may be expressed using a variety of metrics – e.g., monetary or time penalties) as well
as the efficacy of remediation mechanisms – overall success and coverage of remediation
mechanisms.
For the microrebootable application server, we identify four metrics that can be used to
evaluate its serviceability properties:
1. The fault/failure coverage of the system. This is the percentage of failures for which
the system has an acceptable response.
2. The mean time to system restoration. This is the expected number of time units needed
to restore the system to its normal/original operating condition, S 0.
3. The expected penalties associated with outages (downtime). These quantify the
negative consequences of outages and may be expressed in terms of money spent/lost
due to system un-availability (e.g., paying for SLA violations, or lost revenue due to
the system being down) or some other suitable metric.
4. The SASO (stability, accuracy, settling time and overshoot) properties of the Recovery
Manager’s operation. This describes the operation of the Recovery Manager using a
simple feedback control loop, which we can analyze using traditional control theory
tools.
Fault/Failure Coverage. The fault/failure coverage for the microrebootable application
server during an interval T is the percentage of failures for which there is an acceptable
response. In our analytical evaluation, failures handled in S 1 or S 2 are considered acceptable
since these result in minimal disruptions to the end-users of the system [20].
The fault/failure coverage of the system during an interval T is a function of the number of
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failure escalations. In 1 day (T = 86,400,000 msecs), 432 failures are injected, of which we
expect 99.74% to be handled in S 1 or S 2 (Equation 4.22).
432 − (Fwar→eBid + FeBid→JVM/JBoss + FJVM/JBoss→Operator)
432
∗ 100% = 99.74% (4.22)
Mean Time to System Restoration (MTTSR). The MTTSR is the average number of
time units required to return the system to its original/normal operating mode. Using
SHARPE we calculate this to be 576.177875 msecs.
Expected Downtime Penalties. The total expected downtime penalty is a function of the
total number and duration of outages experienced by the system during an interval T . These
penalties can be calculated based on any availability guarantees that govern the system’s
operation. Table 4.5 gives the downtime allowance per day (in minutes) based on the number
of 9’s availability guaranteed. Using this table and S S avail(client) calculated earlier we can
express the expected downtime penalties.
Availability guarantee Max downtime per day Expected penalties
99.999 ∼ 0.0144 mins (0.17 - 0.0144)*$p
99.99 ∼ 0.1440 mins (0.17 - 0.1440)*$p
99.9 ∼ 1.4400 mins $0
99 ∼14.4000 mins $0
Table 4.5: Expected downtime penalties using Microreboots
Stability of the Microreboot Recovery Manager. To reason about the stability of the
Recovery Manager’s operation we propose the feedback control diagram shown in Figure
4.5. In our diagram a controller takes a recovery time deadline as input (e.g., the MTTSR
calculated earlier – ∼ 576 msecs) and monitors how well the Recovery Manager is able to
meet that deadline (i.e., measured output equals the actual MTTSR). Based on the deviations
between the desired MTTSR and the actual MTTSR the controller can vary the control
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input. Possible choices for control inputs include, but are not limited to: the rate at which
failure events are routed to (or admitted by) the Recovery Manager for resolution via a
microreboot or the percentage of failure events dispatched to the Recovery Manager for
resolution via microreboot. Spikes in failure event arrival rates and accompanying increases
in the measured MTTSR may signal that these failures may need to be resolved by other
means and/or should be brought to the attention of a human operator.
Figure 4.5: Microreboot Recovery Manager feedback control diagram
Other Types of Analyses. In addition to evaluating (Markov and Control Theory) models
of the system to quantify various reliability, availability and serviceability properties, there
are three other types of analyses that can be performed on these models: sensitivity analysis,
tradeoff analysis and specification determination.
• Sensitivity analysis – looks at how the analysis results change if one or more of the
input parameters change [72]
• Tradeoff analysis – investigates how trading off a change in one input parameter for
another affects the analysis results [72].
• Specification determination – determines the values of given input parameters required
to meet a specific reliability, availability or serviceability goal.
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4.3.6 Analysis Results
Table 4.6 summarizes the analysis results for the microrebootable application server RAS
model shown in Figure 4.4 based on the model parameters in Table 4.2.
Measure Metrics Results
Reliability
Failure escalations per day (Fa→b) 22.671386
Frequency of recovery activities per day (F2) 4.14 mins
Frequency of outages per day (F3) 0.056537
Frequency of recovery actions per day > 1 sec (F4) 70.578179
Availability
Basic steady-state availability (S S avail(admin)) 0.997127
Tolerance availability (S S avail(client)) 0.999883
Capacity-oriented availability (S S avail(capacity)) 0.993716
Serviceability
Fault/failure coverage 99.74%
Mean-time to system restoration (MTTSR) 576 msecs
Expected downtime penalties per day (4 9’s) (0.17 - 0.1440)*$p
Table 4.6: Summary of Microreboot RAS model analysis results
4.4 Related Work
The analytical tools – Continuous TimeMarkov Chains (CTMCs), Markov Reward Networks
and Feedback Control models – and techniques for their analysis have been well studied
and used by others to study many aspects of computing system behavior.
[69], [101] and [121] provide a rigorous discussion of the mathematical principles (proba-
bility theory and queuing theory) underlying Markov chains and Markov reward networks
as well as techniques for their analysis and solution. [69] and [101] specifically provide
numerous examples of applying Markov chains to study the performance, reliability and
availability characteristics of computing systems.
[98] and [2] discuss techniques for the computationally tractable analysis and solution of
Markov models. These techniques are available in the SHARPE [160] RAS modeling tool,
which we use in the construction and analysis of RAS models.
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Markov chains have been used in the study and analysis of dependable and fault-tolerant
systems and the techniques used to realize them. Examples include analyses of RAID
(Redundant Arrays of Inexpensive Disks) [114] and telecommunication systems [101]. They
have also been used in the study of software aging [13] and in evaluating the efficacy of
preventative maintenance (software rejuvenation). Dependability is concerned with assess-
ing the ability of a system to deliver its intended level of service to its users especially in
the presence of failures which impinge on its level of service [107]. There are three of
the dependability measures of interest: reliability measures, availability measures and task
completion measures [72] – task-completion is the likelihood that a task will be completed
satisfactorily. [72] also discusses four types of analyses that can be performed – model
evaluation, sensitivity analysis, tradeoff analysis and specification determination. In our con-
struction and analysis of RAS models we employ select reliability and availability measures.
Further, whereas sensitivity analysis, tradeoff analysis and specification determination are
discussed in [72] with regard to Markov chains, these types of analyses can also be applied
to models constructed using other modeling formalisms. As a result, we can employ these
analyses as part of the RAS evaluation process.
Performability [120] provides unified measures for considering the performance and reli-
ability of systems together. Markov reward networks [69] have been used as a formalism
for establishing this link between the performance of a system and its reliability. Other
formalisms used in performability analysis include Stochastic Petri Nets (SPNs) [101] and
Stochastic Activity Networks (SANs) [161], which are both built on top of Markov chains.
SPNs and SANs allow for more detailed and sophisticated modeling of a system’s operation,
e.g., modeling concurrent activities in a system. In our construction of RAS models, we use
Markov reward networks to quantify the impacts of failures and/or remediation activities.
Further, our goal is to develop simple, reusable models templates that can be used for
describing failure scenarios and scoring system responses, rather developing a detailed
model of the operation of underlying system being evaluated.
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Different classes of failures have been studied using Markov chains including independent
failures [101], near-coincident failures [42] and cascading failures [91]. Leveraging these
analytical tools in our construction of RAS models allows us to describe failure scenarios
that represent these different classes of failures.
Feedback control has been used in the development of adaptive computing systems providing
mathematical tools for constructing predictable systems [90]. For example, [139] uses
control theory to develop a fluid model for network traffic management. [145] presents a
database server that adaptively throttles administrative utilities when necessary to maintain
a given level of query performance (an example of disturbance rejection in a control system)
while work in [45] describes the use of feedback control to automatically adjust the size
of memory pools to balance the resource demands in a database management system (an
example of regulatory control/regulation). Finally, [44] presents the principles of feedback
control and discusses the implications for realizing self-managing systems which exhibit the
desirable properties of stability, accuracy, short settling times and avoiding overshoot (SASO)
with respect to the policy-based objectives that govern their operation. In constructing RAS
models of systems we are interested primarily in applications of regulatory control and
assessing the SASO properties of systems and their failure handling mechanisms.
4.5 Summary
This chapter introduced the analytical tools and techniques used to construct RAS models –
Continuous Time Markov Chains, Markov Reward Networks and Feedback Control Models.
In §4.2 we provide background information on these analytical tools. And §4.3 discusses
the measures and metrics of reliability, availability and serviceability while providing an
example RAS model and analysis of the microrebootable application server described in
[20].
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Using our analytical example we demonstrate the construction of a basic RAS model that can
be used to a) describe failure scenarios used to evaluate a microrebootable application server
and b) score/evaluate the application server’s responses to injected faults. In conducting our
analysis we identify a number of reliability, availability and serviceability metrics that may
be used in system evaluations and illustrate how they are derived and calculated.
Our analysis is complementary to the measurement-based evaluation done in [20], consid-
ering other aspects of reliability, availability and serviceability not covered in the original
work, e.g., reasoning about the frequency of failure escalations, recovery activities and
outages; presenting three perspectives on availability for comparison – basic steady-state
availability, tolerance availability and capacity-oriented availability; and finally discussing
fault/failure coverage, mean-time to system restoration and estimated downtime penalties
for the microrebootable application server.
In the next chapter we combine runtime fault-injection tools, including Kheiron, which was
described in Chapter 3, with the RAS modeling tools described in this chapter to develop the
7U-Evaluation Benchmark – a model-based and measurement-based reliability, availability
and serviceability benchmark for web-application stacks and their components.
Chapter 5
The 7U-Evaluation Benchmark
In this chapter we present a methodology for evaluating the RAS characteristics of N-tier
web application stacks and their components – the 7U-Evaluation method – and demonstrate
its effectiveness via three case studies measuring the RAS properties of different deployments
of the TPC-W web-application [119].
The 7U-Evaluation Benchmark is a model-based and measurement-based evaluation ap-
proach that combines runtime fault-injection tools, Chapter 3, with analytical RAS models,
that describe and score specific failure scenarios (Chapter 4).
In our experiments we subject different TPC-W deployments to the same failure conditions,
develop RAS models to describe and score the failure scenarios, and conduct fault-injection
experiments to obtain values for the RAS model parameters. Based on the data collected
from the fault-injection experiments, we compute, compare and discuss the RAS metrics for
each deployment.
In the sections that follow we discuss the challenges of RAS benchmarking, the design
considerations for the 7U-Evaluation Benchmark that address those challenges, present our
experimental results, and compare our approach to traditional performance benchmarking
approaches as well as similar efforts to benchmark aspects of reliability, availability and ser-
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viceability in the fault-tolerant computing, dependable computing and autonomic computing
communities.
5.1 Introduction
The importance placed on realizing reliable, highly available and serviceable (easy-to-
manage/self-managing) software systems necessitates approaches for evaluating the reliabil-
ity, availability and serviceability (RAS) characteristics of systems [113, 118, 102, 3]
Benchmarks provide a structured way to evaluate systems by allowing interested parties
“...to measure well-defined features of a system or component according to an agreed ... set
of methods and procedures [113]. In assessing the RAS characteristics of systems, we wish
to identify or develop methods and procedures that quantitatively capture: a) the impacts of
faults or failures on a system’s reliability, availability and serviceability and b) the efficacy
of any remediation mechanisms.
In order to conduct an RAS benchmark, it is necessary to have an environment and tools
that allow the system under test to be exposed to failure-provoking stimuli [16]. Direct
fault-injection into components of the system under test is the primary technique that enables
such an environment [8]. An important part of the RAS evaluation process is to inject faults
that exercise any remediation mechanisms that the system under test has or that highlight
RAS deficiencies. The determination of which faults meet this criteria depend on a) the
system or class of system being evaluated and b) problems that have been observed and/or
are currently being studied.
Another important element of an RAS benchmark is the generation of realistic workloads
for the system under test. This allows us to study the impact of failures and other stressful
conditions (the fault-load) on the typical operation of the system. Generating realistic
workloads for systems is a difficult problem; however, RAS evaluations can build upon
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existing performance benchmarks, which provide excellent sources of workloads, e.g.,
benchmarks produced by the Standard Performance Evaluation Corporation (SPEC) [177],
the Transaction Processing Performance Council (TPC) [190] and the National Institutes of
Standards and Technology (NIST) [140].
The use of performance benchmarks to provide realistic workloads during an RAS evaluation
influences the metrics that are collected as well as the way these metrics are used in scoring
the system under test. The performance metrics collected can be used to reason about
complete outages or degraded modes of operation, which result from injecting faults or
inducing failures in the test system. In §4.3.6 we illustrate how variations in performance
metrics can be used/incorporated to reason about different facets of reliability, availability
and serviceability, e.g., basic availability vs. tolerance availability vs. capacity-oriented
availability, which take different operating modes of the system into consideration. The
metrics used to express these facets of reliability, availability and serviceability and the
RAS models used to compute them specify the scoring criteria for an RAS evaluation and
describe the failure scenarios that the system under test is subjected to during an evaluation.
5.2 The 7U RAS Benchmarking Methodology
In the previous section we describe the conceptual elements needed to build RAS bench-
marks: a system under test, a testing environment and tools that support fault-injection,
realistic workload generators and a set of scoring criteria/failure scenario descriptions. In
this section we combine these elements into a methodology for performing RAS evaluations.
Our methodology is an extension of measurement-based dependability benchmarks [96]. It
consists of seven steps:
1. Specify fault-model: first a fault-model is developed that mimics faults, failures and
stressful conditions previously seen or likely to be seen in practical deployments of the
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system under test. The fault-model codifies the set of problems the system is expected
to detect, diagnose and/or repair. During this stage of the methodology fault-injection
tools that can reproduce the faults and failures of interest are identified or developed.
2. Specify the fault-remediation relationship: injecting faults in the system should
elicit a response from the system, e.g., triggering an existing remediation or compro-
mising a measure of interest. In the case of the latter, variations in the compromised
measure of interest can be used to build or improve detection or repair mechanisms in
the system.
3. Decide on micro-measurements for remediations: these are metrics collected from
the remediation mechanisms, e.g., remediation success, remediation times, etc.
4. Decide on macro-measurements and create scoring models for system evalua-
tion: macro-measurements are the measures of interest, e.g., different facets of
reliability, availability and serviceability. During this step RAS models used for
scoring are developed. These scoring models describe different failure scenarios,
establishing a link between the micro-measurements of the remediations – success,
coverage, recovery times, etc. – and the reliability, availability and serviceability
measures.
5. Develop workload and metric collectors: during a benchmark run the system under
test is subjected to a workload to simulate actual use of the system and allow for
the collection of metrics from the system related to its performance, failure behavior
and/or remediation activities.
6. Run benchmarking and fault-injection experiments: the overall benchmark study
consists of multiple experiments, each involving one or more failure scenarios where
the system under test is subjected to the workload and a faultload.
7. Analyze results and revise scoring models: results from the benchmark runs are
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analyzed and scored, after which the existing scoring models may be refined or new
models that describe new failure scenarios added.
The RAS benchmarking methodology outlined above presents a number of practical chal-
lenges: selecting reasonable or representative faults, representative workloads, reproducibil-
ity of results and portability to different systems, identifying metrics used for scoring the
responses of the system under test, and collecting data from benchmark runs used as param-
eters in scoring models. In the next section we discuss how we addressed these challenges
as we develop an RAS benchmark for N-tier web-applications and their components.
5.3 RAS Benchmarking Challenges
5.3.1 Selecting reasonable or representative faults
The first practical challenge in developing an RAS benchmark is to specify the fault-model
under consideration. The fault-model follows from the system under test (or class of system
under test). Based on the system under test and/or the class of system under test, published
studies on problems/failures experienced in the field may be used to guide the creation of the
fault-model. To conduct an RAS evaluation the fault-model may have to be appropriately
scoped/restricted to the set of problems/failures that can be reproduced using accessible
fault-injection tools.
In our first application of this RAS benchmark we use N-tier web-applications as the
class of system under test and the TPC-W web-application as a specific test subject. We
chose N-tier web applications as our class of systems under test due to their ubiquity.
They have standardized components – web server, application server, database server and
operating system and a well-understood client-server workload model. Further, we were
able to find published studies about problems/failures experienced by N-tier applications
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and their components [21, 31, 142, 179], which guided the identification and development
of fault-injection tools and provided some ideas for metrics (see §5.3.4).
The TPC-W web-application specification was developed by the Transaction Processing
Performance Council (TPC) [190] as part of a benchmark for e-commerce sites. It mimics the
activities of an online bookstore in a controlled environment and reference implementations
of the benchmark specifications can be found online, e.g., the Java-based implementation
from the PHARM research team at the University of Wisconsin-Madison [147], which we
use in our experiments (see §5.4, §5.5 and §5.6). Alternative web-applications, e.g., RUBiS
[141], which mimics an online auction website like eBay, or the SPEC jAppServer [176],
which emulates information flow among an automotive dealership, manufacturing, supply
chain management and an order/inventory system could have also been used.
Our fault-model for the TPC-W web application stack consists of device driver faults
targeting the operating system and memory leaks targeting the application server. We chose
device driver faults because device drivers account for ∼70% of the Linux kernel code and
have error rates seven times higher than the rest of the kernel [31]; similarly Microsoft’s
analysis of crash dumps submitted by Windows XP users to their Online Crash Analysis
website attribute 70% of crashes to faults or failures in third-party device drivers [115] –
faulty device drivers easily compromise the integrity and reliability of the kernel, while
memory leaks and general state corruption (dangling pointers and damaged heaps) are
highlighted as common bugs leading to system crashes in large-scale web deployments [21].
We identified the operating system and the application server as candidate targets for fault-
injection. Given the operating system’s role as resource manager [185] and part of the native
execution environment for applications [63], its reliability is critical to the overall stability of
the applications it hosts. Similarly, application servers act as containers for web-applications
and are responsible for providing a number of services, including but not limited to, isolation,
transaction management, instance management, resource management and synchronization.
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These responsibilities make application-servers another critical link in a web-application’s
reliability and another prime target for fault-injection. In our experiments we target Java-
based application servers due to the availability of a number of open-source/free alternatives
including Caucho Technology’s Resin [186] application server and The Apache Foundation’s
Tomcat [53] application server.
With respect to remediations for these faults, there are a number of possibilities. For device
driver failures operating system kernels may crash, which is a structured way of recording a
problem and halting the system to prevent further damage [115], or employ some form of
device driver recovery, e.g., Nooks [122], hardened device drivers on OpenSolaris [136]1.
To address resource leaks/memory leaks, application server restarts have been used to react
to low memory conditions resulting from memory leaks or as preventative maintenance to
avoid low memory conditions (rejuvenation) [21]. Other approaches combine rejuvenation
with redundancy/load-balancing, e.g., VM-Rejuv [173], to mitigate the effects of memory
leaks.
In evaluating the RAS properties of N-tier web-application deployments we investigate the
efficacy of these remediation mechanisms.
5.3.2 Representative Workloads
The workload used to exercise the system during an RAS evaluation must be representative
of realistic uses of the system [113] to provide insights into the impacts of faults and failures
on its operation.
The reference implementation of the TPC-W provided by the PHARM research team at
the University of Wisconsin-Madison includes a workload generation tool that emulates
browser clients for the TPC-W web-application. Remote Browser Emulators (RBEs) act
1Programming-language extensions e.g. SafeDrive [198] are also used to develop recoverable device
drivers.
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like users sending requests to the TPC-W web-application, interacting with it according to
one of three strategies (mixes) outlined in the TPC-W benchmark specification – Browsing
mix, Shopping mix or Ordering mix. Different mixes control the proportion of activities
that involve a specific page of the TPC-W web-application (see Table 1 in [119] for further
details on the interaction strategies).
5.3.3 Reproducibility and Portability
Conducting RAS evaluations involves introducing changes into systems, e.g., injecting faults
or inducing failures to evaluate the system’s response (or lack thereof). However, individual
changes must be introduced in a manner that is reproducible on a specific system and
possibly reproducible across different systems if cross-system comparisons are necessary
[3]. In the case of cross-system comparisons an RAS benchmark must be portable if it is to
be used across different platforms. Reproducibility allows evaluations to be repeated, which
can improve the confidence in the measurements [113].
For reproducibility and portability of our benchmark we use target systems and fault-
injection tools that can be deployed on multiple platforms.
Our Kheiron/JVM (§3.8) fault-injection tool can be used on any Java-based application,
which allows us to target a variety of Java-based application servers and/or Java-based
web-applications.
For device driver fault-injection we target the network device drivers on Linux 2.4.18, 2.6.20
and OpenSolaris operating systems. We use a version of the Nooks SWIFI device driver
fault-injection tools [122, 123] developed at the University of Washington for device driver
fault-injection on Linux 2.4.18. We developed a port for these tools that injects faults into
device drivers on Linux 2.6.20
The Linux (2.4 and 2.6) device driver fault-injection tools inject a variety of faults including:
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text faults, stack faults and null pointer faults. Faults injected by the Linux device driver
fault-injection tools can lead to kernel panics if no device driver recovery services are
available or device driver recovery fails.
To evaluate the efficacy of hardened device drivers on OpenSolaris we use the device driver
hardening test harness provided by Sun Microsystems [136] to inject faults into network
device drivers. The test harness operates at the level of data accesses, intercepting data
accesses of the device driver and injecting faults into the device driver, e.g., corrupting data
and interfering with interrupts, simulating faults that occur in the hardware managed by
the device driver. The corruptions performed by the test harness can lead to device driver
crashes, hangs and/or kernel panics if no device driver recovery services are available or if
device driver recovery is unsuccessful.
Device driver fault-injection is inherently not very portable across different operating system
kernels, e.g., Windows, Linux and OpenSolaris, since these kernels differ significantly in the
data structures, components/kernel-objects and component-interactions used to implement
resource management functions, I/O, etc. [115, 39, 155]. Further, porting between major
versions of a specific operating system kernel, e.g., Linux 2.4.x and Linux 2.6.x may require
changes to some of the underlying mechanisms used to support driver fault-injection tools.
For example, accommodating changes to kernel data structures used to represent modules
and processes between Linux 2.4.x and Linux 2.6.x.
5.3.4 Metrics and Scoring
Metrics and scores for an RAS evaluation may be based on direct measurement or calculation
using modeling [113]. The ability to obtain direct measurements is dependent on the
availability of system observation points. Facilities may exist in the system to collect direct
measurements, e.g., logs, or the system may need to be instrumented to facilitate data
collection. Calculating reliability, availability and serviceability metrics require modeling.
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These models in turn require input from field experience, e.g., fault probabilities and fault
distributions, which may be difficult to estimate. Overall, the scores obtained should account
for the impact of failures and/or responses on different users (administrators and clients) and
the efficacy of the response.
In our 7U Evaluations, rather than estimate fault properties and distributions, we use fault-
injection tools to control these parameters – estimates of fault properties and distributions
based on field-data from failures can, however, inform and improve the fault-mixes used
in fault-injection experiments. We induce failure conditions in the system under test and
collect data on a number of aspects of system operation, including the occurrence of outages
and degradation events, downtime, and the speed, coverage and success of remediations. We
use this data in our scoring models to estimate RAS properties for a specific scenario.
It is accepted that whereas fault-injection is a powerful tool for validating and evaluating
remediation mechanisms in systems [191, 32], it cannot predict actual availability or mean
time between failure (MTBF) [195, 77]. However, the goal of our 7U benchmark is not to
predict MTBFs and MTTFs in absolute terms 2, but rather to provide a framework for 1)
reproducing and studying specific failures in systems leading to better fault-injection tools;
2) validating the remediation mechanisms available in a system or reasoning about yet-to-be-
added mechanisms and; 3) providing a consistent method of scoring, using simple, reusable
RAS models as templates, which capture failure impacts and/or remediation activities to be
evaluated from the different perspectives of interest.
[179, 142, 14] present some specific metrics that may be used for N-tier web applications
and internet services, including frequency of outages, frequency of degradation events,
downtime from the perspective of the client, downtime from the perspective of the IT
operators and lost revenue, while §4.3.2 discusses other RAS metrics that may also be of
2Predicting MTTFs for software is inherently difficult due to the lack of physical laws governing the opera-
tion software components/systems[21], unlike for hardware/physical systems, whose operation is governed by
the laws of physics. However, MTTF predictions for hardware have recently been called into question [163].
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interest, e.g., frequency of failed remediations, basic steady-state availability, tolerance
availability, capacity-oriented availability, fault-coverage, mean time to system restoration
and expected downtime penalties.
5.4 Evaluation Part 1
In our first evaluation case-study we model, evaluate and compare two deployments of the
TPC-W web-application subjected to memory leaks and device driver faults, which target
the application server and operating system, respectively.
5.4.1 7U Process
System under test. For the system under test we use the TPC-W web-application stack.
The TPC-W stack consists of a (Java-based) TPC-W web-application implementation, the
Resin web/application server [186] and the MySQL [4] database server co-located on a
single operating system instance3.
The two deployments used and compared in our evaluation are shown below:
1. Resin 3.0.22, MySQL 5.0.27, Linux 2.4.18
2. Resin 3.0.22, MySQL 5.0.27, Linux 2.6.20
Fault model. The Resin application server uses automatic restarts to react to memory
leaks, while the device driver recovery framework Nooks protects the Linux 2.4.18 kernel
from the effects of device driver failures. In our evaluations we exercise these remediation
mechanisms and compare against a stack deployed on Linux 2.6.20, which does not have
device driver recovery.
3We use virtual machines for each deployment.
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Memory-leak failures in the TPC-W web-application classes hosted in Resin are induced
using Kheiron/JVM [63] and the approach described in §3.8.6. Device-driver faults are
injected into the network device driver (the pcnet32 ethernet device driver) using the Nooks
SWIFI (SoftWare Implemented Fault-Injection) tools [122], which were originally developed
for Linux 2.4.18 by Michael Swift et al. [122] and ported, by us, to Linux 2.6.20.
Fault-remediation relationship. Resin initiates an application server restart under mem-
ory pressure, while the operating system employs device driver recovery (where possible) or
crashes to protect the system.
Micro-measurements. For micro-measurements we collect metrics on application-server
restart times, device driver recovery times, device driver recovery success rates, operating
system restart times and client-side goodput.
Macro-measurements. For macro-measurements we use the four node, five parameter
model shown in Figure 5.1, with parameter descriptions shown below, to describe and
score the failure scenario used in our evaluation. We use this scoring model to quantify the
following facets of reliability, availability and serviceability:
• Reliability – frequency of outages
• Availability – tolerance availability
• Serviceability – expected downtime penalties
The construction of this scoring model is described in §5.4.2 and it is a generalization of the
RAS model shown in Figure 5.7.
The model consists of four states and six parameters:
• S 0 - System working normally.
CHAPTER 5. THE 7U-EVALUATION BENCHMARK 151
Figure 5.1: Failure scenario scoring RAS model
• S 1 - System recovering a failed device driver.
• S 2 - Device driver recovery failed and system needs to be rebooted.
• S 3 - Application server restart due to memory exhaustion.
• λdriver f ailure – forced rate of device driver failures.
• µdriver recovery – mean time for device driver recovery.
• c – the coverage factor, success rate of device driver recovery, this allows us to
consider imperfect recovery scenarios.
• µreboot – mean time to reboot the system if device driver recovery is unsuccessful.
• λmemory leak – observed rate of memory-leak related failures.
• µapp server restart – worst-case restart application-server under low-memory conditions.
The goal of our experiments is to inject faults into specific components of the system under
test and study its response. The faults we inject are intended to exercise the remediation
mechanisms of the system. We use the experimental data to mathematically model the
impact of the faults we inject on the system’s reliability, availability and serviceability with
and without the remediation mechanisms.
In our experiments we force/set the rate of memory-leak failures to 1 every 8 hours and the
rate of device driver faults is set to 4 every 8 hours. These rates were chosen arbitrarily,
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and are used to illustrate the modeling and evaluation process; however, additional data on
failure mixes can improve similar evaluation efforts.
Whereas our fault-injection experiments may expose the system to rates of failure well above
what the system may see in a given time period, these artificially high failure rates allow us
to explore the expected and unexpected system responses under stressful fault conditions,
much like performance benchmarks subject the system under test to extreme workloads.
5.4.2 Deployment 1: Resin, MySQL, Linux 2.4.18
In Deployment 1 our test platform uses VMWare GSX virtual machines configured with:
512 MB RAM, 1 GB of swap, a single x86 processor and an 8 GB harddisk running
Redhat 9 on Linux 2.4.18. We use an instance of the TPC-W web-application (based on the
implementation developed at the University of Madison-Wisconsin) running on MySQL
5.0.27, the Resin 3.0.22 application server and webserver, and Sun Microsystems’ Hotspot
Java Virtual Machine (JVM), v1.5. We simulate a load of 20 users using the Shopping
Mix [119] as their web-interaction strategy. User-interactions are simulated using the
Remote Browser Emulator (RBE) software also implemented at the University of Madison-
Wisconsin. Our VMs are hosted on a machine configured with 2 GB RAM, 2 GB of swap,
an Intel Core Solo T3100 Processor (1.66 GHz) and a 51 GB harddisk running Windows
XP SP2.
There are three remediation mechanisms we consider: (manual) system reboots, (automatic)
application server restarts, and Nooks device driver protection and recovery [122] – Nooks
isolates the kernel from device drivers using lightweight protection domains: as a result
driver crashes are less likely to cause a kernel crash. Further, Nooks supports the transparent
recovery of a failed device driver.
Finally, we use the following system-configurations: Configuration A – Fault-free system
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operation, Configuration B – System operation in the presence of memory leaks, Config-
uration C – System operation in the presence of device-driver failures (Nooks disabled),
Configuration D – System operation in the presence of device-driver failures (Nooks en-
abled), and Configuration E – System operation in the presence of memory leaks and driver
failures (Nooks enabled).
In our experiments we measure both client-side and server-side activity. On the client-side
we use the number of web interactions and client-perceived rate of failure to determine
client-side availability.
A typical fault-free run of the TPC-W (Configuration A), takes ∼24 minutes to complete
and records 3973 successful client-side interactions (166 client-side interactions per minute).
Figure 5.2: Client interactions – Configuration B
Figure 5.2 shows the client-side goodput over ∼76 hours of continuous execution (187 runs)
in the presence of an accumulating memory leak – Configuration B. The average number
of client-side interactions over this series of experiments is 4032.3 ± 116.8473. In this
figure there are nine runs where the number of client interactions is 2 or more standard
deviations below the mean. Client-activity logs indicate a number of successive failed HTTP
requests over an interval of ∼1 minute during these runs. Resin’s logs indicate that the server
encounters a low-memory condition, forcing a number of JVM garbage collections before
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restarting the application server. During the restart, requests sent by RBE-clients fail to
complete. A Poisson fit of the time-intervals between these nine runs at the 95% confidence
interval yields a hazard rate of 1 memory-leak related failure (Resin restart) every 8.1593
hours.
Figure 5.3 shows a trace sampling the number of client interactions completed every 60
seconds for a typical run, (Run #2), compared to data from some runs where low memory
conditions cause Resin to restart. Data obtained from Resin’s logs record startup times of
3,092 msecs (initial startup) and restart times of approximately 47,582 msecs.
Figure 5.3: Client-side interaction trace - Configuration B
To evaluate the RAS-characteristics of the system in the presence of the memory leak, we use
the SHARPE RAS-modeling and analysis tool [160] to create the basic 2-node, 2-parameter
RAS-model shown in Figure 5.4. Table 5.1 lists the model’s parameters.
Figure 5.4: Simple RAS model
Whereas the model shown in Figure 5.4 implicitly assumes that the detection of the low
memory condition is perfect and the restart of the application server resolves the problem
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S 0 an UP state where the system services requests
S 1 a DOWN state, no client requests are serviced
while the application server is being restarted
λ f ailure observed rate of failure, 1 failure every 8 hours
µrestart time to restart the application server, ∼47 seconds
Table 5.1: RAS-Model Parameters – Configuration B
100% of the time, in this instance these assumptions are validated by the experiments.







the steady state avail-
ability of the system is 99.838%. Further, the system has an expected downtime of 866
minutes per year – given by the formula (1 − Availability) ∗ T where T = 525, 600 minutes
in a year. At best, the system is capable of delivering two 9’s of availability. Table 5.2 shows
the expected penalties per year for each minute of downtime over the allowed limit. As an
additional consideration, downtime may also incur costs in terms of time and money spent
on service visits, parts and/or labor, which add to any assessed penalties.
Availability guarantee Max downtime per year Expected penalties
99.999 ∼5 mins (866 - 5)*$p
99.99 ∼53 mins (866 - 53)*$p
99.9 ∼526 mins (866 - 526)*$p
99 ∼5256 mins $0
Table 5.2: Expected SLA penalties for Configuration B
In Configuration C we inject faults into the pcnet32 device driver with Nooks driver
protection disabled. Each injected fault leads to a kernel panic requiring a reboot to make
the system operational again. For this set of experiments we arbitrarily choose a fault rate of
4 device failures every 8 hours and use the SWIFI tools to achieve this rate of failures in
our system under test. The fact that that the remediation mechanism (the reboot) always
restores the system to an operational state allows us to reuse the basic 2-parameter RAS
model shown in Figure 5.4 to evaluate the RAS-characteristics of the system in the presence
of device driver faults. Table 5.3 shows the parameters of the model.
Using SHARPE, we calculate the steady state availability of the system as 98.873%, with an
expected downtime of 5,924 minutes per year, i.e., under this fault-load the system cannot
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S 0 an UP state where the system services requests
S 1 a DOWN state, no client requests are serviced
while the application server is being restarted
λ f ailure achieved rate of failure, 4 failures every 8 hours
µrestart time to reboot the system, 1 minute 22 seconds
Table 5.3: RAS model parameters – Configuration C
deliver two nines of availability.
Next we consider the case of the system under test enhanced with Nooks device driver
protection enabled – Configuration D. Whereas we reuse the same fault-load and fault-rate,
4 device driver failures every 8 hours, we need to revise the RAS-model used in our analysis
to account for the possibility of imperfect repair, i.e., to handle cases where Nooks is unable
to recover the failed device driver and restore the system to an operational state. To achieve
this we use the RAS-model shown in Figure 5.5; its parameters are listed in Table 5.4.
Figure 5.5: RAS model of a system with imperfect repair
S 0 an UP state where the system services requests
S 1 an UP state, where Nooks is recovering a failed
driver
S 2 a DOWN state, where Nooks’ recovery attempt
fails and the system needs to be rebooted
λdriver f ailure achieved rate of failure, 4 failures every 8 hours
µnooks recovery time for Nooks to successfully recover a failed
device driver, 4,093 microseconds worst case
c the coverage factor, represents the success rate
of Nooks, varying this parameter lets us study
the impact of imperfect recovery
µreboot time to reboot the system, 1 minute 22 seconds
Table 5.4: RAS model Parameters – Configuration D
Figure 5.6 shows the expected impact of Nooks recovery on the system’s RAS-characteristics
as its success rate varies.
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Figure 5.6: Availability – Configuration D
Whereas Configuration C of the system under test is unable to deliver two 9’s of availability
in the presence of device driver faults, a modest 20% success rate from Nooks is expected to
promote the system into another availability bracket while a 92% success rate reduces the
expected downtime and SLA penalties by two orders of magnitude (see Figure 5.6) 4.
Thus far we have analyzed the system under test and each fault in isolation, i.e., each
RAS-model we have developed so far considers one fault and its remediations. We now
develop an RAS-model that considers all the faults in our fault-model and the remediations
available, Configuration E – see Figure 5.7.
Figure 5.7: Complete RAS-model – Configuration E
Figure 5.8 shows the expected availability of the complete system. The system’s availability
4In our experiments we were unable to encounter a scenario where Nooks was unable to successfully
recover a failed device driver; however the point of our exercise is to demonstrate how that eventually could be
accounted for in an evaluation of a remediation mechanism.
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is limited to two 9’s of availability even though the system could deliver better availability
and downtime numbers – the minimum system downtime is calculated as 866 minutes per
year, the same as for Configuration B, the memory leak scenario. Thus, even with perfect
Nooks recovery, the system’s availability is limited by the reactive remediation for the
memory leak. To improve the system’s overall availability we need to improve the handling
of the memory leak.
Figure 5.8: Availability – Configuration E
5.4.3 Deployment 2: Resin, MySQL, Linux 2.6.20
In Deployment 2 our test platform uses VMWare GSX virtual machines configured with:
512 MB RAM, 1 GB of swap, a single x86 processor and an 8GB harddisk running
OpenSuse 9.2 on Linux 2.6.20. We use an instance of the TPC-W web-application (based
on the implementation developed at the University of Madison-Wisconsin) running on
MySQL 5.0.27, the Resin 3.0.22 application server and webserver, and Sun Microsystems’
Hotspot Java Virtual Machine (JVM), v1.5. We simulate a load of 20 users using the
Shopping Mix [119] as their web-interaction strategy (the same conditions used in §5.4.2).
User-interactions are simulated using the Remote Browser Emulator (RBE) software also
implemented at the University of Madison-Wisconsin. Our VMs are hosted on a machine
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configured with 2GB RAM, 2 GB swap, an Intel Core Duo E6750 Processor (2.67GHz) and
a 228 GB harddisk running Windows XP Media Center Edition SP2.
Unlike Linux 2.4.18 where there is an available device driver recovery framework (Nooks),
there is no equivalent device driver protection framework for Linux 2.6.205. As a result
there are two remediation mechanisms we consider: (manual) system reboots in the case
of device driver crashes and (automatic) application server restarts in the case of memory
exhaustion.
Subjecting Deployment 2 to the same failure conditions as Deployment 1 we collect mea-
surements for: 1) the fault-free system operation, 2) the application server restart times in
the presence of memory leaks and, 3) the system operation in the presence of device driver
failures, and enter these into our scoring model to compare against Deployment 1.
We use the following system-configurations: Configuration A – Fault-free system operation,
Configuration B – System operation in the presence of memory leaks, Configuration C –
System operation in the presence of device-driver failures, and Configuration D – System
operation in the presence of memory leaks and driver failures.
A typical fault-free run of TPC-W (Configuration A) takes 20 minutes to complete and
records 3268 successful client-side interactions (163 client-interactions per minute). During
our experiments we record an average of 3398 ± 67.7209 successful client-side interactions.
In Configuration B, the normal restart time for Resin is 1,499 ms while the restart time
under low-memory conditions is 16,117 ms. Using the simple RAS model (Figure 5.4)
with parameters λ f ailure = 1 every 8 hours and µrestart = 16, 117 msecs we calculate the
steady-state availability for this configuration as 99.944%, with expected yearly downtime
of 294 minutes, i.e., this system is able to deliver 3 9’s of availability under these conditions.
In Configuration C we inject faults into the pcnet32 device driver at the same rate as
5We only ported the Nooks device driver fault-injection tools from Linux 2.4.18 to Linux 2.6.20, not the
Nooks device driver recovery framework.
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we did in Deployment 1 – 4 faults every 8 hours. Without device driver recovery, each
injected fault leads to a kernel panic requiring a system reboot to restore system operation
(1 minute 28 seconds). For this configuration we calculate the steady-state availability for
this configuration as 98.781% with expected yearly downtime of 6,407 minutes.
In Configuration D we consider the combination of memory-leak related failures and
device driver failures. Using the scoring model in Figure 5.1 we calculate the steady-state
availability of the full system as 98.725% availability, with expected yearly downtime
of 6,700 minutes, i.e., overall we expect this configuration to deliver less than 2 9’s of
availability under these conditions.
5.4.4 Deployment Comparisons
Table 5.5 compares the performance and RAS characteristics of Deployments 1 and 2. For
the failure scenario involving memory leak failures observed once every eight hours and
device driver failures injected four times every eight hours (Figure 5.1), Deployment 1 with
device driver recovery enabled is better than Deployment 2. Further, modest success rates
(30%) for the device driver recovery framework on Deployment 1 are expected to move the
configuration into a higher availability bracket (Figure 5.8).
Deployment 1 Deployment 2
Performance Interactions/min 166 163
Measures Normal Resin restart (msec) 3,092 1,499Low memory Resin restart (msec) 47,582 16,117
OS restart (min:secs) 1:22 1:28
Device driver recovery 4,093 µ secs n/a
RAS UP states SUP={S 0, S 1} SUP={S 0}
Measures DOWN states S DOWN={S 2, S 3} S DOWN={S 2, S 3}
S S avail(memory leak only) 99.838% 99.944%
S S avail(driver f ailure only) no recovery 98.873% 98.781%
S S avail(memory leak, driver f ailure) 98.712%→99.835% 98.725%
Downtime(memory leak only)/yr 866 mins 294 mins
Downtime(driver failure only)/yr no recovery 5,924 mins 6,407 mins
Downtime(memory leak,driver failure)/yr 6, 771→866 mins 6,700 mins
Table 5.5: TPC-W Deployment 1 and Deployment 2 Results
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Using our scoring model and the experimental results we can identify a weakness in
the deployments evaluated – reactive handling of memory leaks – and consider possible
mitigations.
Whereas the application server used in the experiments (Resin) automatically restarts itself
under low-memory conditions, the reactive strategy built into the application server may
be complemented (or superseded) by a preventative maintenance scheme that performs a
periodic early restart of the application server.
Preventative maintenance actions may be carried out on a fixed schedule or an adaptive
schedule. For preventative maintenance to be an option the system’s failure distribution
must be hypoexponential (Increasing Failure Rate/IFR §4.2.1), which allows us to divide the
system’s lifetime into two stages. Further, it must be possible to create detection mechanisms
that accurately identify/predict the transition from the first stage of the system’s lifetime to
the second stage.
We use the RAS-model shown in Figure 5.9 in our analysis. Its parameters are listed in
Table 5.6 and are based on the application server restart times of Deployment 1.
Figure 5.9: Preventative maintenance RAS-model
Using these parameters we plot the graph shown in Figure 5.10, which shows the expected
availability of the system as λinspect varies. For the failure conditions/model-parameters
supplied performing a free-memory check a modest number of times per hour and performing
a preventative maintenance action is expected to improve the system’s availability.
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S 0 an UP state, 1st stage of system lifetime
S 1 an UP state, 2nd stage of system lifetime
S 2 a DOWN state, application server is restarted
S 3 an UP state, free-memory inspection occurs
during the 1st stage of the system’s lifetime
S 4 an UP state, free-memory inspection occurs
during the 2nd stage of the system’s lifetime.
A preventative restart is carried out returning
the system to the first stage of its lifetime
S 5 a DOWN state, preventative restart occurs
λ2ndstage rate of transition into 2nd stage of its lifetime,
once every six hours
λ f ailure rate of transition into low-memory condition
state, once in either the 7th or 8th hour
µrestart resin worst time to restart Resin under
low-memory conditions, ∼47 seconds
λinspect rate of free-memory trend-checks
µinspect time to conduct free-memory check,
21,627 microseconds
µrestart resin pm best-case time to restart application,
server 3,092 milliseconds
Table 5.6: Preventative maintenance model parameters
5.5 Evaluation Part 2
In our second case-study we model and experimentally evaluate the efficacy of VM-Rejuv –
a prototype implementation of a virtual machine (VM) based software rejuvenation scheme
for application servers and internet sites [173] developed at the Universitat Polite`cnica de
Catalunya (UPC) in Barcelona.
Software rejuvenation is the concept of gracefully terminating an application and imme-
diately restarting it in a clean internal state [78]. This technique has been implemented as
a form of preventative/proactive maintenance in a number of systems, e.g., AT&T billing
applications [78]6, telecommunications switching software [10], online transaction process-
ing (OLTP) servers [27], middleware applications [15] and web/application-servers [109],
as an approach to mitigate the effects of software aging – the degradation of the state of
a software system, which may eventually lead to system performance degradation and/or
crash/hang failure [1].
6The original proposal of the software rejuvenation technique by Huang et al.
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Figure 5.10: Expected impact of preventative maintenance
Strategies for rejuvenation can be divided into two classes: time-based rejuvenation and
prediction-based rejuvenation [1]. With time-based rejuvenation state-restoration activities
are preformed at regular deterministic intervals, whereas with prediction-based rejuvenation
the time to rejuvenate is based on the collection and analysis of system data, e.g., resource
metrics.
State-restoration activities may include one or more of: garbage collection, preemptive
rollback, memory defragmentation, therapeutic reboots, flushing and/or reinitializing data
structures [27].
VM-Rejuv employs a prediction-based rejuvenation strategy for mitigating the effects
of software aging and transient failures on web/application-servers. Software aging and
transient failures are detected through continuous monitoring of system data and performance
metrics of the application-server; if some anomalous behavior is identified the system triggers
an automatic rejuvenation action [173]. Rejuvenation actions in VM-Rejuv take the form of
preventative application-server restarts.
To minimize the disruption to clients due to an application-server restart, VM-Rejuv employs
redundancy and load-balancing.
Web-application servers are deployed under VM-Rejuv in multiple virtual machines logically
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organized in a cluster. Hosting multiple virtual machines on a single physical machine
allows it to be treated like a cluster as shown in Figure 5.11.
Figure 5.11: VM-Rejuv framework
VM-Rejuv uses three virtual machines for a hosted web-application: one VM to run a
software load-balancer (VM1), one VM to be the main/“active” application server and one
VM to be a hot-standby replica of the main application server (VMs 2 and 3).
The first virtual machine, VM1, runs:
• A load-balancer – the VM-Rejuv prototype uses Linux Virtual Server (LVS) as its
load-balancer [151]. LVS is a layer-4 load-balancer, which provides IP-failover and a
number of load-balancing policies (round-robin, weighted round-robin, etc.).
• An Aging detector – module for forecasting aging-related failures. In the current
VM-Rejuv prototype the Aging detector uses simple threshold techniques concerned
with memory utilization [173].
• An Anomaly detector – module that detects anomalies in VM2 and VM3 using
threshold violations as indicators of anomalies, e.g., throughput falling below a preset
threshold or response time exceeding a preset threshold (SLA violations).
• A Data collector – module that collects statistics from VMs 2 and 3 for analysis.
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• A Watchdog – module that detects server outages. VM-Rejuv uses the ldirectord tool,
which is used to monitor and administer real servers in an LVS cluster [156].
• Software Rejuvenation Agent (SRA) coordinator – module that directs SRAs on VMs
2 and 3 to initiate an application-server restart.
While virtual machines 2 and 3 run:
• The web-application server – the resource being load-balanced and periodically
rejuvenated.
• Software rejuvenation agents – modules that initiate rejuvenation actions.
• A set of probes – modules that collect statistics from various sources including log
files, (guest) operating system kernel (e.g., CPU utilization, memory usage, swap
space, etc.) and application-server proxies (e.g., the P-probe module sits in front of
the application-server collecting statistics on throughput and latency).
Figure 5.12: VM-Rejuv deployment7
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An example deployment of a web-application using VM-Rejuv is shown in Figure 5.12.
During its operation, client requests to the web-application are routed by the LVS load-
balancer on VM1 to the application server on the active VM, while the standby VM (and its
application-server) remains ready but inactive as a hot replica until a rejuvenation is signaled
by the SRA coordinator.
When a rejuvenation action is signaled, the active VM and standby VM switch roles. New
client requests are routed to the application server on the standby VM (old standby VM
marked as the “new” active VM); the application-server on the old active VM finishes
processing any outstanding requests before the local SRA agent restarts the application
server. The interval of time the old active VM spends processing client requests that are
in-flight/outstanding when a rejuvenation is signaled is referred to as the pre-rejuvenation
delay-window.
The use of redundancy in VM-Rejuv and coordinated switch-overs between the active
VM and the standby VM support application-server restarts that minimize the loss of
in-flight client-requests during rejuvenation. These elements combined with application-
specific technologies like session migration/replication (e.g., as found in the Apache Tomcat
web/application server [173]) allow rejuvenations to be performed without disrupting clients,
which potentially improves the client-perceived availability of the web-application.
Deploying a web-application under a prediction-based rejuvenation scheme like VM-Rejuv
has a number of implications for its reliability, availability and serviceability.
Rejuvenation activities can be used as preventative maintenance to avoid certain kinds of
failures, e.g., memory-leaks as shown in [173]. The use of redundancy and IP failover allow
clients to be shielded from the failure of the active VM and minimizes disruptions due
to preventative restarts. These aspects of VM-Rejuv’s operation potentially improve the
7Server icons by Fast Icon Studio (http://www.fasticon.com) designed by Dirceu Veiga. Client/workstation
icons by Layered System Icons designed by BogdanGC (http://bogdangc.deviantart.com/). Database icon by
DryIcons (http://dryicons.com).
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web-application reliability, availability and serviceability. However, the efficacy of problem
detection/prediction mechanisms, the frequency of rejuvenation actions, the success rate of
rejuvenation actions, and the size of the pre-rejuvenation delay-window are all elements that
can negatively affect the RAS properties of an application deployed under VM-Rejuv.
Problem detection/prediction mechanisms influence the rate at which rejuvenation actions
are initiated. Imperfect detection/predictions can result in too many or too few rejuvenation
actions. Whereas too many rejuvenations may not disrupt clients (due to the redundancy and
fail-over) time spent waiting to rejuvenate (the pre-rejuvenation delay-window) represents a
period of vulnerability during which a failure of the active VM can affect clients. Further,
frequent rejuvenations may put the system in a state where the active and standby VMs are
constantly switching roles, indicating that the thresholds used to trigger rejuvenations may
be inappropriate or may make the system unstable. Finally, rejuvenation actions may also
fail, e.g., application servers could fail to restart or node-failover may be unsuccessful, in
which case some other mechanism would need to be in place to rectify the situation.
On the other hand, too few rejuvenations may result in failures/unplanned downtime, which
could have been avoided and may indicate inadequate fault/failure coverage for the system.
In our evaluation of VM-Rejuv we wish to quantify the effects of:
• the rejuvenation frequency
• the success rate of rejuvenation actions (node-failover and application-server-restart)
• the size of the pre-rejuvenation delay-window
on its reliability, availability and serviceability.
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5.5.1 7U Process
System under test. For the system under test we use the TPC-W web-application hosted
on two Apache Tomcat web/application servers [53] under VM-Rejuv. Tomcat is a Java-
based web/application server developed by The Apache Foundation. Apache Tomcat is
used as the web-application server in the VM-Rejuv experiments since a P-probe designed
specifically for communicating performance statistics from Tomcat to the SRA coordinator
is included in the VM-Rejuv prototype 8.
Fault model. VM-Rejuv’s main detection mechanisms use the violation of response
time and/or throughput thresholds to indicate that a rejuvenation action is required. We
identify faults that can be used to trigger these detection mechanisms. Severe memory leaks
affect both throughput and response time, degrading these performance metrics [173] in
application servers. We use Kheiron/JVM to inject memory leaks into the web-application
servers deployed under VM-Rejuv.
Fault-remediation relationship. VM-Rejuv initiates a node-failover and signals a re-
juvenation (application-server restart) action in response to throughput or response time
violations or application server crashes.
Micro-measurements. For micro-measurements we collect metrics on: the time for node-
failover, the frequency of rejuvenation actions, the success of a rejuvenation, the size of
the pre-rejuvenation delay-window, and application-server restart, server-side estimates
of request throughput, and response time client-side goodput via instrumenting parts of
VM-Rejuv (specifically the SRA agent coordinator and the SRA agents), and parsing
application-server logs and parsing TPC-W client logs (client-side goodput is reported as
8The Tomcat P-probe is a Java class that is installed as a filter [129] in the pipeline that processes requests
received by the application-server.
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the number of web-interactions performed by TPC-W clients).
Macro-measurements. For macro-measurements we use the seven node, six parameter
scoring model shown in Figure 5.13, with parameter descriptions in Table 5.7, to quantify
the following the following facets of reliability, availability and serviceability:
• Reliability – frequency of rejuvenations, frequency of active VM failures during
rejuvenation.
• Availability – basic steady state availability and tolerance availability.
• Serviceability – mean time to system restoration.
Figure 5.13: VM-Rejuv RAS model
Workload and metric collectors. Scripts that parse TPC-W client logs, Tomcat logs,
SRA coordinator logs and SRA agent logs are used to gather micro-measurement data.
CHAPTER 5. THE 7U-EVALUATION BENCHMARK 170
S 0 state where active VM services requests and standby VM ready
S 1
state where VM-Rejuv prepares to rejuvenate the
active VM and the standby VM becomes the
new active VM servicing new client requests
S 2 state where old active VM is ready to rejuvenate
S 3 state where the active VM has failed during normal operation
S 4 state where the failure of the active VM has been detected
S 5
state where the new active VM (the old standby VM)
has failed while the old active VM is rejuvenating
S 6 state where the failure of the active VM during rejuvenation has been detected
λre juv rate of rejuvenation
λ f ailure forced/induced rate of failure of the active VM
µpre re juv delay size of pre-rejuvenation delay-window
µapp svr restart mean time to restart/rejuvenate the application server on the active VM
µdetect active vm f ailure mean time to detect that the active VM has failed/crashed
µnode f ail over mean time to failover to the standby VM
Table 5.7: VM-Rejuv RAS model
5.5.2 VM-Rejuv Evaluation
We create a test deployment of VM-Rejuv consisting of three virtual machines co-located
on a single physical machine. VM1 is configured with 640 MB RAM, 1GB swap, 2 virtual
CPUs and an 8GB harddisk. VM2 and VM3 are each configured with 384 MB RAM, 512
MB swap, 2 virtual CPUs and 8GB harddisks. All three VMs run Centos 5.0 with a Linux
2.6.18-8.el5 SMP kernel.
To enable LVS load-balancing, the network interface on VM1 is configured with two IP
addresses, one public IP address and one private IP address (192.168.1.xxx). Our LVS
configuration is based on LVS-NAT [150]. VM2 and VM3 are configured with private IP
addresses only (192.168.1.xxx). VM2 and VM3 can route to VM1 only, whereas VM1 can
route to VMs 2 and 3 and the internet.
The physical machine hosting the VMs is configured with 2 GB RAM, 2 GB swap, an Intel
Core Duo E6750 Processor (2.67 GHz) and a 228 GB harddisk running Windows XP Media
Center Edition SP2.
Figure 5.14 shows our VM-Rejuv configuration. We install Apache Tomcat v5.5.20 and Sun
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Microsystems’ Hotspot Java Virtual Machine v1.5 on VMs 2 and 3 as well as instances of
the TPC-W web-application. We use the MySQL 5.0.27 database server to store the TPC-W
web-application data, and this is installed on VM1. The TPC-W web-application instances
on VMs 2 and 3 are configured to access the database server on VM1. The LVS tools
(IPVS v1.2.1 and ipvsadm v1.24) are installed on VM1 [150]. The following VM-Rejuv
components are installed on the three VMs: the SRA coordinator, ldirectord watchdog,
response time and throughput monitors are installed on VM1 while the SRA agents are
installed on VM2 and VM3.
Figure 5.14: VM-Rejuv configuration9
The VM-Rejuv prototype works with the Apache Tomcat web/application server [173].
Whereas the components of VM-Rejuv are written in Java, operations such as rejuvenating
application servers and updating LVS tables for failover are facilitated by shell scripts
called from Java using the java.lang.Runtime::exec() API. To restart/rejuvenate Tomcat,
9Server icons by Fast Icon Studio (http://www.fasticon.com) designed by Dirceu Veiga. Client/workstation
icons by Layered System Icons designed by BogdanGC (http://bogdangc.deviantart.com/).
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VM-Rejuv’s SRA agents invoke the shutdown.sh and startup.sh scripts in the bin directory
under the Tomcat installation directory, while updates to the LVS table to designate the
new active VM are performed via calls to the Linux Virtual Server Administration utility,
ipvsadm.
We simulate a client load of 50 TPC-W clients using the Shopping Mix as their web-
interaction strategy.
During 15 failure-free runs, each lasting 22 minutes, the average number of client-side
interactions recorded is 7745.2 ± 748.9. Figures 5.15 and 5.16 show a 10 minute sample of
the throughput and response time data reported by VM probes during one of our failure-free
runs. From our failure-free runs the average throughput is ∼13 requests per second and
the average response time is ∼11 ms. We use the server-side throughput and response time
numbers reported to set the SLA violation thresholds for VM-Rejuv and inject faults that
result in the violation of these thresholds, triggering rejuvenation actions so we can estimate
the parameters for our scoring model.
Figure 5.15: VM-Rejuv baseline throughput
sample
Figure 5.16: VM-Rejuv baseline response
time sample
To estimate the size of the rejuvenation window, we set VM-Rejuv’s response time violation
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threshold at mean response time (11 ms) and re-run the workload of 50 clients. VM-Rejuv
triggers rejuvenations after four consecutive SLA violations. During three 22 minute runs we
observe an average of 4 rejuvenation actions per run. During rejuvenation actions, the mean
failover time is 25.62 msecs ± 3.46 msecs (see Figure 5.17) with a mean pre-rejuvenation
delay window size of 14,769 msecs ± 5,420 msecs (see Figure 5.18).
Figure 5.17: VM-Rejuv VM failover time
Figure 5.18: VM-Rejuv rejuvenation window
size (50 clients)
In our fault-injection experiments we subject both Tomcat application servers deployed
under VM-Rejuv to memory leaks that result in resource exhaustion within 5.53 minutes
(332.017 seconds) of running the 50 client TPC-W workload (see Figure 5.19 for example
resource exhaustion traces). We set VM-Rejuv’s response time violation threshold to
the mean response time of the failure-free runs (11 ms) and measure the frequency of
rejuvenations, and the size of the pre-rejuvenation delay window. Introducing memory leaks
in the Tomcat application servers increases the response time and delays the rejuvenation of
the old active VM after the standby server is brought online, since the old active VM must
service outstanding requests before it rejuvenates. Table 5.8 summarizes the results from
five 22 minute memory-leak experiments.
CHAPTER 5. THE 7U-EVALUATION BENCHMARK 174
Figure 5.19: Tomcat resource exhaustion trace
Run # Rejuvenation Rejuvenation Failover time Pre-rejuvenation
actions interval (secs) (msecs) delay window (msecs)
1 8 155.47 33.88 34,657.63
2 9 142.13 31.63 18,321.38
3 6 155.76 27.20 16,175.60
4 7 149.08 24.71 37,538.57
5 8 167.86 27.29 30,314.43
Avg 7.6 154.06 28.94 27,401.52
Table 5.8: VM-Rejuv subjected to memory leaks
Using a mean rejuvenation interval of 154.06 seconds, mean rejuvenation window size of
27,401.52 msecs and mean failover time of 28.94 msecs, we score the VM-Rejuv deployment
using the RAS model in Figure 5.13. The mean time to restart Tomcat during the memory
leak experiments is 3 seconds and the mean time to detect a server outage (via the ldirectord








Table 5.9: VM-Rejuv steady state probabilities – memleak scenario
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The steady-state probabilities of the VM-Rejuv model are shown in Table 5.9 and model
analysis results are shown in Table 5.10.
Using the scoring model we can estimate the number of active VM failures expected during
rejuvenation actions per day, i.e., the frequency of transitions from S 1 to S 5 (FS 1→S 5) plus
the frequency of transitions from S 2 to S 5 (FS 2→S 5). This we estimate at 41 per day under
the failure conditions used in our experiments (1 memory-leak failure every 5.53 minutes).
From the steady-state probabilities of the model we estimate that the deployment spends
∼82% of the time in its normal operating mode/configuration, pi0, and ∼16% of its time
rejuvenating (pi1 + pi2). While rejuvenations are taking place clients-requests are serviced by
the standby VM; as a result the system would be considered UP from the client’s perspective
in states {S 0, S 1, S 2} – UP 1416.5 minutes per day (98.37%) and DOWN 23.5 minutes per
day (1.63%). Administrators on the other hand may consider the system to be UP if it is in
state S 0 since states S 1 and S 2 represent a window of vulnerability. From the administrator’s
perspective the system is UP 1187.5 minutes per day (82.47%) and DOWN 252.5 minutes
per day (17.53%), of which 229 minutes are spent performing rejuvenation actions.
In state S 1 clients still connected to the old active VM may experience some performance
degradation and even lose requests if the degree of resource depletion on the old active
VM is so severe that it cannot clear its backlog before the other VM needs rejuvenating.
Further, increasing the size of the pre-rejuvenation delay window (either through missing
rejuvenation opportunities or imperfect prediction) increases the time spent in S 1 where the
overall system is vulnerable to failures of the current active VM.
5.6 Evaluation Part 3
In our final case-study we model and experimentally evaluate the efficacy of hardened device
drivers in OpenSolaris.
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Measure Metrics Results
Reliability
Frequency of active VM failures during 41.377455
rejuvenation per day FS 1→S 5 + FS 2→S 5
Availability
Basic steady-state availability (UPadmin = {S 0}) 0.824673
Tolerance availability (UPclient = {S 0, S 1, S 2}) 0.983678
Serviceability
Mean-time to system restoration (UPadmin = {S 0}) 22,373 msecs
Mean-time to system restoration(UPclient = {S 0, S 1, S 2}) 5,509 msecs
Table 5.10: Summary of VM-Rejuv RAS model analysis results
OpenSolaris is a fully functional Solaris operating system release built from open source
[155]. Solaris is a UNIX operating system developed by Sun Microsystems. Under the
OpenSolaris initiative the Solaris kernel source was made available under an open license
(circa June 2005). The most recent release of OpenSolaris is based on the Solaris 10
operating system. In the remainder of this section all references to OpenSolaris pertain to
the release based on Solaris 10.
OpenSolaris includes a number of technologies designed to improve the reliability, availabil-
ity and serviceability of the operating system, one of which is the Solaris Fault Manager.
The Solaris Fault Manager is a software architecture for fault management that incorporates
several software components: an event protocol for sending and recording error and fault
information, a fault-diagnosis engine and a set of programming interfaces that improve
diagnosis, isolation, recovery and dynamic deactivation of faulty hardware [155]. This
collection of software components is referred to as the Fault Management Architecture
(FMA) [136]. A fault-centric software model correlates error reports into a binary telemetry
flow and dispatches the telemetry stream to an appropriate diagnosis engine. Diagnosis
engines can generate specific information about the fault for use by maintenance personnel
and cause corrective actions to be automatically taken if possible, e.g., taking a faulty
hardware component oﬄine.
The FMA I/O Fault Services enable device driver developers to integrate fault management
capabilities into I/O device drivers [136]. The Solaris I/O fault services framework defines a
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set of interfaces that enable device drivers to coordinate and perform basic error handling
tasks and activities. Hardened device drivers make use of the I/O fault services framework
for error handling and diagnosis.
5.6.1 7U Process
System under test. In our evaluation of hardened device drivers we use the Broadcom
Gigabit Ethernet (bge) device driver as a test subject. TPC-W web-application stack
components are deployed on OpenSolaris and the web-application and database components
are bound to a network interface managed by the bge device driver.
Fault model. We use the bus ops fault injection tool (bofi) [135] to inject faults into the
bge device driver. bofi is part of the device driver hardening test harness provided by Sun
Microsystems [136]. bofi facilitates controlled corruption of programmed I/O (PIO) and
DMA requests and interference with interrupts, thus simulating faults that occur in the
hardware managed by the driver [136]. These faults, when injected, can lead to service
loss due to corrupted PIO/DMA operations, service loss due to stuck interrupts, service
degradations and unresponsive drivers.
In our fault-injection experiments we script bofi’s fault-injection operations using utilities in
the driver hardening test harness. These utilities are used to run a specific workload, log the
accesses made by the device driver while the workload is run, generate specifications on
how to corrupt the driver’s accesses to its hardware and generate test scripts that re-run the
workload while injecting faults that corrupt specific device driver accesses.
Fault-remediation relationship. Hardened device drivers are required to respond imme-
diately to detected errors by attempting recovery, retrying an I/O transaction, attempting
fail-over, reporting the error to the calling application/stack or panicking if the error cannot
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be constrained in any other way. Detected errors are communicated to the Fault Manager
as an ereport – a structured event defined by the FMA event protocol specification [136].
The event protocol specifies a common set of data fields that must be used to describe
error and fault events, and a list of suspected faults. ereports may be used to indicate a
number of events including, but not limited to, reporting that a device has: entered an invalid
state, self-corrected an internal error, encountered an uncorrectable internal error, detected a
stalled data transfer, detected an unresponsive device or detected that a device has raised too
many consecutive invalid interrupts.
In addition to detecting and reporting errors, hardened device drivers must indicate whether
or not an error has impacted the services provided by a device. Service impacts are reported
as one of:
1. Service lost – service provided by the device is unavailable.
2. Service degraded – driver can provide a partial or degraded level of service.
3. Service unaffected – an error was detected but the services provided by the device are
unaffected.
4. Service restored – all the device’s services have been restored.
Micro-measurements. For micro-measurements we collect metrics on: driver recovery
times, driver recovery success and the frequency of service losses or degradation.
Macro-measurements. For macro-measurements and scoring we use the model shown in
Figure 5.20 to quantify the following facets of reliability, availability and serviceability:
• Reliability – frequency of service losses that escalate to the driver being marked as
unresponsive, frequency of partial service restorations (degradation of service).
• Availability – basic steady-state availability, tolerance availability.
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Figure 5.20: Hardened device driver RAS model
• Serviceability – mean time to system restoration.
The model consists of six states and ten parameters:
• S 0 – driver/device working normally.
• S 1 – service loss due to stuck interrupts.
• S 2 – service loss due to corrupted PIO operations.
• S 3 – driver/device status reported as unresponsive.
• S 4 – service recovery not reported after service loss due to corrupted PIO operations.
• S 5 – service reported as degraded.
• λ f ailure – forced rate of device driver failures.
• pbadint limit – proportion of failures that result in stuck interrupts.
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• psvc loss – proportion of corrupted PIO operations that lead to service loss.
• µbadint limit – mean time for recovery from stuck interrupts.
• µsvc lost – mean time to recover from service losses due to corrupted PIO operations.
• µreset – mean time until a response is received from the driver/device in lieu of a
service recovery report.
• µno response – mean time to report restoration of services after driver/device marked as
unresponsive.
• µdegraded – mean time to report return to normal operation after service degradation.
• psvc lost f allthru – proportion of service losses that lead to the driver/device being marked
as unresponsive.
• pno response f allthru – proportion of unresponsive driver events that are partially restored
to degraded level of service.
Workload and metric collectors. Fault-injection activities, device driver diagnosis, de-
vice driver service impact reports, and driver recovery actions are timestamped and stored in
the fault-management logs – accessible via the fmdump utility. We use data recorded in this
log to estimate parameters used in our scoring model.
5.6.2 Evaluating Hardened Network Device Drivers on OpenSolaris
Our test platform uses a Sun Ultra40 Workstation configured with 4 GB RAM, 6 GB swap,
1 AMD Opteron Dual Core Processor and a 500 GB harddisk running OpenSolaris. The
Ultra 40 Workstation is equipped with three network interface cards (NICs), two on board
and one on an PCI Express (PCI-E) expansion card. The two onboard NICs are managed
by the unhardened nVidia 1Gb Ethernet v1.15 device driver (nge), while the PCI-E NIC
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uses the hardened Broadcom Gigabit Ethernet v0.57 device driver (bge). One nge interface
and the bge interface are assigned static IP addresses while the remaining nge interface is
un-used.
We configure bofi to target the FMA-aware/hardened bge device driver. For the workload
we use an instance of the TPC-W web-application, running on MySQL 5.0.27, Resin
3.0.22 and Sun Microsystems v1.5 Hotspot Java Virtual Machine. The database server and
web/application server components of the TPC-W web-application stack receive requests
from 20 Remote Browser Emulator (RBE) clients using the Shopping Mix as their web-
interaction strategy. The MySQL database server and Resin web/application server are
bound to the bge interface, while RBE clients submit requests using the available nge and
bge interfaces.
Accesses to/from the bge interface are logged during the execution of a 23 minute TPC-W
run and used to create fault-injection test-scripts for the bge device driver. The fault-injection
test-scripts re-run the TPC-W workload multiple times injecting one or more faults during
each run. Between runs the database server and web/application server are restarted.
Over the course of 39 fault-injection runs (15 hours, 23 minutes) the following fault/failure
data was retrieved from the fault-management logs: a total of 100 faults are injected, 83
of which result in corrupted PIO operations, 1 stuck interrupt and 16 unresponsive driver
events 10.
67 of the 83 corrupted PIOs led to service loss, the stuck interrupt failure led to service
loss and the 16 unresponsive driver/device events result in periodic, but short lived, service
interruptions – a total of 84 faults/failures during 923 minutes (λ f ailure) leading to service
loss or interruptions with 79.76% attributed to corrupted PIO operations (psvc loss), 1.19%
attributed to stuck interrupts (pbadint limit) and 19.05% attributed to unresponsive driver/device
events. Of the 67 service lost events due to corrupted PIO operations, recovery was re-
10The failure mix was a consequence of the workload being run and the accesses that occur during the
workload.
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ported for 55 of them (psvc restored = 82.09%), 1 resulted in an unresponsive driver/device
(psvc lost f allthru = 1.49%) and there were 11 unreported recoveries11. µreset was set to 556.9
msecs for the unreported recoveries based on the inter-fault injection times during runs
where this behavior was observed.
Of the 16 unresponsive driver/device events, 15 were reported as restored while 1 lead to
degradation before complete service restoration was reported (pno response f allthru = 6.25%).
Recovery from service loss due to stuck interrupts (µbadint limit) was reported as 1085.2 msecs,
recovery from service loss due to corrupted PIO operations (µsvc lost) was 576.9 msecs and
recovery from degraded operations (µdegraded) was 173.5 msecs.
Using these parameter values in our scoring model (Figure 5.20 we obtain the steady-state
probabilities shown in Table 5.11, which we use to calculate the reliability, availability
and serviceability metrics shown in Table 5.12. From the steady-sate probabilities of the
model we estimate that the bge device driver experiences 1.6 service losses that escalate
to the driver being marked as non-responsive (FS 2→S 3) per day, 17.1 un-reported device
driver recovery events (FS 2→S 4) per day, and 1.7 service losses that lead to partial/degraded
service restorations (FS 3→S 5) per day. We also estimate that the driver spends 99.92%
of its time servicing requests, UP ∼1438 minutes per day and DOWN ∼2 minutes per
day considering both steady-state availability (pi0 = 99.9169%) and tolerance availability
(pi0+pi5 = 99.9173%). Mean time to service restoration for the bge device driver is estimated
at ∼550 msecs.
11Situations where service impacts were reported but no log entry for service restoration was reported even
though the workload continued to run. The bge device driver subsequently responded to new fault-injections
and report service impacts with no further follow-up.







Table 5.11: Hardened bge device driver steady-state probabilities
Measure Metrics Results
Reliability
Service loss to unresponsive driver fall-throughs (FS 2→S 3) 1.6 a day
Service loss to unreported recovery fall-throughs (FS 2→S 4) 17.1 a day
No response to degraded-service fall-throughs (FS 3→S 5) 1.7 a day
Availability
Basic steady-state availability (UPadmin = {S 0}) 0.999169
Tolerance availability (UPclient = {S 0, S 5}) 0.999173
Serviceability
Mean-time to system restoration (UPadmin = {S 0}) 548.2 ms
Mean-time to system restoration(UPclient = {S 0, S 5}) 546.0 ms
Table 5.12: Summary of hardened bge driver RAS model analysis results
5.7 Related Work
Our approach to benchmarking reliability, availability and serviceability combines run-
time fault-injection tools with the models of failure scenarios used to describe and score
fault-injection experiments. The models used for scoring can be used to capture different
perspectives on the failure and recovery behavior of systems.
In [77], [25] and [32] the authors discuss the importance of fault-injection tools in evaluat-
ing the reliability of systems and compare the tradeoffs between different approaches for
hardware fault-injection and software-implemented fault-injection (SWIFI). Two classes
of hardware fault-injection (injection with contact, e.g., pin/chip-level fault injection and
injection without contact, e.g., exposure to heavy ion radiation) and two classes of soft-
ware fault-injection (compile-time fault-injection and runtime fault-injection) are presented.
Compared to hardware fault-injection, software-implemented fault-injection has a number
of benefits including: the ability to emulate a variety of faults/failures, lower cost since dedi-
cated hardware is not needed, convenience, portability to other platforms and extensibility to
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include new classes of faults. In our 7U evaluations we use SWIFI tools capable of runtime
fault-injection to allow us the flexibility to interact with different target systems without the
need for re-compilation and/or re-linking.
[96] presents a framework for benchmarking the reliability, availability and serviceability
characteristics of systems and discusses three classes of benchmarks: measurement-based,
model-based and hybrid – combinations of measurements and modeling where models guide
experiments and/or are validated/refined by experiments. Our 7U evaluation method is an
example of the hybrid benchmark approach. In our 7U benchmark RAS models are used to
guide fault-injection experiments; however, we expect these models to evolve over time as
different failure scenarios are considered and/or more insights about the failure and recovery
behavior of the system under test are obtained from fault-injection experiments.
[89], [16], [87], [117] and [17] are examples of measurement-based evaluations of reliability
and availability.
[89] proposes the R-Cubed (R3) – Rate, Robustness, and Recovery – framework for avail-
ability benchmarking that evaluates availability as a function of three attributes: the rate
of failures and maintenance events, robustness and recovery. Whereas our 7U benchmark
considers the failure-rates, failure handling and recovery it does not consider maintenance-
induced failures/faults. However, analytical models can be constructed to reason about
maintenance-induced failures/faults, their impacts and their resolutions. [16] conducts a
measurement-based study of availability and maintainability benchmarks using software
RAID systems. In evaluating availability, the authors emphasize 1) capturing the perspective
of the end-user and 2) the need for availability metrics that capture the spectrum of avail-
ability, i.e., taking into consideration degraded modes of operation as well as the normal
mode of operation. In our 7U benchmark we demonstrate how the models used for scoring
can quantify different facets of availability, e.g., basic steady-state availability, tolerance
availability and capacity-oriented availability of a system.
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[87] describes the DBench-OLTP dependability benchmark. DBench-OLTP is a measurement-
based dependability benchmark for online transaction processing systems (database systems).
The fault-model used in DBench emulates operator faults, e.g., deleting a database table,
deleting a user schema, abrupt transaction system shutdown, etc. The DBench benchmark is
composed of three sets of measures – baseline performance measures, performance measures
in the presence of the faultload and dependability measures. Baseline performance mea-
sures are reported in terms of transactions per minute (tpmC) and price per tpmC ($/tpmC).
Performance measures in the presence of the faultload are reported in terms of number of
transactions executed per minute in the presence of faults and the price per transaction in
the presence of faults. Finally, the dependability measures reported are: the number of data
errors detected by consistency tests, availability from the point of view of the system under
test (SUT) and the availability from the client’s point of view. We differ from this work in
our choice faults, choice of metrics and our use of models for describing failures and scoring
recovery activities by computing multiple facets of reliability, availability and serviceability.
[117] describes the System Recovery Benchmark. The authors propose measuring system
recovery on a non-clustered standalone system. The focus of the work is on detailed
measurements of system startup, restart and recovery events. Our work is complementary
to this, relying on measuring startup, restart and recovery times at varying granularity.
We consider these measurements at node-granularity as well as application/component
granularity. Further, we relate these micro-measurements to the impact on the high-level
objectives guiding the system’s recovery decisions.
[17] describes work towards a self-healing benchmark. The authors identify a number of
challenges to benchmarking self-healing capabilities including: quantifying healing effec-
tiveness (identifying different metrics to quantify the impact of disturbances), accounting for
incomplete healing and accounting for healing specific resources (spare disks, hot standbys,
etc.). In our 7U benchmark RAS models based on Markov Chains and Markov reward
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networks can be used to capture different facets of reliability, availability and serviceability,
model imperfect recovery/repair scenarios and consider spare/redundant resources. Further,
our use of models allows us to make a connection between the mechanisms used by a system
to accomplish healing and their relation to the high-level system goals, dictated by SLAs
and policies, governing the system’s operation. Finally, we can also use models to analyze
the effects of individual or combined remediation mechanisms on the overall efficacy of the
system’s healing capabilities.
[168] makes a case for application-specific benchmarks; the application of our 7U approach
to web-application stacks and their components is an example of an application-specific
benchmark. Further, the use of tailored models for scoring allow us to focus on specific
aspects of the system under test being evaluated.
Our work is complementary to the work done on robustness benchmarking [43] and fault-
tolerant benchmarking [191]. However, we focus less on the robustness of individual
component interfaces for our fault-injection and more on system recovery in the presence of
component-level faults, i.e., resource leaks, delays or hangs in components and component-
removals.
[47] is an example of a model-based approach to RAS evaluation. In this paper the authors
build a RAS model to explore the expected impact of Memory Page Retirement (MPR)
on hardware faults associated with failing memory modules on systems running Solaris
10. MPR removes a physical page of memory from use by the system in response to
error correction code (ECC) errors associated with that page. Using their models the
authors investigate the expected impact of MPR on yearly downtime, the number of service
interruptions and the number of servicing visits due to hardware permanent faults. Unlike
our experiments, which focus on software and rely on fault injection experiments to collect
data, the authors focus on hardware failures and use field data from deployed low-end and
mid-range server systems to build and evaluate their models.
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5.8 Summary
In this chapter we discussed and presented a model-based and measurement-based approach
to evaluating the reliability, availability and serviceability properties of web-application
stacks and their components. We use runtime fault-injection tools to insert faults/induce
failures into three target systems (§5.4, §5.5 and §5.6), developed analytical models for
describing the failure scenarios and scoring system responses, and demonstrated the mea-
sures that can be computed to evaluate or compare systems based on their responses (or lack
thereof) to different failure scenarios.
Using RAS models we identify different facets of reliability, availability and serviceability,
which can be quantified via fault-injection experiments, and link the details of remediation
mechanisms (recovery time, recovery success rates, etc.) to high-level RAS-metrics that
govern the system’s operation.
Chapter 6
Contributions, Future Work and
Conclusion
6.1 Thesis Contributions
The contributions of this thesis include the following:
1. A generalized approach to effecting runtime adaptations in applications hosted in
managed and unmanaged execution environments. In developing our runtime adapta-
tion techniques, we identify facilities in contemporary execution environments (e.g.,
Microsoft’s Common Language Runtime, Sun Microsystems’ Java Virtual Machine
and the Linux operating system on the Intel x86 processor) that can be used to ef-
fect dynamic modifications to the applications they host. The runtime adaptation
techniques we develop facilitate in-situ and in-vivo interactions with systems and are
transparent to both the application being modified and the execution environment.
2. A suite of runtime fault-injection tools, Kheiron, that targets multiple execution
environments and applications written in multiple languages. Kheiron uses our
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runtime adaptation techniques to interact with application elements (data-structures,
functions/methods, data-types, classes, type-instances/object-instances, etc.).
3. Identification of analytical tools – Markov Chains, Markov Reward Networks, Feed-
back Control – and techniques that can be used to reason quantitatively about different
facets of the reliability, availability and serviceability properties of systems. In our
work towards an RAS benchmark we identified analytical tools (models) that can
describe and score the failure scenarios used to evaluate systems. We discuss the RAS
measures and metrics that can be computed using these models and present examples
based on real systems to illustrate their use.
4. A model-based and measurement-based approach to evaluating the RAS characteris-
tics of systems, which combines runtime fault-injection with the analytical models.
We describe and demonstrate how these evaluations are conducted and scored, identify
the data sources used to estimate parameters of analytical/scoring models, identify run-
time fault-injection tools (some developed by us, and some developed by third-parties)
that can be used in the system-evaluations, and discuss the results.
6.2 Research Accomplishments
In addition to the contributions listed above, the following practical accomplishments have
already been completed to date:
• Published papers, including [44], [196], [62], [64], [63], [65], [66] and an invited talk
[67].
• Equipment donations from Sun Microsystems and StackSafe Inc. supporting our
RAS-benchmarking work.
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6.3 Practical Concerns
There are a number of practical concerns that need to be addressed when conducting a 7U
evaluation:
Sourcing or creating RASmodels. RAS models are used to describe the failure scenarios
used in the evaluations and to score the system’s responses. However, the issue of who
creates these models is an important one. System vendors have an important role to play in
this process. Whereas vendors may have detailed knowledge about (parts of) the system
and are well-placed to discuss failure modes and scoring responses, end users rely on
these systems for their business’ day-to-day and/or mission-critical activities and also have
opinions on whether the system has failed. Discrepancies between what vendors consider
failures and what clients/end-users consider failures can, and have, occurred [163]. As a
result, considering both perspectives in the evaluation process is key to increasing confidence
in the systems being developed and deployed. We expect that more than one RAS model
will be used in the evaluation of a system and over time, models contributed by both vendors
and end-users (customers, researchers, etc. ) will result in a set of standardized failure
scenarios and scoring criteria as has occurred with performance benchmarks (e.g, SPEC,
NIST, TPC) [177, 140, 190]. Vendors may use RAS models to conduct their own internal
evaluations, compare against other systems and/or demonstrate compliance with agreed
upon standards, while end-users can use these RAS models to verify/validate vendor claims.
Incremental evaluations. During a system’s lifetime the fault-model used in its RAS
evaluations will be modified and/or expanded. New faults may be added to augment the
existing faults in the model and/or RAS-enhancing mechanisms may be added or improved
in the system. These modifications to the fault-model and/or system may require new or
refined RAS models to describe and score the failure scenarios used in the RAS evaluations.
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RAS evaluations may employ one or more failure scenarios; depending on the changes made
to the fault-model or the system some (or in the worst case all) of the failure scenarios may
have to be re-run to obtain updated information on the system’s RAS capabilities under the
selected failure scenarios. The number of failure-scenarios re-run may be influenced by the
importance placed on each failure scenario by the evaluator.
System accessibility to collect model parameters. Collecting the data used to estimate
parameters in the RAS models may necessitate observation points/hooks in systems. Exam-
ple observation points include: log files, console output, and compiled-in or dynamically
added instrumentation points. Logging APIs/toolkits, e.g., log4j, log4cxx and log4net [52]
may be used by the original system developers to produce data about the system’s operation,
data may be collected from the execution environments where the system runs or dynamic
instrumentation tools like DTrace [24], Dyninst [18] and Kheiron [63, 62] may be employed
to collect data from the system and/or execution environment. These data-collection strate-
gies are applicable to both closed-source and open-source software systems. In the case of
closed-source systems, third-party evaluators may rely on existing instrumentation points
or employ dynamic instrumentation tools, whereas for open-source systems third-party
evaluators can augment the system with compiled-in instrumentation and/or use dynamic
instrumentation tools. Whereas it is unlikely that vendors and end-users will agree on every
observation point, access to the source and/or runtime instrumentation tools allow parties
the flexibility to obtain the data they are interested in from the system being studied.
Managing the costs of running the benchmark. Running a 7U evaluation may incur a
number of costs, which may be expressed in terms of time, money and/or effort concerned
with: setting up or configuring the infrastructure used in the evaluations, e.g., obtaining
physical and/or virtual machines to create evaluation testbeds, installing and configuring
target systems and their dependencies, identifying (obtaining) or developing fault-injection
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tools and workload generators. Virtualization technologies, e.g., VMWare [83], Xen [183],
Kernel-based Virtual Machines [80], Solaris Zones [155], etc.) can be used to create
evaluation testbeds, specialized testing/staging environments, e.g., StackSafe’s Test Center
[81]1, VMWare ESX [85], etc., can be used to clone existing physical or virtual machines
and import them into the testbed. Fault-injection tools and workload generators may need
to be developed; some may be provided by vendors, e.g., bofi [135] while others may be
open-source, e.g., TPC-W [119].
Limitations. With respect to evaluating the RAS capabilities of a system, difficulties in
coercing the system into specific failure modes and reproducing specific failure scenarios or
classes of failures represent the major limitation of our RAS-benchmarking approach. Our
evaluation approach is based on a combination of modeling and measurement, where both
elements rely on re-creating specific failures in systems. If the failures under consideration
are reproducible, e.g., by using specific fault-injection tools, generating specific workloads
or capturing and replaying requests/events, then they can more readily be packaged into
scenarios and distributed with an RAS benchmarking suite. However, failures that are
difficult to reproduce or induce are hard to include in the set of failure-scenarios distributed
in such a suite. The distinction between reproducible failures and hard-to-reproduce failures
is analogous to the distinction between repeatable bugs (Bohrbugs) and non-repeatable bugs
(Heisenbugs) [60]2.
6.4 Future Work
The work in this thesis has been focused on developing an approach to benchmarking
reliability, availability and serviceability. As a result there are a number of interesting
1See §A for details on our experience using the Test Center.
2We do not claim that the failures to be studied as part of an RAS benchmark are necessarily manifestations
of software defects. This perspective on failures is illustrated in our definition of failures presented in §3.1.
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possibilities for future work.
6.4.1 Immediate Future Applications
Near-term research directions based off the work done in this thesis include:
Selecting fault-injection targets. Improving the selection of fault-injection targets in in-
ternet applications and cost-estimates of failure impacts using path-based request-tracing
[30]. In our current work injecting failures into web-application stacks and their compo-
nents, we considered each failure/failed request to have equal consequences. However, in an
E-commerce web-application, like the TPC-W online book store, some failed requests are
more costly than others. For example, failed operations on shopping carts or failed payment
processing activities can be more costly than failed item-search operations, and as a result
evaluators may want to focus on failures that affect “high-value” requests and re-produce
these failures in benchmark runs. To classify/identify high-value requests we need to trace
client-interactions from the initial contact with the web-application through to a specific
target operation, e.g., client-interactions that lead to a payment submission.
Employing a path-based tracing toolkit like X-Trace [51] is one possible option. X-Trace
is a network diagnostic tool designed to provide users and network operators with better
visibility into Internet applications. It annotates network requests with metadata that can
be used to reconstruct requests (including requests that make use of multiple network
layers). Request-reconstruction is facilitated by X-Trace identifiers used to record the path
requests take through a network. Currently components are X-Trace-enabled via source-code
augmentations (Java and C++ applications are supported [154]); however, we envision using
the runtime adaptation techniques developed in this thesis to dynamically inject X-Trace
support into applications/components.
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Evaluating other web-application deployments. Applying our RAS evaluation approach
to more sophisticated web-applications, which mirror enterprise web-application deploy-
ments, e.g., J2EE web-applications or .NET web-applications using component services.
Component services include: transaction management (Java Transaction API/JTA, COM+
transactions), messaging (Java Message Service/JMS, COM+ queued components), object
pooling, remoting services (Java Remote Method Invocation/RMI, .NET Remoting) and
directory services (Java Naming and Directory Interface/JNDI, COM+ catalog). These ser-
vices represent key elements that are intended to improve the web-application’s performance
and reliability.
The TPC-Wweb-application used in our evaluation experiments does not use any component
services, however, applying our evaluation approach to the SPECjAppServer2004 [176]
would allow us to interact with a J2EE web-application. SPECjAppServer is a multi-
tier benchmark for measuring the performance of J2EE application servers that exercises
all major J2EE technologies implemented by compliant application servers including:
transaction management, messaging services and object pooling.
Workload generator tools and strategies. Using different workload generator tools and
strategies to study system behavior. Workload generators fall into two major classes: those
that use a closed system model and those that use an open system model. In a closed
system model, new job arrivals are only triggered by job completions (followed by think
time), whereas in an open model new jobs arrive independently of job-completions [164].
The TPC-W workload generator (RBE client emulator) used in our evaluation experiments
follows a closed system model. [164] shows that closed and open system models yield
significantly different results when both models are run with the same load and service
demands. Further, they posit that many applications exhibit behavior that is “in-between”
the extremes of closed and open system models – described as partly open system models.
An important part of RAS evaluations involves quantifying the impacts of failures and
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the impacts of remediations under typical operating conditions. As a result using flexible
workload generators will allow evaluators to create environments that are closer to normal
operating conditions, which will facilitate a better understanding of typical system behavior
and the behavior of the system when subjected to faults/failures. Further, whereas workloads
may be viewed as activities conducted while faults are injected, they may also be crafted to
induce failures in systems. Advances in problem diagnoses, e.g., use of statistical machine
learning [35, 28, 29] may identify a vector of attributes that reasonably predict the failure of
a system (e.g., specific fluctuations of system resources). Designing fault-injection tools that
are capable of re-creating all of necessary conditions (reproducing the failure vector) may
be challenging; however, specific workloads or workload variations, e.g., targeted surges,
may be used to reproduce the necessary conditions for system failure.
Evaluating classes of systems other than web-applications. Modeling and injecting
failures in other classes of systems besides web-applications, e.g., multimedia stream-
ing/delivery platforms and studying their responses (or lack thereof). Recent work [38]
looks at studying the effects of failures and repairs in a peer-to-peer video delivery network
(GolP2P) using Markov chains. Failures are described as the loss of peer-nodes transmitting
video (and the subsequent depletion of play buffers), while repairs/reconfigurations occur
when receiving nodes identify suitable replacements for lost transmitter-nodes before user
experience suffers. In [38] the authors devise quality of experience metrics (QoE) for the
video and audio streams received, which are a function of the loss rates, delays, reliability,
availability, etc. of transmitting peers.
Flexible work generation strategies and tools, models of failure scenarios, fault-injection/failure-
inducing tools and RAS metrics can be used to evaluate the RAS properties of stream-
ing/delivery platforms.
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6.4.2 Future Directions
Longer-term research directions based off the work done in this thesis include:
Programming language and execution environment support for runtime modification
of applications. As discussed in this thesis a number of contemporary execution environ-
ments provide facilities that can be used to dynamically modify running systems, however,
there are few guarantees of the safety of runtime changes. The ability to manipulate pro-
grams in execution is a powerful yet risky facility. However, stakeholders will be wary
of using runtime adaptation facilities in production systems without stronger guarantees
on their safety. The form and the degree to which we can express and codify such guar-
antees is still an open question, but the increasing sophistication of system-construction
tools (high-level languages, modeling tools, integrated development environments/IDEs3,
etc.) and application execution environments (managed execution environments, e.g., the
JVM and CLR and unmanaged execution environments, e.g., operating systems, processors,
Xen, VMWare, hypervisors etc.) may provide insights into additional support for realizing
adaptive systems and the development of runtime adaptation toolkits.
Developing runtime fault-injection/failure-inducing tools for systems. Injecting faults
and inducing failures in systems are important activities in evaluating system reliability,
availability and serviceability, and the development of fault-injection tools and fault-load
generators is currently an open area of research. Tools that inject faults and induce failures
in systems can be used to study how systems fail and benchmark system responses. Sys-
tem administrators/operators can use these tools to develop pre-canned failure-scenarios
(workloads and fault-loads) to benchmark their systems. Further, they can also be used to
train system operators, familiarizing them with system failure-modes and/or the (manual or
3Contemporary development environments already make use of runtime code updates during debugging,
e.g., Hot Code Replacement (HCR) in Eclipse [54] and Edit-and-Continue in Visual Studio .Net 2005 [36].
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automated) mechanisms available to mitigate or address these failures.
Familiarizing operators with system failure-modes and the mechanisms available to address
failures is an important tool in combating automation irony [153] and has implications for the
development of self-managing/autonomous systems. As systems become more autonomous,
they assume more responsibility over their management activities – configuration, healing,
optimization and protection. Whereas this allows operators to focus on other tasks, reduced
contact with the (autonomous) system limits the amount of hands-on control experience
they get and inhibits their ability to construct mental models and rules of system operation
used for resolving problems. In essence, system automation may potentially make system
administration harder, e.g., resulting in cases where automation takes care of the majority of
management tasks, leaving administrators to deal only with the exceptional states that occur
when automation fails and/or complex management tasks. Restoring system operation from
these exceptional states may require detailed knowledge of the system’s operation and the
operation of the automated mechanisms the system employed unsuccessfully.
As a result, the development of these runtime fault-injection tools can be used to increase
operator-confidence in the system’s failure handling mechanisms while allowing them an
opportunity to get hands on control experience with the system in different failure modes.
Facilities for familiarizing operators with the system’s failure-modes and failure handling
capabilities can be enhanced by mechanisms that provide a degree of transparency into the
activities of the system, e.g., providing descriptions and/or justifications for system (failure
and recovery) actions [180].
Creating specialized testing environments for conducting RAS evaluations. Whereas
we can create tools that are able to interact with systems “in-situ” and “in-vivo” to make
modifications and/or inject faults, enterprises are likely to be wary of allowing runtime
fault-injection experiments on production systems (stronger safety guarantees for runtime
modifications and high confidence in remediation mechanisms may reduce, but not eliminate
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their concerns). As a result, RAS evaluations may occur in testing/staging environments.
Testing/staging environments require infrastructure and management, e.g., sourcing, in-
stalling, configuring and maintaining multiple machines (including keeping production
systems and staging systems in sync). The use of virtualization technologies may reduce the
physical hardware resources needed; however, they do not eliminate the management over-
head concerned with installing, configuring and updating these copies of production systems.
Tools that support the cloning/import of production systems into virtualized containers,
where they can be organized into application stacks, may reduce some of the management
overheads concerned with setting up the infrastructure needed to perform RAS evaluations.
The inclusion of RAS benchmarking tools in these virtualized staging environments may be
a reasonable compromise between the need to evaluate production systems and the desire to
evaluate the reliability, availability and serviceability capabilities of systems. Examples of
such virtualized staging environments include the StackSafe Test Center [81] and VMWare’s
ESX [85]4.
Inducing failures via security vulnerabilities, e.g., system corruptions, crashes, denial
of service (DoS) attacks, worm outbreaks/ propagation, etc. Tools that exploit security
vulnerabilities in controlled ways, e.g., those provided by the OpenWeb Application Security
Project (OWASP) [55], may be used in RAS evaluations of systems where the fault-model
of interest is focused on specific attack vectors. The objectives of the RAS evaluations
may include: threat-modeling, penetration testing, understanding how applications and
systems are affected by exploiting specific security vulnerabilities, designing or validating
threat/attack responses and/or hardening systems against specific attack vectors.
4Using VMWare Converter [84] to convert physical machines into virtual machines.
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6.5 Conclusion
In this thesis, we develop a measurement-based and model-based evaluation methodology for
evaluating the reliability, availability and serviceability properties of systems. In developing
our RAS evaluation methodology we:
• Develop a generalized approach to effecting runtime adaptations in applications hosted
in managed and unmanaged execution environments.
• Implement runtime fault-injection tools capable of in-situ and in-vivo interactions
with systems.
• Identify analytical tools that can be used to quantify multiple facets of reliability,
availability and serviceability. These analytical tools are used to construct RAS
models, which describe failure scenarios and score system responses to these failure
scenarios.
• Combine runtime fault-injection experiments with RAS models to demonstrate the
evaluation process.
As the future work above demonstrates, this thesis enables the beginning of new research
areas, especially in the areas of realizing systems capable of runtime adaptations and
improving fault-injection tools and environments used for RAS evaluations. Further, this
thesis presents a framework for developing RAS benchmarks for systems that combines
practical tools with rigorous analytical techniques. Ultimately, we hope the work done here
bridges the gap between practical and analytical approaches for studying and understanding
the failure behavior of systems and reasoning about mechanisms that improve the reliability,
availability and serviceability of current and next-generation (self-managing) systems.
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Appendix A
Experience with StackSafe’s Test Center
The StackSafe Test Center is a pre-production staging, testing and analysis platform targeted
at IT Operations teams [81]. The Test Center establishes a virtualized sandbox (see Figure
A.1) in which end users (IT Operations staff) can test and analyze systems in a representative
production environment. Included in the Test Center are tools that allow end-users to create
copies of the production servers that make up a software infrastructure stack. System images
can be imported from physical and/or virtual machines; further, the Test Center’s use of
virtualization allows imported images to be networked into a working software infrastructure
stack, which mirrors a production configuration.
The Test Center is intended to support testing activities that cover a number of areas
including, but not limited to: application assembly and validation, performance tuning,
security/risk assessments, patch testing, continuity and disaster recovery (playing what-
if scenarios with production), diagnostics and root cause analysis, and reliability testing
[81]. In this chapter we familiarize ourselves with the Test Center, using it as a testbed
environment for conducting RAS evaluations. We re-create the VM-Rejuv deployment
used in §5.5 (the load-balanced TPC-W web-application stack), discuss the Test Center
configuration used, measure the failure-free performance of the system and re-run our
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Figure A.1: StackSafe Test Center – source Improve Business Uptime and Resiliency
through a New Model for Software Infrastructure Testing by IT Operations [81]
fault-injection experiments inside the Test Center.
A.1 Experimental Setup
Our experimental platform uses a Test Center configured with 8 GB RAM, 512 MB swap,
4 Intel Xeon E5345 Dual Core 64-bit 2.33 GHz CPUs and a 1.5 TB disk array running
StackSafeTM Test Center release 5 on a Linux 2.6.18 SMP kernel. Test Center release 5 uses
Xen v3.1.0 [183] to provide virtualization services. Outbound network access is enabled in
the Test Center to allow imported machines (guest hosts) to connect to resources on the same
network as the Test Center, e.g., database servers, Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
(LDAP) servers, etc. Enabling outbound network access is also a prerequisite for allowing
inbound connections to individual guest hosts, i.e., assigning an externally visible static IP
address to a guest host.
Our original VM-Rejuv deployment (§5.5) consists of three VMWare GSX virtual machines:
VM1, the Linux Virtual Server (LVS) load-balancer (IPVS v1.2.1 and ipvsadm v1.24) and
database server (MySQL 5.0.27), and VMs 2 and 3, the Apache Tomcat web/application
servers (Apache Tomcat v5.5.20) hosting the TPC-W web-application classes. All three
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VMs run Centos 5.0 on Linux 2.6.18-8.el5 (see [82] for a list of operating systems that can
be imported into the Test Center as guest hosts).
Using the Test Center’s Import CD we boot these three VMs from the import CD and clone
them into the Test Center 1. We enable outbound connections on each VM and we assign
a static IP address to the imported VM1 guest host and enable inbound connections to it
so that the TPC-W workload generator (remote browser emulators/RBEs) can access the
TPC-W web-application from IP addresses external to the Test Center. We assemble VMs 1,
2 and 3 into an Infrastructure Stack inside the Test Center, which allows us to treat these
three VMs as a single logical unit, e.g, issuing start/stop commands or running tests and
reports against all components.
Since the Test Center is configured with 8GB of RAM, each imported VM is allocated 1 GB
of RAM, instead of the 512 MB, 384 MB and 384 MB allocations used in §5.5 for VMs 1,
2 and 3 respectively 2. The LVS load-balancer in the VM1 guest host is configured to direct
web-requests to the VM2 and VM3 guest hosts using LVS-NAT3 as before and we test the
failure-free operation of the TPC-W web-application deployed under VM-Rejuv inside the
Test Center.
We simulate a load of 50 TPC-W clients using the Shopping Mix as their web-interaction
strategy.
During ten failure free runs each lasting 22 minutes the average number of client-side
interactions recorded is 9315.9 ± 120.6. Figures A.2 and A.3 show a 16 minute sample of
the throughput and response time data reported by VM probes during one of our failure-free
runs. The average throughput is ∼6 requests per second and the average response time is
∼27 ms.
1The import of each 8 GB VM harddisk takes ∼20 mins to complete on our network.
2The current release of the Test Center limits the RAM allocated to each imported guest host to 2GB.
3The Test Center uses the 10.216.71.x and 172.30.8.x networks internally to provide IP addresses for guest
hosts. In our experiments we also assigned 192.168.1.x IP addresses to the guest host network interfaces using
OS-level configuration files.
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Figure A.2: Test Center: VM-Rejuv baseline
throughput sample
Figure A.3: Test Center: VM-Rejuv baseline
response time sample
Setting VM-Rejuv’s response time violation threshold at the mean response time (27 ms)
and re-running the workload of 50 clients we observe an average of 2 rejuvenation actions
per run over 10 runs. The mean failover time is 86 ms and the average pre-rejuvenation
delay window size is 19,778 msecs.
In our fault-injection experiments we subject both Tomcat application servers deployed under
VM-Rejuv to memory leaks that result in resource exhaustion within 11.1 minutes (666.271
seconds) of running the 50 client TPC-W workload. We set VM-Rejuv’s response time
violation threshold to the mean response time of the failure free runs (27 ms) and measure the
frequency of rejuvenations, the VM failover time and the size of the pre-rejuvenation delay
window. Over five fault-injection runs, each lasting 22 minutes, we record an average of 5
rejuvenations per run (mean rejuvenation interval of 256.69 seconds) with mean switchover
time of 68 ms and mean pre-rejuvenation delay window size of 30,202 ms (Table A.1).
Using a mean rejuvenation interval of 256.69 seconds, mean rejuvenation window size
of 30,202.37 msecs and a mean failover time of 68.10 msecs we score this VM-Rejuv
deployment using the RAS model in Figure 5.13 (see Table 5.7 for parameter descriptions).
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Run # Rejuvenation Rejuvenation Failover time Pre-rejuvenation
actions interval (secs) (msecs) delay window (msecs)
1 5 257.85 64.60 36,090.60
2 5 263.11 64.40 24,775.60
3 4 242.92 140.50 38,625.25
4 5 238.78 27.40 21,859.20
5 5 280.78 43.60 29,661.20
Avg 4.8 256.69 68.10 30,202.37
Table A.1: Test Center: VM-Rejuv subjected to memory leaks
The mean time to restart Tomcat during the memory leak experiments is 2 seconds and the
mean time to detect a server outage (via the ldirectord watchdog) is 5 seconds.
The steady-state probabilities of the VM-Rejuv model are shown in Table A.2 and model








Table A.2: Test Center: VM-Rejuv steady state probabilities – memleak scenario
Using the scoring model we can estimate the number of active VM failures expected during
rejuvenation actions per day, i.e., the frequency of transitions from S 1 to S 5 (FS 1→S 5) plus
the frequency of transitions from S 2 to S 5 (FS 2→S 5). This we estimate at 14 per day under
the failure conditions used in our experiments (1 memory-leak failure every 11.1 minutes).
From the steady-state probabilities of the model we estimate that the deployment spends
∼88% of the time in its normal operating mode/configuration, pi0, and ∼11% of its time
rejuvenating (pi1 + pi2). While rejuvenations are taking place client-requests are serviced by
the standby VM; as a result the system would be considered UP from the client’s perspective
in states {S 0, S 1, S 2} – UP 1428.7 minutes per day (99.21%) and DOWN 11.3 minutes per
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day (0.79%). Administrators on the other hand may consider the system to be UP if it is in
state S 0 since states S 1 and S 2 represent a window of vulnerability. From the administrator’s
perspective the system is UP 1271.8 minutes per day (88.32%) and DOWN 168.2 minutes
per day (11.68%), of which 157 minutes are spent performing rejuvenation actions.
Measure Metrics Results
Reliability
Frequency of active VM failures during 14.127668
rejuvenation per day FS 1→S 5 + FS 2→S 5
Availability
Basic steady-state availability (UPadmin = {S 0}) 0.883192
Tolerance availability (UPclient = {S 0, S 1, S 2}) 0.992137
Serviceability
Mean-time to system restoration (UPadmin = {S 0}) 24,507 msecs
Mean-time to system restoration(UPclient = {S 0, S 1, S 2}) 5,280 msecs
Table A.3: Test Center: Summary of VM-Rejuv RAS model analysis results
A.2 Summary
In this chapter we use StackSafe’s Test Center as a platform/environment for conducting RAS
evaluations. We import and configure a load-balanced TPC-W web-application (deployed
under VM-Rejuv[173]) in the Test Center to use as our target system. The guest hosts used
for the load-balancer, and the two application server components are imported from the
VMWare GSX virtual machines created for the experiments in §5.5.
In preparing for our fault-injection experiments we rely on the Test Center’s ability to
clone/import existing production systems and assemble them into infrastructure stacks.
Further, we use Test Center’s support for incoming and outgoing network connections
(between guest hosts and resources on the same network as the Test Center, e.g., load
generators, database servers or directory services) to create a testing environment that
closely mirrors the production environment. Our cloned environment differs from the
environment in §5.5 only in the amount of resources (RAM) assigned to the virtual machines
– we were able to allocate more memory to the VMs imported into the Test Center since it is
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configured with 8 GB of RAM in contrast to the 2 GB of RAM installed on the physical
machine hosting the three VM-Rejuv virtual machines in §5.5.
We combine our runtime fault-injection tools and RAS models with the testing environ-
ment/infrastructure provided by the Test Center (physical/virtual machine cloning, the
virtualization of systems and networks, support for network connections between imported
guest hosts and external resources) to demonstrate a practical approach to performing RAS
evaluations, where the requirement that RAS evaluations be carried out on production sys-
tems may be satisfied via sophisticated testing/staging tools capable of replicating portions
of production environments. Further, runtime instrumentation tools, runtime fault-injection
tools and RAS modeling tools/environments (probe placement, failure-scenario design
interfaces, etc.) can be included in the set of tools/services provided by virtualized staging
environments for integrated reliability, availability and serviceability testing and evaluation.
Finally, the ability to integrate supporting tools/services for RAS evaluations (e.g., runtime
fault-injection tools, RAS modeling environments, etc.) directly into a virtualized test-
ing/staging environment like the Test Center represent an opportunity to reduce the number
of disparate stand-alone tools/interfaces that evaluators need to content with when preparing
to conduct a set of RAS evaluations.
